CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000100370001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 21, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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21 March 1951
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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DOCUMENT NO.
ri0 CHANGE IN CLASS!
DECLASSIFIED
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AUTH: HR 7Q L2
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Office of .current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Dept., USAF reviews completed
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Possible Soviet diplomatic "feeler" regarding Korea (page 3).
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FAR EAST
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4. US B-29 encounters night attack (page 5).
5. Indonesian Prime Minister resigns (page 5).
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 GENERAL
1. Possible Soviet diplomatic "feeler" regarding Korea:
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According to the Israeli delegation
at the UN, at an Israeli reception on
14 March Soviet delegate Malik twice
took the initiative in raising the Korean question. Malik reportedly
asked an Israeli delegate for his views regarding the possibility of a
settlement of the Korean war and appeared to be interested in the en--
suing conversation, although no specific suggestions were made by
either participant. The Israeli delegation was struck by Malik's re-
peated references to the current Paris meeting of the Deputy Foreign
Ministers and thought Malik showed "great awareness" of the con-
nection between the Korean problem and the Paris conference
Comment: This is the only available
report of a Soviet "feeler" at the UN regarding Korea in recent
months. Since the Israelis were active during the January attempt
at mediation between the US and Communist China, the USSR may well
have approached the Israeli delegation in order to gain information
as to how firmly the UN is behind its Korean objectives. British UN
Delegate Jebb has suggested that Gromyko be approached in Pa-,-is
concerning a possible Korean settlement, but the US, British and
French deputies recently agreed that it was not advantageous to do
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4. US B-29 encounters night attack.-
A US medium bomber flying a night-
harassing mission over northwestern
Korea on 17 March was attacked by
from three to five enemy aircraft at
16,000 feet. The engagement began
northwest of Pyongyang at midnight,
craft displayed aggressiveness and flew at a high rate of speed.
with the enemy breaking contact ten minutes later just north of the
38th Parallel. The bomber's air crew reported that the enemy air-
Comment.- This is the first in-
stance of night interception of a UN aircraft. The tactics and speed
demonstrated by the attackers suggest that the enemy fliers involved
possessed an advanced degree of training and that jet aircraft were
employed. Enemy use of radar may have been involved, or this may
have been a chance interception by some kind of special night patrol.
The incident is another indication of a current step-up in enemy air
efforts.
5. Indonesian Prime Minister resigns.
On 20 March Prime Minister
Mohammed Natsir tendered his
resignation to President Sukarno.
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Comment: The fall of the Natsir
Cabinet presages the probable emergence of a coalition government
that will include representatives of Natsir's Masjumi Party and the
Indonesian National Party. The latter party is highly nationalistic
and has been increasingly supported by Communist oriented groups.
As a result of its influence, the government will probably move
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