CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000200030001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 21, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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21 April 1951
Copy No0 "
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Lk.
DOCUMEN I NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
l l DECLASS HLD
CLASS. CHANC._ D T0: __1--
NEXT REVIEW DA-l-L
DOS review(s) completed.
USAF review(s) completed.
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
USSR
L Pravda comments on MacArthur dismissal (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Jets reported in North Korean Air Force (page 3).
3. Popular dissatisfaction in China increasing (page 4),
NEAR EAST
4. British may misjudge conservative Iranian attitude on oil (page 4).
5. Iranians propose nationalization of Iranian-Soviet fisheries (page 5).
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EASTERN EUROPE
7. Anti-Soviet riot follows killings in Poland (page 6).
8. WFTU transfers its headquarters to Vienna (page 7).
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USSR
Pravda comments on MacArthur dismissal:
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the Korean war; (2) was needed to explain the
removal of an, important "symbol of US aggressive policy" to the Commu-
O andAs noteworthy in asking what steps the US intends to
nist world,
take for peat dul settlement of the conflict.
The US Embassy in Moscow comments that
the 18 April Pravda editorial on the MacArthur
dismissal (1) reiterates the Soviet position on
Comment: The Pravda editorial, which was
given prominent treatment, adds no new twists to the established line,
which has consistently supported the Chinese terms of settlement.
The week's delay in Pravda's comment was probably due to a desire
to" be sure that the dismissal represented no basic change in US policies.
The question of US intentions on peaceful settlement is rhetorical in
context and therefore is not intended to suggest an interest on the part
of the USSR in such a settlement.
FAR EAST
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2. Jets reported in North Korean.Air Force:
had North Korean markings "consisting of a red star encircled by a
red band, and a blue band as the exterior circle. "
An Air Force operational summary, report-
ing clashes on the Sino-Korean border between
UN and Communist aircraft on 16 April, states
that two of the MIG's engaged in the air battle
Comment: This is the first report received
in CIA that MIG's with North Korean markings have been observed.
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3. Popular dissatisfaction. in China increasing
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popular dissatisfaction with the
Peiping regime has grown in recent months
as a result of heavy casualties in Korea,
excessive taxation, police-state oppression in general and the current
purges in particular. However, there is no indication of an imminent
split in the regime, nor has there arisen any active resistance to it
by the,Chinese masses; anti-Communist guerrilla activities appear to
be uncoordinated and incapable of posing a serious threat to the regime's
stability.
Sino-Soviet relations on the working level lack cordiality, the Sino-
Soviet alliance appears secure.
In regard to foreign relations,
Peiping's anti-US campaign has been ineffective, that the
regime is becoming increasingly hostile to the UK, and that, while
by conclusions which the US Consul General in Hong Kong has drawn
Comment: This account is in general supported
NEAR EAST
4. British may misjudge conservative Iranian attitude on oil:
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US Ambassador Grady, in reviewing Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company "past differences" with
the US Embassy in Tehran, stated on 18 April
that "those differences were only with regard
to the policies of the company which have led them close to disaster.
Grady reports that the most conservative Iranian leaders hold a far
more extreme attitude toward nationalization than the AIOC and the
British Foreign Office realize.
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Co_ t: The AIOC has long exercised con-
siderable influence in Iran while it carried out its own policies, which
have at time$ been somewhat high-handed. In the present crisis the
company appears to think that time is on its side and-that ffnanciAl
pressure will eventually force the Iranian Government to- accept the
company's terms. The company has, however, on. the whole been
liberal in its policies toward Iranian workers and has treated them
fairly when judged by labor conditions as they exist in Iran. It is
obvious that any concession at this time short of.acceptance of the
principle of-nationalization will not solve the present-crisis.
5. Iranians: propose nationalization of Iranian, -Soviet fisheries.:
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that Parliament plans to
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nationalize the Caspian fisheries on expiration
of the Soviet concession in September 1952.
Several deputies are now drawing up a bill on this subject and will intro-
duce it shortly in Parliament,
Comment:. The Caspian fisheries are owned
jointly by the Iranian and So- Governments with each government
holding 50% of the shares. The terms of the contract in theory permit
the Iranian Government to dissolve the company if it does not wish to
renew the contract; the company's assets would then be divided between
the two governments. In practice the USSR has dominated the fisheries
and has enjoyed most of their profits. There is a strong possibility of
Soviet opposition to the nationalization measure, since Soviet security
interests in the Caspian Sea are involved.
While the proposed bill to nationalize the
company might be interpreted as an extension of the current fever in
Iran for nationalization of foreign industry, it should not be compared
with the move for nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,
which is envisaged as taking place immediately rather than when the
contract expires in 1993.
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EASTERN :EUROPE
Anti-Soviet riot followg killings in Poland:
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have informed the
US Embassy in Warsaw of a riot to Stettin
on 9 April following thq killing on the street
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of two Polish civilians by a Soviet officer. As a result, a crowd
collected and stoned the Russian, who, after killing three more Poles,
sought refuge in a nearby cellar. Polish militiamen present,., pressed
by the crowd to shoot the Russian, refused; the crowd, incensed, shouted
that the militia could and did use aa'ms against Poles?butcould not do so
against a Russian murderer. In a show of force, the militiamen fired
into the air; the people thereupon attacked the militiamen, killing at
least three and wounding others. The demonstration 4was quelled by the
Army, which surrounded the area and arrested some two thousand per-
sons. The US Embassy observes that, because of the complete control
exercised by the Polish authorities, no rumors of this -incident are
current in Warsaw.
Comme -? Previous reports of unrest and
labor difficulties in the Stettin area have been received. One report
alleges that ethnic Germans in the area are causing difficulties; a
second report states. that a dock strike occurred in Stettin in February
as a spontaneous demonstration against the shipment of goods to the
USSR.
headquarters in Paris. The federation s secretariat declares that Vienna
was chose: because of its favorable location and the "cordial welcome
which the Austrian workers are sure to give the federation. " The
Viennese Communist paper calls the development a "great distinction"
and "moral aide' for Austrian workers who, it is sure,will do all
possible to show themselves worthy of the high honor.
The Communist-dominated World Federation
of Trade Unions has decided to locate its head-
quarter s in Vienna, following the French Govern-
ment order dipsolving the international
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Commen : The transfer of this Communist-
front organization to Vienna may make additional difficulties for the
Austrian Government, which is already under pressure from labor and
from Soviet interference with the Austrian police, and which is
threatened with strikes and Communist youth demonstrations.
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