CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000200150001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 5, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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SUMMAR Y
GENERAL
1. British reservations delay talks on economic aid to Yugoslavia (page 3)
FAR EAST
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5. Fear of.war reported in Manchuria (page 6)
6e British concerned, over Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma (page 6)
7. Ceylon may recognize Bao Dai government (page 7)
NEAR EAST
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8a. Nehru recently subject to strong anti-American influences (page 7)
9. Comment on Prime Minister Mossadeq?s program (page 8)
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GENERAL
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Talks on economic aid to Yugoslavia now taking
place in London among representatives of the. US,
UK, France and the World Bank (IBRD) have
become snarled over reluctance of the British
to comfit themselves on the revision of Yugoslav
debt schedules to meet IBRD' requirements. The
UK has also indicated reluctance to give Yugoslavia
British aid on a grant rather than on a loan basis.
Earlier the UK had insisted on including in the economic aid program "common
use" items that might be used for both civilian and military purposes. The
US delegation comments that the British seemed unmoved, by US and French
references to the overriding political considerations and appeared unconcerned
that the IBRD loan might fall through as a result of the London talks.
Comment. The Yugoslav aid.talks were initially
conducted on a bilateral basis between the US and the UK, and then extended
to include France. Representatives of the IBRD were invited in the hope of
providing for eventual. stabilization of the Yugoslav economy through an IBRD
capital investment program, coordinated with the more immediate needs of
Yugoslavia? s balance of payments. The IBRD representatives have indicated
that a four-year $200 million capital investment IBRD loan could be carried
by Yugoslavia if its current unfavorable balance of payments, picture is
corrected through other foreign aid. The earlier agreement of the three
powers on the principles of the aid program has now become ensnarled in
more specific questions of implementation. Despite the UK's recent caution,
Britain has shown its concern for the Yugoslav situation through the recent
extension of a loan of four million pounds and through encouragement of
proposals for military aids
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5. Fear of war reported in Manchuria-.
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A Russian-born naturalized American,
who left Harbin on 10 April and arrived
in Hong Kong on 1 May, told the US Consul
General in Hong Kong that the fear of war was
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growing in Harbin. The atmosphere was particularly tense in Manchouli
(on the Sino-Soviet border in northwest Manchuria), where Chinese residents
were being evacuated from the Sino-Soviet border and where the USSR was
.erectinng fortifications on its side of the border, In Harbin, air raid pre-
cautions were inaugurated at the time of Chinese intervention in Korea and
were being further implemented at the time of the source?s departure. Several
hundred Soviet airmen were stationed at the Harbin airfield, but few were seen
in the city. Flights over Harbin were infrequent and never consisted of more
than five planes in a group. Source reported a very heavy southward rail.
movement, largely after dark, through Harbin. He observed four or five
train-loads of Russian tanks and one load of Mongol horses, Source stated
that there was no doubt in the minds of the inhabitants that the real power in
the area, though exercised through the Chinese, w;as held by the USSR.
Many Russians have been discharged in preparation for tha turn-over of
enterprises :including the railway to the Chinese in 1952.
Comment y Few reports are received from
the northeastern areas. This one appears. credible.
6. British concerned over Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma:
that these forces are being supported by the US, may be expected. shortly
to make high level approaches on the subject in Washington: They consider
that the Nationalists do not merely provide the Chinese Communists with an
excuse to invade Burma but constitute a pressure on the Communists to act
which would inevitably result in the establishment of a Communist government
in Burma.
US Embassy London reports that the British Govern-
ment is becoming increasingly concerned over the
refugee Chinese Nationalist troops in the Burmese
state of Kengtung. The British, apparently feeling
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Ceylon may recognize Bao Dai government,
A Ceylon diplomat who has been in Indochina of a
rice purchasing mission hinted at the, time of his
departure that Ceylon might extend diplomatic
recognition to the' Bao Dai government US Minister
Heath in Saigon had assumed that Ceylon would follow the lead of India in
continuing to refuse recognition, and speculates that the Ceylon envoy's
remarks may reflect an evolution of his government's attitude, or may simply
be a device for promoting a rice deal.
recognition for some time and has generally aligned itself more closely with
UFO policy (the UK recognized Bao Dai in February 1,950) than has India.
Ceylon is a rice deficit area and may feel that i might be in a preferred
position to obtain some Vietnamese rice if it opened diplomatic relations with
Bao Daio Thus far, Thailand has been the only southern Asian nation to
recognize the Bao Dai government; the Western nations have been endeavoring
to persuade other Asian countries to take similar action in order to bolster
its prestige.
Comment, It is known that Ceylon has been considering
NEAR EAST
9. Nehru recently subject to strong anti-Americann influences,
US Ambassador Henderson reports that during the
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close association with V. K. Krishna Menon,
Indian High Commissioner in London, and with Lady
Mountbatten, wife of India?s last Viceroy and Governor-General Several
responsible Indian officials have told Ambassador Henderson
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Lady Mount atten's anti-American influence over Nehru is a subject of
almost common gossip in India. One prominent Indian who dined with Nehru,
Menon, and Lady Mountbatten later told Ambassador Henderson that he was
shocked at the anti-Americanism which dominated their dinner c ersation.
Comment, Nehru is known to be susceptible to the
influence of Lady Mountbatten and K,ri.shna Menon, both of whom are violently
anti-American and the latter of whom is probably a Communist. These two
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persons may well have had a direct hand in producing (a) Nehau's statements
of 29 April and 1 May to the effect that India does not have to accept food
from any country which accompanies its offers with political "strings,"
(b). the 26 April statement of Secretary- General Bajpai, Indian Ministry of
External Affairs, that UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie would serve no
useful purpose in visiting India this spring, and (c) the 1 May proclamation.
convening a Constituent Assembly in Kashmir in defiance of the UN Security
Council Resolution of 30 March.
9. Comment on Prime Minister Mossadea's nro~ram:
Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq presented
his cabinet to the Majlis on 3 May and stated that his government did not
believe it necessary to present an elaborate program to the` Majlis. He
proposed, however, to enforce the oil nationalization law, to use. the proceeds
to support the government's economic policy of "promoting the welfare and
comfort of the people, " and to amend the municipal and parliamentary election
laws. All of these points are consistent with Mossadeq's avowed political
convictions. As yet, however, even the Shah has indicated that he has. no 2.511
information as to the method by which Mossadeg plans to implement
nationalization.
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