CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000300540001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

approved For ReleWe`2
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
[ 1 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S +4
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70
CiATF ? REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Department review completed
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
USSR
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1. Embassy Moscow speculates on Soviet policy at San Francisco .(page 3)b
NEAR EAST
5. 'Greek Marshal Papagos confident of electoral victory (page 6)0
WESTERN EUROPE
6. French seek discussion in Washingtort_ :.. of Allied "rights" in Germany
(page 6).
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USSR
Embass
The US Embassy in Moscow suggests; that at-
San Francisco the Soviet Union may attempt-to
mijiimize substantive differences between the
Kremlin's previously expressed views and the
text of the US- UK draft. Thus, the Soviet Government would seek to give
the impression that it could sign the treaty'. if, Communist China is brought. in
on the final discussions concerning treaty differences, and if the treaty con-
tains no provision for future Japanese security arrangements. The USwould
attribute its objection to such a provision to a fear that Japanese sovereiity
would be limited.
Since this position would parallel that of India,
the embassy believes that Moscow may consider it as the best hope of dis-
suading hesitant countries from signing, while holding out the prospect that
the Kremlin is willing to make some sacrifices on the treaty in exchange
for an over-all settlement in the Far East.
Noting the.lack of progress at the cease-fire
conference in Korea, the embassy also suggests the possibility that Soviet
delegation members., in private discussions with other delegates, may attempt:
to bring pressure by threatening a final rupture of the Kaesong talks.
Comment: Embassy Moscow previously ex-
pressed the opinion that Soviet participation in the conference was designed
to delay the treaty, to capitalize on the reservations of some states with re-
gard to the draft, and to maintain the pretense of a desire for settlement on
major issues with the West.
In view of the refusal of India and Burma to
sign the US-UK draft, the USSR can exploit their absence, as well as thatof.,
Communist China, as evidence that Asian nations do not support. the Western
treaty. The Soviet delegation will presumably employ tactics at San Francisco
to encourage further defections among doubtful signers like Indonesia,
Pakistan and some Arab states.
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NEAR EAST
Creek Marshal Papagoa goanfident of electoral victory
Marshal Papagos, a candidate in the Greek
elections of 9 September, has privately in-
formed the US Ambassador that when -- not
if -- he forms the new government, he will
become both Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense. The< latter
position would enable him to clear up the "deteriorated military situations
Papaos expressed the fear that if the King did not relinquish the position
of Cpbamander-ini-Chief of the Armed Forces before the elections, "there
would be considerable e.ibarrassment for all concerned,, '?. .
Comment Recent palace and government
efforts to weaken Papagos' candidacy by tampering with the army have re-
duced its morale and efficiency, and he is convinced that strong measures
must be taken if this influence is to be counteracted.
WESTERN EUROPE
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don i ashine?:on of .
French Foreign Offine officials recommend
discussion,, in the forthcoming Washington
Foreign Ministers talks, of only the major
issues involved in the substitution of con-
tractual relations for the. Occupation regime in Germany. Minor disagree-
ments and details *oul be handled by the Allied High Commission.
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On some of these maim issues thea'French' are
strongly opposed to making Allied rights subject to the prospective contractual
agreements with Germany. These rights include investigation of scientific
and industrial developments,. an Allied function which might be placed under
the Council of Ambassadors replacing the High Commission; and retention of
supreme authority in a few fields, on which the Foreign Office is not yet
decided.
Furthermore, the French oppose a limitation
of the reserved right of intervention to cases of a "clear and present danger
to security, " because they fear the Allies would be reluctant to intervene im
any crisis until the situation had deteriorated too far.
Cow; Ever since the Brussels talks of
December 1950, the French have insisted that the Allies retain some sover-
eign powers in Germany beyond the rights enjoyed under the anticipated con-
tractual agreemenntso
More recently, the French have become some-
what less liberal in their attitude toward restraints on the Germans than they
were. ' This trend is influenced by developments in West Germany, where the
press is currently agitating for the complete abolition of all Allied rights in
Germany.
The Bonn government, moreover, while recog-
nizing that the Allies will of necessity retain special rights growing out of the
quadripartite arrangements at the end of the war, can be expected strongly
to oppose the policing of German scientific and. industrial work.
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