FRANCE AND THE ALGERIAN PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000500030021-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: June 20, 1957
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 35-57
SUBJECT: France and the Algerian Problee
20 June 1957
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GpsoioriNT NO. ....*1.......-^0...*????......00.01.110...???74
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. it
At DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE.
ADALtuTtit; R 10-2rtEvieelem 410 cow
1, The effects of the Algerian conflict on France's political
and economic position and its relatiana with Africa have assumed
critical proportions during 1957. The Algerian issue in varying degrees
has greatly affected France's current financial crisis, the fall of the
Monet governmentl the imbroglio with Tunisia, and the entire range of
French foreign policiee. An outburst of terrorism and rioting in
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Algiers preceded the Botabges-Maunoury government's entry into office
earlier this month. In these circumstances, two questions appear to
require special consideration: (a) whether any real change in France's
Algerian policy is likely this summers, and (b) whether the French
administration in Algeria, if not the Fourth Republica is likely to be
drastically altered during this p3riod as a consequence. Our present
answer to both questions is in the negative?
This memorandum which has been discussed with CCI, is an interim
assessment pending a new NIE on France (inchuding Algeria) now
scheduled for 1 August production.
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2. The Situation in Algadja0 Whereas it was possible last summer
to envisage the development of a more liberal French policy toward
Algeria, the impact of the Suez intervention on France dictated a
different courso of event s? Beginning with the arrival of General Massu
mmd his paratroopers in Januarys a renewed emphasis was placed on the
repressive rather than the reforming aspects of Minister Resident Lacostees
"pacification" policy for Algeria. It is true that Lacoste perservered
with his adminintrative and other reforms -- most of which have been
embodied in apecial legislation -- but the relative failure of these
plans has been widely recognized for months. Moreover, the need to give
French army officer? administrative functions which otherwise could not
have been fulfilled has tended to entrench the army in control of Algeria.
During the same periods Mallet was being forced away from the original
conditions of his January "cease-fire" offers and toward adamant support
for Lacoste. These trends have resulted in increasing power for the
French ailpys, the rode.
tion of French informal contacts with the rebel
FLN (National Front) leaderss and a widening gulf between the European
and Moslem communities.
30 On its side, the FLN has apparently made aubstantial. gains in
over-all strengths although the numbers of its "Liberation Armr (ALN)
Lave remained roughly constant at about 20-259000 over the paat year.
There are reports of confusion and jealousy saong the FLN-ALN member
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rivalry between them and the older UNA (Algerian National Movement,
whose limited strmulai consists mainly of North Africans in Frame.), and
tribal feuding in remote areas. The nationalist uovecent as a whole
nevertheleas seem to maintain its high morale. It is receivinG ample
materiel an moral support from other Arab areas, it has at least the
tacit support of the majority of Algerians Ivao are being alienated by
French securi* measures -- and its increasiagly heavy casualties appear
to be reAmmxisithout much difficulty. The FLN continues to insist as
embalm upon French recognition of the principle of Algerian independence,
and it has rejected both the cease?fire offer and Tunisian Premier Bourguibags
suggestions for a test of French intentions.
It. The fall of the Monet government an 21 May stimulated the FLN to
fresh terrorist activity, largely designed to attract international attem-
tion and to impress both the Algerian populace and the next French cabinet
with the failure of pacification and the need for an accommodation with the
nationalist movement. This remains the most likely explanation of the
massacre near *Ulna at the end of May, although tribal feuds may have played
an important role. The several explosions in Algiers early this month were
clearer cases of nationalist terrorism, and provoked a significant reaction
in the colon rioting 4nost3,y by students and veterans) of 11 Jane, which to
some extent played into FLN hands. The return of an uneasy calm to the
capital has been accompanied by a growing colon realization of the futility
of the outburst; the influence of more moderate European leaders in Algiers
appears to have at least temporarily increased.
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50 Concern over these events in Algeria, as well as riots and
assassinations in France itself, has been reflected in changed French
tactics, but not in Frew% policy. The present government in some rril
has talons firmer position than its predecessor on quelling the rebel-
lion. The conflict has gained a new intensity and dimension; the French
have announced a large-scale air operation against rebel bands near
Philippeville, and recent troop clashes have involved larger numbers
and caeualties. Moreover, the French command apparently has decided
that protection cannot be afforded all areas at once, and that some
will have to be left unguarded in order to concentrate on pacifying
certain regions. This will almost certainly result in more stringent
French measures in such regions and increased rebel activities in the
unprotected areas. The FLU will probably do its utmost to discomfit
France prior to the UN General Assembly session early this fall. Con.
tinued and heightened violende thus seems in store for Algeria over
the next few months*
6. .11#2.1aonmaltigcluff2Eftsgbjcata. In this situation,
pressure for a new French policy in Algeria is mounting and a willing.
mess to discuss the problem objectively is becoming more pregnant. An
element of the French press has been discuss the Algerian problem
over the last several months in terms other than solely a passionate
defense of current poli . This is apart from the emotional
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to Servan-Schrieberts lama attaek on French "pacifloationn tactios0
Moreover, a number of politiolans #s well as political commentators are
privately conceding the eventual French loss of Algeria? Muller but
unexpressed fears are beginning to affect a segment of the public?
70 The bulk of the preseures for a change are concerned with
the oversell French position viass Africa? Beading the list are
the considerations arming fram the much-publicized oil discoveries
and
in the Sahara? TO refloat their importance,Aconomie organization to
exploit the many Saharan natural resources was set up some months ago
by the French, and the present French cabinet inoludes a new Minister
for the Sahara, There is a growing realization that ,the present Algerian
strife is incompatible with plans to extract the oil, and to build and
maintain pipelines, Bence there are indications of a changing attitude
toward the Algerian rebellion not only among business interests both in
France and Algeria, but alsoiwithilikagat political ciroles in the
metropole -- although the latter development is still highly tenuous?
8, But the Sahara and its resources are not confined to Algeria;
Frene West and Equatorial Africa and Morocco are alai) involved in these
economic considerations. Behind the French anwitiort and current appli-
cation of the leiARe to the Troploal Afrioan territories lies the
belief that such aotion Is vitally needed to prevent the spread of the
Algerian infection and to insure future Frenah aooess to Saharan resources?
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Moreover:, the French risked causing the breakdown of negotiations for
the European common market in Order to obtain assistance in developtug
Africaoo resources. While France thus has a strong interest in
the peaceful development of areae bordering Algerian those areas
themselves have no less a stake in avoiding hostilities and obtaining
French financial aid. Both Premier Bourguiba and the Sultan of Morocco
have attempted to mediate between the Algerian rebels and the French,
and they are likely to inorease their efforts to bring about an Algerian
settlement. A further attempt at mediation ee by Frances partners in
the Coal and Steel Community nay be developing this fall in comm
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tion with plans to associate Morocco and Tunisia with the common market
project?
9. 'Another salient aspect of the pressures for a changed French
policy toward Algeria is the cost of reeressing the rebellion -e well
over one billion dollars a year. While a substantial portion of this
sum would not be "found money" in the event of an Algerian settlemente
the continued conflict contributes greatly to the French inflationary
problem ee specifically the billfor imports. The French Assembly has
shown a not unprecedented reluctance to pay for the consequences of
policies it supports. Thus the
who have been the staunchest
advocates of a firm stand in Algeria, overthrew AbIlet when he nth-
mitted the bills although they had the excuse of having opposed his
social expenditures. The present government is in the process of sub,.
mitting an even larger bill, but one designed to bear less heavily on
the business comeunity.
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10. In this connection, the proportions of the French Socialist
Party's dilemma over Algeria are likely to expand. A snail but growing
minority of the SFIO &puttee has been opposed to the Algerian policy
espoused by its chief. This opposition was muffled while Monet was
premier and continues to be inhibited by the presence of SFIO ministers
in the present cabinet, but the collective Socialist conscience is
likely to be increasingly pricked by developments in Algeria, The
financial policies of the Bowies governmentp especially if it shows
undue concern for business seneitivities, probably will make it easier
for the Socialist conscience to operate. Reversal of French trade
liberalization within ?EEC is already causing much concern, particularly
with regard to prospects for ratification of the common market project.
Its Socialist position with respect to the present governments over-all
policies may be subjected to considerable criticiem at the SFIO national
congress later this month.
11. Agl_Sme for thgAtAIMIL2te, The above pressures for a changed
Algrial policy for the most partmey still be too inchoate and too
logically, rather than emotionally? based to have =incisive effect in
the near future. The French government, political parties, and public
to a considerable extent remain prisoners of the intense nationalist
sentiment and propaganda which were evoked by the Suez affair. Proponents
of any substantial change in the Algerian relationship with France are
liable to be charged with ?abandonment" of Algeria if not with betrayal
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of the army. The French army has to a large degree committed its
prestige in Algeria, and tide to regard its past traditions and future
position as being at stake. There is, in addition, the recurring theme
that any fundamental French policy shift would mean desertion of "one
million Frenchmen", a thesis which is not shaken by the fact that it is
doubtful whether even a majority of the colons originally derived from
metropolitan France.
12, In determining its policy, the French government must confront
the speetres of an army coup or a colon uprising, We believe that either
contingency is highly unlikely except in the event of an abrupt and
drastic change in French policy, which is equally improbable at present,
The colons are not wholly of one mind with respect to rigid insistence on
the present policy. Their influence has declined somewhA as a result of
their inability to prevent some of the Lacoste refOrms, and they are un.
likely to attempt rebellion or concerted and sustained violence to pressure
the goverawantvd.thout the support or at least the sympathy of the army,
The latter generally stood by during the recent riots and gave only
minimal protection to the Moslems; it might take the same attitude toward
further similar incidents involving the colons, However, army support
for more extreme colon actiorkprobably would entail a readiness to under?
take a military coup, There is considerable dissatisfaction among regular
army officers in Algeria regarding past French policies, but there is
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little evidence that they are thinking in terms of a coup. There are
even fewer indications of any serious planning for a coup in France
itself. While the usual speculation about de Gaulle was prevalent
during the recent political "crisis", it is partisularly unlikely that
the general -- who had always insisted on a legal devolution of power --
would attempt to take the reins over the Algerian issue. Indeed, there
is reason to believe triatt his attitude toward Nort. Africa is not very
different from that Mendes-France.
13. The Short-l)rm OutloOk. Bourges-Naunoury, while declaring
his attachment to the Mollet-Lacoste policies, has stated his intention
to: (a) pursue "profound administrative reforms" with the eventual
objective of abolishing the goveonment-gemeral and replacing it with a
decentraliaed administration; and ()) propose a "loi cadre" for a new
Algerial political etructure, starting with local institutions and
proceeding upward by slow stages. These programs appear to promise little
beyond theplans a1r4ady launched by Lacoste without much effect, lare
probable eine qua lam for an Algerian.settlament is French negotiation
with the rebel leaders. No French governaert is likely to attempt,
official talks with the Algerians -during thee summer months except on
terms ahich would probably be unaccepthble .o the rebels. While it is
possible that the former unofficial contacts might be reestablished, the
Frena are unlikely in this period to make conceseions sufficient to bring
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?AMENS%
the nationalists to the conference table. Not only the preeiees
past performance and current predelictions, but his need for rightist
votes in the Assembly would preclude such concession
14. Thus it is unlikely that there will be any fundamental change
in French policy leading toward an Algerian settlement before next fall.
Since we estimate that Houraa has only a somewhat better than even
chance of retaining office until the AsseMbly summer recess* it is
possible that the above judgmente might be vitiated by his overthrow?
However, we believe that these judgments depend much more upon the nature
of the Assembly and French cpinion than on the character of the premier,
and that they mould remain valid during the next few months.
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