PRELIMINARY VIEWS ON COLUMBIA*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000500030025-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: June 5, 1957
• Content Type: MEMO

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
5 June 1957
L)OCUMENT NCI. _._..._.,.3 -5
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 31-57 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. C]
^ DECLASSIFIED ~
SUBJECT: Preliminary Views on Colombia CLASS. CHANGED TO: T s ,:J
NEXT REVIEW DATE: L24.0 ._ .. , .
t is n the hands of
1. Political power in Colombia presentl? res
a military junta, headed by the former War Minister, Major General
Gabriel Paris, and including four other military officers who hold
top posts under the Rojas regime. The junta has appointed, in col-
laboration with traditional political party leaders, a primarily
civilian cabinet equally divided between Liberals and Conservatives
who have not recently been prominent in politics. The junta suspend-
ed Rojast puppet National Constituent Assembly, reestablished press
freedom, and has begun to replace Rojast departmental governors. It
has publicly limited its tenure of office to 7 August 1958 and has
promised to hold free elections before that date. Although the junta
has obtained the pledged support of both the Liberal and Conservative
parties, the strong endorsement of the powerful Catholic Church, and
a substantial measure of popular support, it faces difficult political
and economic problems.
# This memorandum has been discussed with DD/P and OCI.
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2. Political problems. Its immediate problem is to maintain
stability. Although the junta has shown considerable skill in
solidifying its position, there is no assurance that the junta as
presently constituted can continue in power. The members of the
junta are all Conservatives; however,, they represent both moderate
and extreme rightist elements with the moderates currently in the
majority. It will probably be subjected to conflicting pressures
in its efforts to restore domestic tranquility and political liberty.
On the one hand, civilians will probably continr.o to press for prompt
action toward the restoration of representative government,, including
early elections, as well as reduction of excessive military expenditures.
On the other hand, some military elements w ill probably exert strong
pressures for retention of the privileges which they acquired under
the Rojas regime. Disagreements as a consequence of these pressures,
as well as over such perennial problems as appointments, might cause
significant disunity within the ruling group and lead to shakeups in
the junta.
3. Probably the greatest potential source of difficulty for the
regime is the possible development of disunity between and within the
Conservative and Liberal parties, only recently united by their common
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objective of ousting Rojas, The leaders of both parties,,* personally
convinced of the need for unity to insure restoration of constitutional
government and responsive to the appeal of the Church and the preference
of business interests for moderation, appear determined to maintain a
united front in their cooperation with the regime. However,, their
bi-partisan efforts will probably be severely strained by pressures from
local and other national party loaders intent on protecting party
interests and on obtaining positions of influence. The Liberals in
particular will probably press for withdrawal of Liberal support from
Conservative leader Guillermo Loon Valencia, who still sppears to be
the joint Conservative-Liberal presidential candidate,, 4W and for
separate Congressional slates. Moreover, factionalism within the
Conservative party, particularly if ox President Laureano Gomez returns,
might place further strains on bi-partisan unity. If the el-,ctoral
coalition is abandoned with the parties campaigning vigorously for their
own candidates and if party rivalry is accompanied by widespread
violence? the scheduled restoration of constitutional government
would be jeopardized.
Liberal leader Alberto Lleras Camargo and Conservative Guillermo
Leon Valencia
j Guillermo Leon Valencia, a moderate Conservative, was selected as
joint candidate prior to Rojas' ouster to demonstrate civilian
unity in opposition to Rojas' reelection.
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4. Although subversion has generally declined in recent years,
some increases in terrorist, guerrilla, and Communist activity might
Some extremist supporters of the former regime recently car-
ried out terrorist acts in the capital and in a few other cities.
Although presently active guerrillas appear to be primarily apolitical,
engaged essentially in banditry, and are principally localized in
one department, guerrilla activity might become more intense and
widespread in the event of a resumption of violent Conservative-
Liberal rivalry. There is little evidence of Communist control among
presently active guerrillas, and Communist capabilities for extensive
subversion are limited. With a view to the 1958 elections, Communists
may attempt to increase their activities in organized labor, but we
do not believe they will meet with much success. Should there be any
significant increase in subversion, the regime will probably take
firm action to reduce it.
5. The economic problem. The regime also faces economic problems,
primarily of a financila nature. Although the domestic economy remains
fairly healthy, Colombia's balance of payments situation is serious.
The former regime, in an effort to alleviate the prc.blem, undertook an
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austerity program including the restriction of imports and credit
controls. Through agreements with foreign banks it settled the majority
of its extensive arrears on foreign commercial obligations.* The
present regime has indicated it will honor these agreements, but in
order to do so it must maintain the austerity program. However, it
will be faced by increasing demands from industrial and commercial
interests to relax import controls, which have caused shortages resulting
in a slackening of industrial and commercial activity, and by pressures
from bankers to free credit controls. It is likely that the present
regime will maintain the austerity program, undertaking only minimal
measures, possibly including relaxation of some price controls, in an
attempt to appease the business community.
6. The regime's economic problems are further complicated by
a current budget deficit estimated at !l07 million and a shortage of
dollar and other exchange. The price of coffee, which provides about
# Estimated arrears settled as of end-March: US - 1$126 million;
West Germany - i$32 million; Ganada - 'i$11 million; UK - $9
million; Sweden - `''p6 million. Settlement terms: 60% cash and
140% in bonds bearing 4% interest and amortized over 30 months.
3HE Exchange reserves: April 1957 - about ?`1133 million
January 1955 - $257 million
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83% of Colombia's foreign exchange, is now at about the minimum
level on which the current budget was based. Coffee prices may
weaken somewhat over the next several months though not critically.
In an effort to alleviate its balance of payments situation, it
appears likely that the government, with the support of the business
community, will devalue the peso. It has maintained the former
regime-'s request for a 425 million loan from the IMF, and will
probably request additional financial assistance from the US and IBRD.
7. Prospects for transfer of power. The p:-es(-ant regime is
concerned with restoring; and preserving the prestige of the military.
It views itself as a provisional government entrusted with the
responsibility for turning over power to a freely elected government,,
and we believe that it presently intends to hold country-wide elections
during 1958. Pending such elections the regime will probably be
beset with problems resulting from conflicting civilian and military
pressures. The preparations for elections themselves, including
formal registration of all voters, will be difficult and time-
consuming, If Liberal and Conservative leaders are able to control
their extremist partisan membership, the chances are fairly good
that the regime will accomplish the transfer of power to an elected
government on schedule. On the other hand, if Liberal-Conservative
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rivalry as well as Conservative factionalism are carried to extremes,
the regime will probably postpone elections. In the latter event,
serious civil disturbances would probably eventually force the
military to turn over power to a civilian government. In any event,
sooner or later, Conservative-Liberal political rivalry will be
renewed in a struggle for power, and when this occurs, political
tension in Colombia will become the rule rather than the exception.
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