CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000100390001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 24, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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24 March 1951
Copy No. -I
O = .A3SiFIED
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DOCUMENT NO. Y-At--
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
(. C'r:AANGED TO: TS S C
A-ill : 7 2
DATE. R. t r)iEVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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USAF review(s) completed.
State Dept review(s) completed.
TOP SECRET
as
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Approved
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Deputy Foreign Ministers' meeting approaches crucial stage (page 3).
2. Increase in Satellite military strength reported (page 3).
FAR EAST
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4. Bao Dal resigns himself to French domination (page 4).
NEAR EAST
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6. Egyptian Government concerned over Iranian developments (page 5).
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Approv
GENERAL
Deputy Foreign Ministers' meeting a roaches crucial stage-
During an informal discussion with the
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r
emphasiz ng e y
German demilitarization point as a separate agenda item. (He indicated
for the first time, however, that he might agree to including the latter
point as the second rather than the first agenda item.) The Western
delegates rejected the Soviet position regarding both of these items.
Gromyko asked repeated;whether the West would make any new proposals
and, although the Westerri delegates replied negatively, the British and
French delegates hinted at a possible new formula on the German demili-
tarization item. In US delegate Jessup's opinion, Gromyko has not yet
said his final word but is holding fast in the expectation of some Western
concessions
Western delegates on 22 March, Soviet Dele-
gate Gromyko plainly indicated that his present
instructions were definite on the necessity of
eduction, of armaments question and of including the
i th
2. Increase in Satellite military strength reported'.
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ence of the US Military Forces in Europe
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all available factors does not indicate any
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imminent hostilities on the part of the Soviet Union. The conferees agreed,
however, that continuing increases in the strength of the Satellite armies
for the first time, of jet aircraft in a Satellite air force
arance
h
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e appe
and t
(i.e. Poland) reveal that Satellite offensive capabilities are becoming a
significant factor in the East-West power alignment. They pointed to the
following significant increases in Soviet/Satellite military strength in
Europe- (a) an increase of 30,000 in Soviet Ground Forces in Germany
between February 1950 and March 1951; (b) an estimated increase in
Czech army strength from 116,000 to approximately. 160,000 during; he
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next two months', (c) the addition of a tank division to the Hungarian army;
and (d) the growth of the Rumanian army from 190x000 to 05,0000 The
conference noted that the reported arrival of 40 Soviet YAK45 jet fighters
in Poland marks the first appearance of Russian-made jets in any European
Satellite air force.
4. Bao Dai resigns himself to French domination,
In an interview with US Minister Heath, Bao
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Dai described General e Lattre as a cneces-
sary evil," whose mili ary leadership is
indispensable but whose authority will not
lead to a solution of French-Vietnamese problems. The Emperor believes
that it would be useless to press for Vietnamese control over Vietnam's
armed forces at this time and that De Lattre's conception of Bao Dai's
role is that of a I 'protectorship sovereign," on the order of the Sultan of
Morocco. Bao Dai observed that the arrangements being made for the
defection of as many as 15,000 Viet Minh troops in a body will probably
fail, because De Lattre is likely to insist that they surrender directly
to French authorities rather than to Bao Dai -- a condition that would
be unacceptable to the potential defectors. The Emperor states that he
must therefore "efface himself" and make no "compromising" public
appearances at this time.
Heath comments that, while Bao Dai is pro-
bably right in believing that he cannot successfully resist the tendency
of De Lattre's advisors to maintain Vietnam as a closed preserve of the
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French, the Emperor's decision to withdraw to his hill-station head-
quarters at Dalat is "too easily arrived at."
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6; Egyptian Government concerned over Iranian developmen$so
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p
th B 'tishiT company they and opposition leaders are
According to US Ambassador Caffery in Giro,
top political circles in Egypt are increasingly
concerned over developments in Iran. Caffery
orts that while government officials are
re
inclined to blame a ri
genuine alarmed at the possibility that the Moslem Brotherhood will re-
vive assassination type politics, which, under the guidance of the Commu-
nists, it would direct against Egyptian leaders, Caffery adds that Egyptian
political leaders do not know how to deal with this situation.
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 Approv
omment- Recent events in Iran will hardly
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to
lead to public violence in Egypt, Nevertheless, the expanding activities
of the Moslem Brotherhood during the past year, its increased dissatis-
faction with the government, and its long-term antipathy. against foreign
influence in Egypt furnish an adequate basis for concern that it night use
this opportunity to resume its terrorist activities.in Egypt.
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