CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000300560001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 2, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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2 . $eptember 1951
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BUL JETIN
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
[ ; DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANCED TO, TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUT HR 70-
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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State Department review completed
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
GENERAL..
1.. British ambassador recommends headquarters outside Egypt for
proposed Mediterranean command (page 3).
2. Egyptian diplomats make last minute .effort to postpone UN action
on Canal issue (page .3.)....._.
FAR EAST
Macao prepares for increased trade wi communists page
NEAR EAST
5,. Afghanistan. and Iran reach. oil agreement (page 6)..
WESTERN EUROPE
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7.. French concurrence in Germany's admission to NATO is foreseen
for 1952 (page 7).
8. Schuman adds Moroccan question to Washington agenda (page 8).
9. French Premier considers coal shortage serious problem (page 8).
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GENERAL.....
British ambassador recommends headquarters outside Egypt for proposed
Mediterranean commancl:
The. British .Ambassador to .Egypt has recom-
mended. to his government that the headquarters
of the proposed..Allied command for the eastern
Mediterranean should be located outside Egypt,
since its location there would prejudice the chances of obtaining Egypt's
participation in the command structure.
Comment: One of the main reasons.which led
the British to propose this combined regional command, which would ini-
tiaJUy include the UK, the US, France, Turkey and -- they hope -- Egypt,
was their belief that Egyptian nationalist sentiment would prove less hostile
to granting military facilities to such a multinational organization than to
Britain alone. Available. evidence suggests, however, that the current
mood in. Egypt would preclude agreement not merely to the command head-
quarters but to the stationing at present of any foreign troops on Egyptian
soil.
25X1 A 2. Egyptian diplomats make last minute effort to postpone UN action on Canal
issue:
Both the Egyptian Ambassador and Egypt's
Chief UN Delegate have approached US
officials with the aim of developing a new
formula for settling the Suez Canal dispute,
now before the UN Security Council.. Both
men have asked the US to help in postponing
the UNSC action on. this issue.
The UN Delegate frankly expressed his
for delay. He suggested that this embarrassing situation be resolved by
further postponement on the pretext 'of appointing a committee or individual
to investigate the matter further.
concern, over a unexpected support the USSR gave the Egyptian request
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In answer to the US.comment. that the best
way to counter the Soviet move would be for.Egypt to lift the restrictions,
the Egyptian Delegate intimated that internal political problems would
prevent Egypt from, complying with such a.suggestion. He then warned
that the proposed UN resolution would "further prejudice the US position
in the entire Arab. world.
...Comment. Egyptian desire to avoid an
s,dverse Sc ,city Council decision on. the Canal issue has not been suf -
.'ficieantly strong to, inndueo It to make a compromise offer which might be
acceptable. While some Egyptian leaders recognize the dangers of Soviet
support, there are other nationalists who agree with the Foreign Minister,
who has been quoted as welcoming the Soviet maneuver as, "a happy
surprises -,
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40
Macac prepares for increased trade with Communists,
Macac officials are planning to make the
Portuguese colony a more important transit
base for strategic shipments to the Com-
munistso The Macao government has pur-
Iapanq four other vessels will be chartered to step up service with Portu-
guese Timor9 and quick turn-around is planned for vessels bringing petroleum
from Thailand and the .Phtlippinneso
chased three ships and intends to acquire three more for direct trade with
PO J. Lobo, Macao's Director of Economics,
is personally connected with these deals, at the same time officially dis-
claiming ability to prevent the traffic. Twelve trade advisers from Peiping
were recently added to the staff of the fan Kwang Company, the principal
Communist purchasing agency in Macao,
Comment: Communist interest in utilizing
Macao as a smuggling base has become particularly manifest since Hong
Kong broadened its export control program last June. Petroleum appears
currently to be the principal item in this traffic, but truck tires, crude
rubber, metals, motor vehicles, auto parts, radio equipment, and on
occasion munitions are also handled.
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NEAR EAST
Afghanistan and Iran reach oiLagr.eemento
Agreement between Iran and ,Afghanistan
for the delivery of oil. to Afghanistan has
been formally announced in Kabul. The
US Embassy. in.Afghanistan, in. expressing
doubt of the feasibilI.ty of overland transportation, points out that the
roads linking ]bran with Afghanistan are inadequate for regular and size-
able oil shipments.
Comment.- Both countries are impelled by
obvious propaganda motives. Afghanistan wishes to free itself from
dependency upon Pakistan and the USSR. Iran needs to sell oil. Afghani-
stan's annual oil consumption, however, is equivalent to only a small
fraction of one day's normal production of the Abadan refinery.
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WESTERN. EUROPE
25X1A 7. French concurrence in Germany's admission to NATO is foreseen for
1952,P
According to a report from the US Embassy
in London, a "responsible official" of the
French Foreign Office has stated that he and
some of his colleagues are personally con-
vinced that Germany's membership in NATO is both inevitable and de-
sirable.
These officials emphasize, however, that
the worst way of accomplishing this would be for the US or UK to raise
the issue with the French before or at the time when the Germans agree
to a defense contribution. In the opinion of the source, French public
opinion would be able to accept German membership in NATO about six
months after that date, or about mid-19520
Comment. This is the first indication that
any French officials are prepared to consider German admission to NATO
at a definite future date. In all aspects of the German problem, French
officials stress the importance of careful timing in order to insure that
German commitments to the common defense will induce a further swing
of French public opinion in favor of new steps toward German equality.
A relatively tolerant attitude toward Germany has been developing in
France since July 1949, when Schuman informed the Assembly that Ger-
many's participation in NATO was "unthinkable" and a question that "can
never come up now or even at a later date. "
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8. Schuman adds Moroccan question to Washington .agenda
French. Foreign. Minister Schuman plans
to add the question. of Morocco to the agenda
for his bilateral.. talks.with .Secretary Acheson.
A memorandum is now being drafted in the
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Foreign Office outlining France's policies and. practices in Morocco.
Because the Foreign. Office believes that
US officials want future French policy to be built around the nationalist
Istiglal party, the memorandum will disparage the party and point out
that Istiglal rule would result only in civil war and chaos. The French
will draw heavily on the paradox of US and Communist support for Istiglal,
and stress the "advantages to the West of a cooperative Morocco in case
of war. 11
The memorandum will not contain an over-
all plan for the progressive Independence of French North Africa, a
policy long recommended by US diplomats.
Comment. Sensitivity of the French over
US influence in their Moroccan protectorate has become an obsession.
US diplomats have not advocated that French policy be built around the
Istiglal party, which not only does not have US support but also. has rib -
Jected all Communist overtures.
The US has repeatedly urged that the French
adopt a concrete program looking toward greater autonomy for Morocco--
a policy similar to the granting of independence to the Philippines. These
recommendations have been rejected by the French.
9. French Premier considers coal shortage serious problem.
French Premier Pleven has told Ambassador
Bruce and Mr. Harriman that the general
European coal shortage poses the greatest
economic problem currently facing France.
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The French feel that solutions for this
problem should be sought in the coming Foreign. Ministers' talks. One
possibility would be to finance coal shipments. from the US out of mili-
tary assistance funds to the extent that the coal is to be used in the
manufacture of military... items..
Commennte According to. official French.
estimates of 1 July, France will, produce about 55 million metric tons of
coal in 1951 and obtain 5 or 6 million tons from the Saar. The balance
of French import needs for 1.951 is estimated at over 15 million tons, of
which the traditional suppliers in Europe cannot furnish more than 9
million tons. Of the remaining gap of over 6 million tons, for which
France looks to the US, less than one-fourth was obtained from the US
in the first half of 1951. Meanwhile French steel production is at only
80 percent of capacity,
The Office of EOA's Special Representative
in Paris estimates that foreign demands upon the US for coal in fiscal
year 1952 might rise as high as 30 million tons at a cost representing
about three-fourths of total US foreign economic aid.
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