CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000500320001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 20, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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20 January 1952
Copy No. 49
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN C1AS !
DECL ASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED) TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE: -- - -_-
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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DOS review(s) completed. TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
GENERAL.
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1.
USSR seeks concessions through UN discussion of Korean war (page 3).
2.
Soviet note to Austria clarified (page 3).
FAR EAST
3.
US Minister disturbed over French morale in Indochina (page 4).
4.
Chinese Communist leader believes Viet Minh can defeat the Frenc
(page 4),
h
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. British Foreign Office working on new compromise proposals for
Egypt (page 6).
Iranian Communists expected to win parliamentary representation
(page 5).
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GENERAL
1. USSR seeks concessions through UN discussion of Korean war:
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The American Embassy in Moscow believes
that Soviet proposals for UN discussion of
the Korean problem represent tactical stalling
to gain further UN concessions or a better
logistical position in Korea. The Embassy
suggests that the USSR is attempting to put
UN negotiators under added pressure from
those members anxious for an early peace.
In a similar comment, the British mission in
Peiping adds its belief that both the USSR and China want an armistice on
"reasonable" terms and that the Central People's Government was proba-
bly consulted on the Soviet maneuvers in the UN.
Comment: Available evidence indicates that,
despite rumors of disunity, there will be continuing coordination of Sino-
Soviet strategy with respect to the Korean war.
2. Soviet note to Austria clarified:
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The recent Soviet note to Austria mentioning
"Austrian citizens liberated by the Soviet
Union" has been clarified by the Austrian
Minister in Moscow. It apparently refers to
400 Austrians liberated in Poland toward the end of the war and repatri-
ated to Austria, for which the Austrian Government was to assume ex-
penses. The Soviet note thus refers entirely to one of the previously
agreed upon articles, rather than, as originally interpreted, to an article
still to be negotiated.
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3. US Minister disturbed over French morale in Indochina:
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American Minister Heath states that Marshal
de Lattre's death has had a "staggering"
impact on all sectors of French opigion in
Indochina. He adds that the appointments of
General Salan as Commander in Chief and of Gautier as High Commissioner
are viewed with misgiving and, in some quarters, with open opposition to
this division of authority. He foresees the'- possibility that an attitude of
defeatism will develop if a "third-rater" is named as a permanent successorto
De Lattre or if the military situation in Tonkin becomes more critical.
Comment: De Lattre provided French officials
and troops in Indochina with a tremendous psychological boost during the
first half of 1951, but his absences during the past six months had no
noticeable, effect on French morale.
French forces in Tonkin, on the other hand,
have been under constant attack by the Viet Minh since the first week of
December, and all reports indicate continued and intensified pressure by
the enemy, whose material strength is being rapidly increased by aid
from Communist China.
4. Chinese Communist leader believes Viet Minh can defeat the French:
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the Secre- 25X1
tary of the Communist Party Committee in
Kwangsi as stating that the Viet Minh is suf-
ficiently strong to defeat the French-Vietnamese
forces despite increasing US aid. Chinese units will not be needed in
Indochina unless the French are reinforced by troops from other Western
nations.
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 Comment: I levidence of greatly
increased Chinese material aid and the prolonged campaign against the
French defense perimeter give credence to this:report. Numerous
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2App ove
in the past two weeks have deprecated December reports that
overt Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina was imminent.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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6. Iranian Communists expected to win parliamentary representation:
candidates who are making special appeals to the workers. The labor
leaders consider that the good discipline of the Communists will result
in a total vote for Communist-supported candidates of 150,000 to 200,000.
Labor circles report further that if genuinely free elections were per-
mitted in the oil province of Khuzistan, Communists or fellow travelers
would defeat the National Front candidates.
Non-Communist Iranian labor leaders estimate
that at least five Communist-controlled deputies
will be elected to the next parliament. The
Communists are backing a slate of twelve
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Comment: The outlawed Tudeh Party is
making a determined effort to wi presentation in the Majlis through
the use of front organizations and candidates posing as Nationalists. Pre-
vious reports have estimated that Tudeh sympathizers might win up to
twelve seats.
While the Communists apparently are gaining
strength among the worker's in all parts of Iran, there is no other indication
that they are currently as strong in Khuzistan as the labor leaders quoted
above have asserted.
7. British Foreign Office working on new compromise proposals for Egypt:
At Foreign Secretary Eden's request the
British Foreign Office has drafted a new pro-
sal for the Sudan which probably contains a
formula for recognizing Farouk as its king.
Foreign Office officials, however, show "no
great enthusiasm" for redrafting the Middle
East Command proposals at the present time
as requested after the Eden-Acheson talks. They would prefer first to
obtain Egypt's conditional agreement to join the Command and then develop
the proposals as necessary to meet the specific problems of Anglo-
Egyptian defense.
Comment: Eden has apparently abandoned his
previous opposition to any compromise on the Sudan. British and American
officials, as well as pro-Western Egyptian political leaders, have insisted
that only recognition of Farouk as King of the Sudan would persuade
Egypt to consider the defense proposals. There is still no evidence that
once such a concession had been made Egypt would give up its contention
that it can defend the Suez Canal under any circumstances except global war.
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