CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000500300001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 18, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For'I*eaT(3P9/(SE RR0975QO0500300001-2
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18 January 1952
Copy No. ..
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT No
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DOS review(s) completed:
TOP SECRET
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 SUMMARY
25Doved
USSR
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1.
2.
Comment on new travel restrictions in the USSR (page 3).
FAR EAST
3. Chinese Communist food production reportedly increased (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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4. American Ambassador in Cairo opposes dispatch of US military
assistance to Canal zone (page 6).
5. Italians reportedly seek deal with British regarding recruitment
of workers for Suez (page 6).
7. Greek Marshal Papagos urges new elections (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
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8. Niemoeller limits scope of Moscow discussions (page 8).
9. Belgium takes firm stand against Temporary Council recommendations
(page 8).
LATIN AMERICA
10. Outlawed Venezuelan party reportedly purchasing arms in Paris (page 9).
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 RAAdAd
USSR
1. Comment on new travel restrictions in the USSR
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The Soviet Government has enlarged the
restricted travel area for foreign diplomats to include key localities
in the vicinity of Moscow as well as twenty-two cities in European
Russia and Siberia. This action has the effect of further limiting
foreign knowledge of defensive installations surrounding Moscow. Five
of the cities are located on the Trans-Siberian railroad west of Lake
Baikal. With these additions to previous restrictions, all possibility
of observing this main artery for the supply of war materials and in-
dustrial goods to the Far East and the Korean front is eliminated.
(See map on following page. )
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2J
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20 40 80 120 160 180
NORTH
60
SEA
c
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P.,u 0
40
, J J
P5 s~lc ~ /~ ~
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ao
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ly.
Some boundaries shown on this mep are de Facto boend-
ant: 001), not necessarily recognized as definitive by
11 United Stat,, G ,,,,,eh the U T d States Gove.n
me
ent has not r cogm:ed the incorpotation of Estonia,
-`` Letia, a~d Let tern ente the S glee U, on.
-~ _-
'
120
80 100
60
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
AREAS CLOSED TO FOREIGNERS
1
4rf?os cIt'rs4?d to fcrpigntrj? _.-Boundary of USS.R Bait 36,701 000 Railroad( selected) Localities c csed to foreigners-
g
250 500 1000 15oo (Trraris--S,b n) prior to Jon. 1952.
i
Statute Miles
1000 te 1500 2000 Additional Iccolh es closed t-
L.O T ties w t'1it1 j closed L.t"tr_t 0 250 500 u
but c .-en to foreigr,ers. Ki oneeters foreigners,beginning Jan.1952.
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AnarWed
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FAR, EAST
3. Chinese Communist food production reportedly increased:
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The preliminary Communist estimate of food
production in China during 1951 is 130, 065, 000
tons, or ten million tons higher than the 1.950
output
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final figures will not be available until the levy of farm taxes is com-
pleted in March 1952.
Comment: Increased'food production would
indicate that Communist China's economy, which is predominantly agri-
cultural, has not been critically affected in spite of the strains of the Korean
conflict. Although final figures will probably vary from the preliminary -
estimate given above, the Chinese Communists appear to -have been success-
ful in at least maintaining the 1950 level of agricultural output, from which
Peiping was able to export over a million tons.
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 Approved
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. American Ambassador in Cairo opposes dispatch of US military assistance
to Cana zone:
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According to the US Ambassador in Cairo, the
dispatch of American warships or other military
contingents to the Suez Canal zone in compli-
ance with the British request for assistance would
endanger the establishment of the proposed Middle East Command.
Comment: The Egyptian Government has already
publicly warned that it would consider foreign military assistance to the
British authorities in the Canal zone as a "hostile act. "
5. Italians reportedly seek deal with British regarding recruitment of workers
for uez:
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The Italians are reportedly trying to arrange a
deal whereby the British will be allowed to re-
cruit semi-skilled Italian labor for the Suez
Canal zone on condition that Britain import
Italia orke s r its coal mines.
Comment: The British would like to obtain
14, 000 semi-skilled Italian workers for'lhe Canal area. The Italians, how-
ever, in view of their large unprotected minority Within Egypt and
their desire to maintain good relations with the Arab states, are not likely
to permit the British to recruit any considerable number of workers in
addition to those already in the Suez area.
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7. Greek Marshal Papagos urges new elections:
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Marshal Papagos, leader of the opposition in
Parliament, has reiterated to the American
Ambassador his determination not to collaborate
with Deputy Prime Minister Venizelos, whom he
distrusts. The present government, Papagos believes, is damaging Greece
by its release of dangerous Communists, by political meddling in the army,
and by failing to deal with pressing economic problems. Papagos urged the
Ambassador to use his influence with the King for the dissolution of Parlia-
ment and for holding new elections on the majority system.
Comment: Marshal Papagos has steadily
opposed collaboration with any other party and has continued to call for new
elections. Recent governmental moves, replacing pro-Papagos army
officers and pressing for an investigation of the rightist officers' organi-
zation, have apparently strengthened this attitude and there is little hope
for effective cooperation between Papagos and Venizelos. While the govern-
ment has Obviously been lax in its screening of the political prisoners it
has released - possibly a thousand persons have been set free - Papagos
has exaggerated his criticism in the hope of enlisting the Ambassador's
support.
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WESTERN EUROPE
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8. Niemoeller limits scope of Moscow discussions:
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Niemoeller, during his recent visit to Moscow,
concentrated his attention on church matters
and the question of German prisoners of war.
He refused to have high-level political talks except for a discussion with
Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin.
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Dibelius, top German Protestant leader, feels that the Western Powers
have not taken sufficient interest in promoting talks on unity between the
East and West Germans. The Bishop points out that the strongest anti-
Communist element of a united Germany would be found in East Germany.
Comment: Dibelius' recent statements on the
Niemoeller trip and the question overman unification have not been con-
sistent. Although he first indicated that he agreed with some of the criti
cism of Niemoeller's mission to Moscow, he later publicly defended the trip.
On the issue of German unity, Dibelius has
told Adenauer that he approved in general of the Chancellor's policy of
placing West German integration ahead of German unification. This latest
report of his support of unity discussions suggests a lack of strong con-
victions on the subject.
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9. Belgiumtakes firm stand against Temporary Council recommendations:
Belgian Foreign Minister van Zeeland has
refused to consider withdrawing his country's
note rejecting the NATO Temporary Council
Committee's recommendations for increased
elgian defense expenditures. Claiming domestic approval, he reiterated
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Belgium's opposition to the Committee's procedures and stated that his
country was not alone in thinking that the rights of the smaller countries
were at stake. Van Zeeland suggested that the only solution would be for
another group of twelve representatives to discuss comparative national
contributions.
Comment: Belgium's intransigent attitude on
this question and on the European Payments Union may be extended to its
position on the European Defense Community, ..notwithstanding the recently
announced modification of the Dutch stand.
LATIN AMERICA
10. Outlawed Venezuelan party reportedly purchasing arms in Paris:
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two former high officials of the out-
lawed Democratic Action Party of Venezuela
are negotiating for contraband arms in Paris.
One consignment of arms was reportedly shipped, or about to be shipped,
on 7 January.
Comment: One of the Democratic Action
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to present "the case against the Venezuelan dictatorship" to the United
Nations. This report may represent merely an erroneous interpretation of
his presence in Paris.
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