CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000300410001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 15, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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15 Aug 1951
Copy No. ` /- I
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLAS
t DECLASSIFIED
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Department review completed
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
GENERAL.
Comment on Soviet participation in the Japanese peace treaty
conference (page 3)0
20 Egyptian Foreign Minister planning abrogation of treaty in October
(page 3)e
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EASTERN EUROPE
5. Trieste compromise suggested (page 5).
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WESTERN EUROPE
70. French critical of Acheson proposals for German rearmament (page 7).
8e New treason law would restrict Allied information in Germany (page 7)0
9. Bumper wheat. crop relieves pressure on Spanish Government (page 8).
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GENERAL .
Comment on Sovriet participation in the Japanese`.perce treaty conference
The Soviet deeisian;'to attend the Japanese peace
conference is an indication of concern over Western plans to proceed without
the USSR if necessary. It is also .a sign of Soviet inability to hinder the coa-
elusion of the treaty and to prevent widespread adherence to it. The con-
ference will offer the USSR the opportunity to. exploit objections to the joint
US-UK sponsored draft held mainly by Far Eastern nattons over questi ans
such as reparations, rearmament and Chinese representation.
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2. Egyptian Foreign Minister pla WS. abrogation of treaty in Oc tob er:
The Egyptian Foreign Minister has informed the
US Ambassador in Cairo .that he does not intend
to abrogate tii Anglo-Egyptian Treaty during the
present parliamentary session but to wait, proba-
bly until Octobe The British Ambassador has been ;instructed: to intii a`te
to the Egyptian authorities -- in case there is danger, of an early explosion-
that progress is being made. on the study of a "new approach"' to the defense
A A of the Middle East,
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Comment: This delay, in abrogating the treaty
beyond the August date that the Foreign Minister had previously mentioned,
would seem to reflect the, influence, of the King,' who does not want to have
the negotiations with the British, broken off. The "new approach" being stud-
ied by Britain is probably the Middle East theater command proposal now
under discus0ion in the Standing Group of NATO.. This proposal envisages a
multilateral defense setup for the Eastern Mediterranean under British
command.
Britain evidently hopes that if it offers to in-
clude Egypt in a regional defense pact, Egypt may agree to foreign partici-
pation in Canal defenses.
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EASTERN EUROPE
5. Trieste compromise suggested:
Tito has informed US Ambassador Allen that the
the Yugoslav Government is most anxious to
settle the Trieste question because it remains
the outstanding problem in Yugoslav relations
with the West, and its settlement would materi-
ally strengthen the common front against Comin-
form aggression.
Tito offered three alternative solutions for
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preted by Allen to mean the division of Trieste along present zonal bound-
aries rather than a continuation of the present military regime); (b) the es-
tablishment of a Zone B autonomous regime with provisions for minority
rights; or (c) a territorial exchange by which Yugoslavia would relinquish
the coastal district of Capodistria in exchange for "some Slovene villages in
Zone A"o
settlement of the Trieste issue-. (a) the maintenance of the status quo (inter-
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Comment; The chief obstacle .to a compromise
settlement appears to be disposition of the predominantly Italian coastal
cities in Zone B, which Tito's suggestion of giving up Capodistria does not
cover.
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WESTERN EUROPE
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French critical of Acheson proposals,for German rearmament-
The French Foreign Office has tentative reser-
vations toward the speedy solution for the prob-
lem of German rearmament proposed in the
recent personal letter from Secretary of State
Acheson to Foreign Minister Schuman. While the French admit that simul-
taneous'settlement of both political and military aspects of the problem is
logical and desirable, they believe that unconditional political equality cannot
be granted to the Bonn Government lest the Germans; subsequently "find a
way to welsh" on .making a defense contribution.
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The French Foreign Office thinks also that
public and political opinion is not yet prepared for such an "extreme" idea
as German membership in NATO, and it fears that the proposal to discuss
this point in September may arouse French opposition to other features of
German rearmament..
Comment.* The basic French premise is that
the political arrangement with the Federal Republic should not take the form
of inter-governmental agreements, but rather of a contract between the
supreme Allied authority in Germany and the Bonn Government. The recent
German unilateral action increasing the export price on Ruhr coal, as well
as the stiff bargaining position generally adopted by the Germans, is making
the French Government increasingly wary of further concessions to Germany.
New treason law would restrict Allied information in Germany-
The US High Commission in Frankfurt points
out that the new German treason law is much
broader than similar laws in other countries and,
although aimed at the Communists, might. be in-
terpreted to the detriment of the Allies. Info rcement of this.law might pre-
vent the volunteering of information to the Occupation Powers, especially to
Allied intelligence agencies, and might permit the Allies to have access to
information only in reserved fields.
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The Germans ignored an order to `submit the
law for the consideration of the Allied High Commission; they have, however,
obeyed a further order to refrain from signing the law until consultations
can take place.
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The High Commission is reluctant to disapprove
the law, as this would mean delaying anti-Communist legislation. In-
stead, it is considering passage of a High Commission law to give full pro-
tection to communications and relations between the Germans and the Allies.
Comment: The Germans want, as much as
possible, to have the full range of powers of an independent nation when the
new contractual arrangements go into effect. They intend to hold down
special Allied occupation rights to a minimum, and are particularly con-
cerned to maintain exclusive control over "state secrets.
9. Bumper wheat crop relieves pressure on Spanish Government.
The Minister of Agriculture recently announced
that Spain's 1951 crop prospects are the best in
50 years. Informed government sources say
that this year's estimated total of four million
metric tons, an increase of 30 per cent over the 1950 harvest figure, should
fill Spain's current rations requirements.
Comme nt: The record wheat harvest should
ease public pressure on the government for improved rations of this staple
food. The Spanish Government's frantic efforts in May and June to purchase
foreign wheat reflected a fear that a reduction in the already meager wheat
ration might become necessary, which would further aggravate the grave
internal situation then existing in Spain.. By paying premium prices for this
year's surplus wheat and by continuing to press for wheat credits under the
US Export-Import Bank loans agreement,. the Madrid government may be
able to collect sufficient stocks to increase and improve the wheat ration
without raising the quotas of forced deliveries.
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