CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A000100120001-6
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 12, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 19, 1951
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A000100120001-6.pdf189.2 KB
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Approved For ReIft9e 2i)6 : IE 75A0( 0120001-6 25X1 Copy No. /,b 19 February 1951 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Working Paper!!! Dry Run Only fox NO CHANGE IN CLASS. .A S8 FIED (:?-L- NGED TO: TS S C -- N~".:!" DATE: AM "K. H: HR 70-2 DATE.k/.(i!l.. r1EVIEWER: 25X1 25X1 Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY State Department review completed TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100120001-6 25X1A Approved 25X1 Dutch official reports European reevaluation of Soviet intentions (page 1). YUGOSLAVIA 25X1 4. Tito desires to remain aloof from West (page 2). USSR 7. Commentary on Stalin's interview with a Pravda correspondent (page 4). 25X1A Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100120001-6 Approved 25X1A GENERAL 25X1A 25X1 that, except for the possibility of a Satellite attack against Yugoslavia, a direct attack against Western Europe is extremely unlikely within the near future. In their opinion, Soviet leaders are greatly concerned over the progress of NATO and the rise of national deviation tendencies in Western European Communist Parties and are, as a result, secretly pasting to the defensive. Although the urgency for a speedup of European defense is still generally recognized, I ointed out 25X1 that these circles feel a breathing space is more possible than is believed in the US. 25X1 chief advisers, reports that European higher civil and military circles are coming to believe Comment: is probably in a position 25X1 to judge the changing currents 1 uropean opinion, and his report may reflect the views of certain Dutch Socialists who believe in a defense program commensurate with Dutch recovery needs. While there have been reports from other sources reflecting lessened apprehension in European circles: regarding Soviet intentions, this is the first Dutch report of this nature. 25X1A 1. Dutch official reports European reevaluation of Soviet intentions : Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100120001-6 25X1A Approved ~ 25X1 YUGOSLAVIA . Tito desires to remain aloof from West- 25X1A In recent conversations with US Assistant Secretary of State Perkins, Tito pointed out that he would remain aloof from any bloc so that the Yugoslav people, in the event of a Cominform attackuld not blame their government for, provoking the action. To avoid a public debate regarding Yugoslav military supplies, Tito said he hoped to obtain them through commercial channels by means of long-term loans. He added, however, that if he became con- vinced that a Cominform attack was imminent, this caution might vanish. 25X1A Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100120001-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100120001-6 Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100120001-6 25X1A USSR 25X1A 7. Approve Commentary on Stalin's interview with a Pravda correspondent: The Stalin interview with a Pravda correspondent generally adheres closely to often repeated Communist propaganda themes. Its. emphasis on the "peace cam- paign" and its efforts to contrast the aggressive West with the peace- loving USSR may be timed to coihcide with the forthcoming East Berlin meeting of the World Peace Council. This organization has been repre- sented in.. Communist propaganda as much more representative of the people of the world than the UN. The denunciation of the UN as an or- ganization-acting for "American aggressors" may be intended to set a contrast with the expected moves for `d~eace" by the World Peace Council and to raise the prestige of that organization. The absence of any reference to those Middle and Far East countries which voted to brand Communist China an aggressor contrasts sharply with the 25X1A 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100120001-6 Appiovec designation of the North Atlantic Pact and Latin American countries as the "aggressive core" of the UN. In his prediction tat the Anglo- American forces in Korea would ultimately be defeated because' the unpopularity of the war among American and British. soi s?. 10W.. attempts to governments--a normal Communist technique that has lay d p e *AUT portant part e world "peace" campaign. Stalin's prediction may e likewise hav rested toward encouraging China in connection with the current c'lebration of the first anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty. The Soviet leader has made previous public state- ments regarding the inevitability of war and the possibility of peace- ful coexistence and cooperation between the capitalist and communist .worlds. In these statements, Stalin has implied that war was not in- evitable if the capitalist world would cooperate. The latest statement adds the point that while war is not inevitable, "at least not at the present time," it may become so unless &e people. o world ,.erhaps through the World Peace Council) take the cause of pea Into thei own hands Comment in Stalin's speech on the German question 'is significantly absent. Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100120001-6