CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000200510001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 17, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

DOS REVIEW
COMPLETED
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17 June 1951
zany IN 0. CJ-- -1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
-sue w,574
1,40
DATL:
AUTH: --WP 1i
GHT-. fi Vir-`JVEfi:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. British outline objections to Greek-Turkish membership in NATO
(page 3)
2. US givds Philippines new reparations formula for Japanese peace
treaty (page 4).
FAR EAST
3. French officials show increasing alarm over US activities in Indo-
china (page 4)
4. Anti-bandit campaign in Malaya makes slight progress (page 5)e
5. Airline service between India and "Red" China under consideration
(page 6)
NEAR EAST
6. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company willing to suggest resumption of royalty
advances (page 6)
WESTERN EUROPE
7, US Ambassador's estimate of Spanish Army opinion. (page 7).
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GENERAL
1. British outline objections to Greek-Turkish membership in N
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In an aide?memoire to the US Government,
the UK has stated that it agrees the defense rip-
lationships between Turkey and the West should
be strengthened, but is not convinced that full
NATO membership for Greece and Turkey is the only or the best way to
achieve this objective. The UK does not take issue with the principle of
the US proposal for including Greece and Turkey, but considers that
"it would destroy the North Atlantic character of the alliance and extend
it into the Middle East, which is an area with quite different defense prob-
lems. " Recommending further study of the questions involved, the British
Government specifically suggests an examination of the possibility of the US
joining France and the UK in a security guarantee to Turkey; it comments
that Turkey could then be associated with whatever joint arrangements the
the three powers devise for the Middle East. The UK also states that it
would not regard the adherence of Greece and Turkey as paving the way for
the admission of Spain to NATO. The memoire concludes with the asser-.
tion that the problem of NATO membership for Greece and Turkey "cannot
be studied independently" of "the problem of command in the Mediterran?
ean. "
Comment: This is the most specific statement
to date of the UK attitude towar ncluding Greece and Turkey in NATO,
though the general tenor of British participation in Council of Deputies dis-
cussions has hinted serious reservations about the proposal. In general,
the British Government has welcomed the marked increase of US post-war
interest in the Middle East, but has sometimes intimated that the US is not
sufficiently aware of the need for long-term, coordinated planning covering
the area as a whole. In particular, the British may feel that a regional
pact that includes the Arab states is more realistic than an attempt to treat
Greece and Turkey as part of the North AfrllacAtic community.
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2, >IJ ll ~~ n W r at o s formula f
agree to enter p. o.n:.pUy into negotiations with intere.stsd Al :d Powers
with a!vie to making available the kiiie and industry of the Japanese
people in annan t~t:rin~i;s salvaging and other services as a means of ;par,.,
tial compensation for war dam.-ages .y,- providing that such arrange ents
do not interfere with JapaaWs economic reconstruction, impose additional
liabilities upon other A lied power.,, or place any fo .?et n exchange burden.
upon Japan. T hie ol>:r'tmcnnt inriIt :?.ua;tee that Jo ulo should understand that
the Proposed cialju,"Os are th l most he can/ and suggests that he may
wish. to make d ,dva nce, political preparation for this fact
arations, it lacks 'em ; caipac,ity do a oi. J,,. army on the other hand, would
tr at :
I' TS Department of State has requested t
Q,~ h.,: a ins Manila to inform Phidippine Foy; ._,
ister ffio.muio. confidentially of the gist
:. M!,
of a new r pa;raUa nu formula now being consAd,
ered for the Japannss , peace treaty. Under tb.L."
:formuu.la., t ha Allied , Owl rs Ould recognize
Wat, although Japan a hcc u.td in principle pay ~
Comma into The Philippine Govs:rm ML, not ,
taken, a consistently stung stand the ?eparatto'ne quaLitton, Insisting
that Japan has t` a ca p a ty to pay, owe,r a considerable period of time,
moist of the, l h:i~~ tk11 ~ e' eight billion dollar el$m Since most of the At-
lied ha,: s teen since db' ndonc d any hope of obta intn reparations,
the Philip inne Government may conside t : proposed t rut as a co:nn-
sidera,ble concession to its derv nd ~o ;l:Li view of its douhtt it bargaining
power 'vis-a-vis the ap ;nese, howe'ts:ra the P'h.ll.lip'tn.e Government, may
wish to negotiate a . o ?e specifi tt m..ont concurrently with the treaty.
`~ 'C:.~"1tch officio s i-1~T~~;o,s~ 1~ c:ro 2!ITw II : `~?ft o ' ' 1c ix ti s n ,1 KtJc)td a:
.A .n% of ll.et. ,. , at t-bo French Mg h C m ?nissa,riat
is th i ~ri~ . r ~ fran kly describe-,d to a member of
thy" I_5S J egat5on to Stneon the hardly concealed
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its publicity as impractical and incomprehensible "unless America ex-
pects Vietnam not to remain within the French Union. "" He stated that many
of his associates could see no reason for the large number of Americans
in Indochina except as a cover for an espionage organization or as a base
for developing Indochina into a US zone of influence at the expense of the
French.
which he felt depreciated French contributions to Indochina. He also in..
veighed against the US information and educational program describing
Rciai. strongly. criticized the .F .A., program, and, particularly E A Dub
French opposition to certain US programs in Indochina and plainly implied
that the French Suspect the US of inntendin.d to supercede France in hLdo-
chinnao While emphasizing French gratitude for US military aide this of-
US Minis-ter Heath in Saigon comments that these
"essentially groundless and unreasonable complaints" represent the attitude
and opinions of the majority of French civil officials and very probably
those of General de Lattre himself. He adds, however, that because US
concern in Indochina is primarily with the cvountry' defense and because
that defense is borne solely by the French, cohepsslons should be made to
,.French e ibilitleso Otherwise, he states, US-Fran -Vletnamese rela-
'1?h.n Indochina will become harmfully embroiled,
4a Anti-bandit campaign in Malaya makes
prore
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Disagreement exists inn Singapore over the High
Commissioner's recent report claiming that
the anti-bandit campaign .in Malaya Is. reaching
a "turning point. "" The favorable comparison
teat the report draws between the periods from December through Febru-
ary and March through May is based on increased surrenders on the great-
The British .Defense Coordination Committee for? the Far East asserts, however, that there is little ground for the report's optimistic con-
elusion, and points out that the total number of bandits continues to be be-
tween 3, 5 10 and 59 000. The Committee believes that'the statistics on ban-
dit surrenders and casualties are misleading and that"intelligence has im-
proved only by virtue of the fagt,that it was previously nonexistent.
U5-
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er number of bandits kwed and on improved intelligence
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Comment. Although information from Malaya
does not yet support the estimate the turning point in anti-terrorist
operations has been reached or is imminent, then are reliable indications
that British security'torces are making some progress in their efforts to
choke off the bandits' sources of food and ammunition.
5. Aires service between Ind and 4 Red'P China under-coLlsidera
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New Delhi reports indicate that air service
between India and China may be established
soon. According to the plan now under consid-
eration, an IndiannA rnpany (either the Bharat
or Himalayan Airline) would operate the air service and receive subsidies
from the Chinese Communist Government to cover expected deficits.
The Government of India is reportedly favorably inclined to this plan, T116'
US Embassy in New Delhi nevertheless beli,ves that the Government of
India might be induced to withhold its approval if prompt representations
were made by the US.
Comment: Either of the Indian companies men-
tioned has limited capabilities, and would need considerable sppport and
subsidy from the Communists in order to operate over the difficult air
route between the two countries. The jChinese Qommunnists' willingness
to -subsidize the proposed airlaa inndic ,tes the value that they attach to
the facilitation of traffic between the two countries.
NEAR EAST
4nnglo - I.rantann Oil Company wi:llin to suggest resun~otio . of ro
an c :
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The spokesman of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company's mission that is now negotiating
the Oil dispute with Iran has informed US
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 Ambassador Grady that he believes the time is ripe for the AIOC to agree
to advance the five million pounds recently requested by the Iranian Fin-
ance Minister. He would also favor the resumption of royalty payments,,
which he feels should never have been discontinued. He has informed Am-
bassador Grady, however, that the Iranians have now indicated that any
such advance must be 20 million pounds and not five million. Grady com.
ments that .his is merely an attempt to bargain on the part of Iran.
Comment: The Iranian Government badly
needs the money. The AIOC's monthly advance of two million pounds,
made in accordance with an agreement with ex-Prime Minister Razmara,
was discontinued in April when the Iranian Finance Minister informed the
company that the sums already advanced under this agreement were con?.
sidered by Iran as a settlement of past claims against the company. The
Iranians may hesitate to accept the British offer unless the sum is larger
than five million or unless it can be defined as a settlement. of past:d'ebt%.
WESTERN EUROPE
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7. US Ambassadot's estimate of Spanish Army opinion:
gard Franco as a hindrance to the development of Spanish military strength
and participation in NATO. He comments that despite undoubted monarchist
sentiments among some Army elements, no active support for a change of
regime its believed to exist. Furthermore, while some officers probably
are aware that Franco has been a hindrance to Spain' s receipt of military
aid and participation in NATO, it is extremely doubtful that any group of
influential officers is plotting to remove him. Because of their doubts as
to the effectiveness of NATO and of the French army in particular, the
Ambassador believes that Spanish officers would prefer a bilateral military
arrangement with the US.
US Ambassador Griffis regards as misleading
an American labor leader's report that Span sh
Army circles are ready for constitutional mon-
archy and that Spanish generals possibly re-
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Comment: The Spanish Army's preference
for a special bilateral pact probably stems chiefly from its reluctance to
undertake the commitments involved in NATO membership and its, desire,
to reserve any Spanish military efforrsolely for the immediate defense of
Spain. While Spanish officers' expressions of distrust of French military
capabilities are undoubtedly genuine enough in the light of World War Il
events, they may also be motivated in part by sensitivity regarding the
Riffian wars, when,-..French military intervention (in 1925) saved the
Spanish Army from a complete debacle.
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