THE SITUATION IN BURMA* *

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000500030045-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: March 20, 1957
• Content Type: MEMO

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20 March 1957
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 14-57
SUBJECT. The Situation in Burma
1. The political situation in Burma is relatively calm and
stable at the present. Prime Minister U Nu has returned to office
with less freedom of action than he enjoyed before his resignation
and has promised to consult fully with the BSP faction of the AFPFL
before every major policy decision. The disagreement between U Nu
and Kyaw Nyein, which threatE ed the unity of the governing AFPFL
coalition, apparently has been patched up for the time beings The
Chinese-Burmese border situation is still unresolved, but the tension
the issue generated last fall has largely subsided,
2. There has been some slight modification in the government's
general policies and international orientation in the direction of a
stiffer attitude toward the Bloc and internal Communism, Before
U Nu returned to office, the government announced its decision to cut
rice shipments under the barter agreements with the Bloc to about one-
fourth of last year. This would reduce Burma's increasing economic
# This memorandum superkedes that of 18 March.
This memorandum has been discussed with DD/P and OCI,
COCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
DATE HR ~~ 70?2
DAM REVIEWER: k-01 11C
"
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dependence on the Bloc. As a counterpart to_this decision the govern-
ment is still negotiating, with some hope of success, for a resumption
of US foreign aid, U Nu has stated that the AFPFL will not negotiate
with the Communists in Burma. He has promised that the government
would moderate penalties for those Communists surrendering with their
arms and would legalize their political organizations.
3. The Communist insurgents have recently stepped up their
terrorist activities and staged a number of spectacular raids.
Probably the insurgents are using violence to remain in the public eye
and to increase pressure on the government to negotiate with them.
We do not believe the insurgents have the capability for a sustained
increase in guerrilla activity. Nevertheless, they are capable of
disrupting economic activity and administration in the countryside.
Over a period of time they may be able to inconvenionco the government
sufficiently to win concessions which would allow them to wage their
battle above ground and by political means.
L. Although the present situation is relatively stable, there
are a number of factors suggesting the possibility of trouble ahead.
Probably the most important of these is the strength of the National
United Front (NUF), a coalition dominated by Commi,;,~.st and pro--Communist
parties,, which made significant gains in the elections for the Chamber
of Deputies last April. The NUF gains were probably due primarily to
a growing public dissatisfaction with the AFPFL and the widespread
corruption among government officials. U Nu resigned as Prime Minister
last spring ostensibly to reorganize and clean up the AFPFL. It does
not appear likely that he has accomplished much along that line,
Unless there is some improvement in the standards of efficiency and
honesty in government and in the general level of economic welfare,
there is a danger that over a period of two or three years the AFPFL
may lose much of its popular support to the NUF. There is also a
danger that the AFPFL may accept into its ranks or into the cabinet
Communist dominated individuals or parties to achieve leftist unity.
5. Dissension within the Burmese army is increasing. This is
due primarily to tension between the old line career officers, many of
whom are Anglo Burma is or members of ethnic minority groups, and officers
sponsored by the Socialist party in its effort to gain control of the
army. In the April elections there was a considerable NUF vote in
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array units. Probably this was mostly a protest vote based on
dissatisfaction with government corruption and with government
political activities in the army. We do not believe there is serious
Communist infiltration of the army. However, if dissension within
the army continues, its limited capabilities may be impaired.
6. Over the past several years there has been a steadily
increasing infiltration of Chinese into Burma, many of them agents
carrying forged documents. There is no accurate count of these
illegal entrants but estimates run as high as 10,000. They have
fanned out over north and central Burma, settling down and opening
businesses in the towns and villages. Some have settled in Rangoon
where the Bank of China is reportedly advancing them money to buy up
real estate and rice mills, and to open businesses.. In addition,
Chinese diplomatic missions in Rangoon and Lashio have been effectively
reorganizing the overseas Chinese Communists. The Burmese
government has not been able to cope with this illegal immigration,
and even a satisfactory settlement of the border dispute will
prokably not end the problem.
25X1A9a
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