CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000100450001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 31, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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TOP SECRET
31 March 1951
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Copy NO. C1. -I
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
AUTH? HR 7 - ID,
DATE~~!
CLASS. CHANCED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE: `____
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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State Dept review(s) completed. TOP SECRET
DIA review(s) completed.
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I DECLAS IFIED
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 r;G ed
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Soviet attitude toward Foreign Ministers' meeting (page 3)
2. US delegation's reactions to new Soviet CFM agenda proposals (page 3).
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4. US Embassy Moscow estimates Soviet reaction to Japanese treaty
draft (page 4).
FAR EAST
5. Lull in Indochina broken by"heavy" L 1et Minh attack in Tonkin (page 5)
EASTERN EUROPE
6. Yugoslavs opposed to any attempt to unseat Hoxha now (page 6).
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GENERAL
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Soviet titude toward Farei n Ministers' tet o
By way of pointing out, that major Western
concessions orris preparing a Foreign Min-
isters' agenda could only result in Soviet
advantage, US Embassy Moscow presents
possible alternative Soviet attitudes toward holding a Foreign Minis-
ter" meeting. The Embassy believes that the USSR still puts con?-
siderable store by CFM meetings, at least for disruptive tactics. It
is also possible that in the face of a firmly united Western opinion,
the USSR would desire a Ministers' meeting to compromise on the sub-
stance of some of the issues at stake, and thus attempt to diminish
the impetus of the Western defense drive. If this is the case, the Em-
bassy feels that Gromyko will, if necessary, accept a neutral agenda.
The Embassy points out that if. Gromyko will not yield, as Britain and
France fear, it would be evident that the USSR feels no real compulsion
at this time to contribute materially to any serious efforts to alleviate
European tensions and at most is interested in a Ministers' meeting
solely as a forum for propaganda.
2. US delegation's reactions to new Soviet CFM agenda proposal
Ambassador Jessup, in commenting on the
new Soviet proposals of 28 March for a
Foreign Ministers' agenda, expresses a
belief that-Moscow ordered this concession
to be made at least partly in order to arrive at agreement within a
reasonable time. The chiefs. of the French and UK delegations clearly
consider the new Soviet proposals to be a basis for reaching rapid
agreement with the USSR on an agenda, and Jessup anticipated a "seri-
ous problem" in the tripartite meeting scheduled for 29 March. Jessup
regards the latest Soviet proposals as `tithe first formal and serious
break in the Russian position on anything of major importance," ,and
reports that it was not possible to prevent the Western press from pre-
senting the Soviet move as a concession.
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Comment. The new Soviet proposals
can be expected to strengthen public and official determination, in
both France and the UK, to press for a Foreign Ministers' conference.
The Soviet concessions indicate that the USSR may compromise fur-
ther if necessary for the sake of achieving a Foreign Ministers'
meeting.
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4. US Embassy Moscow estimates Soviet reaction to Japanese treaty
drafts
of the treaty on a multilateral basis, (b) to dissuade other countries,
US Embassy Moscow expects a sharp
Soviet reaction to the Japanese peace
treaty draft. The USSR's tactics would
be designed (a) to prevent the conclusion
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particularly in Asia, from signing the, treaty, and,(c) _to disi upt the op-
eration of the treaty. In addition, the USSR would attempt to portray
Japan as a US colony and a base for US aggression in Asia and also
to capitalize on Asian countries' fear of renewed Japanese imperialism.
China may be expected to advance the most violent opposition to the
treaty.
The Embassy anticipates that Soviet
opposition to the draft treaty is capable of limiting achievement of
US objectives in Asia, even though a number of states sign the treaty.
The USSR would consider that it had gained an advantage if, by its
opposition, several independent Asian states did not sign the treaty,
and if Communist denunciation of the treaty crystallized Asian dis-
trust of US motives and fear of Japan.
Comment- The USSR has already utilized
almost all political and propaganda means at its disposal for opposing
a "separate" Japanese peace treaty. However, if the USSR refuses
to sign the draft treaty, it will thereby gain a useful lever for exerting
pressure on the Japanese Government in the course of bilateral deal-
ings and later treaty negotiations -- since technically a state of war
between the USSR and Japan would still .exist. If Communist China
does not sign the draft, it will possess comparable advantages. It
is conceivable that India, in particular, might not be willing to sign
a treaty which was unacceptable to both the USSR and Communist China.
FAR EAST
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5. Lull in Indochina broken by "heavy" Viet Minh attack in Tonkin-
The US Military Attache in Hanoi states
that Viet Minh forces have begun a heavy
attack at Mao Khe, 30 kilometers north-
northwest of Haiphong. The -attack, which
began during the night and was resumed at daylight, had been in pro-
gress for eleven hours at the time of the Attache's report, The Viet
Minh push is directed against one of the weakest and most vital areas
of the French-defended delta perimeter.
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with its supply port of Haiphong. Reports indicate that the weather
in Tonkin continues extremely unfavorable for both air operations and
ground observation.
mountains lies close to the road and railroad which connect Hanoi
The Mao Khe area, hard
to defend because of its position at the foothills of Viet. Minh-held
EASTERN EUROPE
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Yugoslavs opposed to any attempt to unseat Hoxha now,
In a 29 March article in the Yugoslav news-
paper Borba, Vladimir Dedijer, secretary
of the Yugoslav Parliamentary Committee
on Foreign Affairs, expressed the fear that current internal strife in
Albania may furnish the USSR with an excuse for armed intervention
in the Balkans. According to Dedijer, a purge of individual leaders
in Albania has been followed by collective purges of party organizations,
which have resulted in an intensification of terror throughout the coun-
try. This situation is being exploited by certain elements in Greece
and by Albanian emigre groups in Italy, who are parachuting armed
men and droppifig propaganda leaflets into Albania. Dedijer pointed
out that Soviet propaganda has been accusing Yugoslavia of preparing
aggressive action against Albania. He added that the actions of the
emigres could provide the USSR with a pretext to intervene in "de-
fense of a small socialist country," and might be used as an excuse
to launch an attack on Yugoslavia.
Comment The Tito government has
consistently opposed any external intervention in Albania on the grounds
that the USSR might use such action as a pretext for armed aggression
against Yugoslavia. Another factor bearing on the Yugoslav attitude
may be an estimate of its inability to take advantage of unsettled con-
ditions pro-Tito regime in Albania.
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