CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000500360001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 25, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Fleas
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25 January 1952
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c~~y Noo 4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
oacuMENr No.
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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DOS
review(s)
completed.
TOP SECRET
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 SUMMARY
FAR EAST
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1.
2.
Viet Minh general offensive in south predicted (page 3).
SOUTH ASIA
3. Comment on the abortive revolt in Nepal (page 4).
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NEAR EAST -AFRICA
5. Shah plans no action to remedy desperate Iranian situation (page 5).
6. British not disturbed by Iranian financial outlook (page 5).
7. Tunisians state willingness to accept gradual reforms (page 6).
4.
WESTERN EUROPE
8. West Berlin trade permits again rejected by USSR (page 7).
9. Eden-fears parliamentary criticism on Far East policy (page 7).
10. Government crisis reported impending in Italy (page 8).
SCANDINAVIA
11. .Comment on Finnish Premier's plea for Scandinavian neutrality
(page 8).
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FAR EAST
2. Viet Minh general offensive in south predicted:
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of February and will be
the Viet Minh will launch a general
o ensive to outh Vietnam aimed at further iso-
lating Saigon. The attack will begin near the end
"linked" with operations in Tonkin.
Comment: The major task assigned to the Viet
Minh forces in South Vietnam is to prevent by harassing operations the di-
version to Tonkin of any of the 50, 000 French troops now in South Vietnam.
The over-all position of the Viet Minh in South Vietnam, as estimated by
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rated somewhat during 1951. While some increase in Vlet Minh activity in
the south is possible, it is hardly likely that a general offensives couldbe
undertaken now.
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 SOUTH ASIA.
3. Comment on the abortive revolt in Nepalo
The one-day abortive revolt in Nepal, which
began on the night of 22 January, is indicative of the type of armed, Commu-
nist-encouraged uprising expected to occur there with increasing frequency
in the future. Its ostensible aim was to obtain broader representation for
all political groups, including the Communists, in the Nepalese Governmentm
The revolt was led by K. I. Singh, a leftist
former leader of the Nepal Congress Party which overthrew- the -century-
old, feudalistic government of -Nepal in January 1951 with unofficial Indian
assistance. He had been involved in two unsuccessful armed attempts to
unseat. the Congress Party government during 1951.
In the current uprising Singh had the aid of the
Raksha Dal, a disaffected Nepal Congress Party police organization reported-
ly containing hooligan elements and former Ynembers of the Indian National
Army, which fought for the Japanese during World War II.
Incidents such as this revolt may lead the Govern-
ment of India to conclude that the Nepalese Government is no longer capable
of maintaining order and that India should take over administration of the
state as it did in the case of Sikkim in 1948.
NEAR EAST -AFRICA
4.
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5. Shah plans no action to remedy desperate Iranian situation:
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6. British not disturbed by Iranian financial outlook:
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the
ht
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f
en
r
g
Iran's financial prospects will not
United States into granting budgetary-aid. They
cite Iran's past ability to get along despite its
periodic protests of having reached "the bottom of the barrel. "
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There is no evidence that either the Shah or
the General Staff has any plan to cope with the
deteriorating internal situation, according. to
the American Ambassador in Tehran. He agrees
with the British Ambassador that the Shah will not interfere with Prime
Minister Mossadeq's present policies, unless a situation develops in which
the Shah finds it "easier and more comfortable to do something than to do
nothings "
action. of the General Staff have been apparent for some -time. 25X1
Comment: The Shah's indecision and the in-
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According to the British Economic Counselor,
-the government might run out of currency next month, but can get along
until April by~ selling gold and foreign exchange. By that time he feels
there might be "either a new government or new policies that would enable
the country to live through its economic crisis without any severe amount
of unrest. "
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Comment: British officials, who hope that
deteriorating conditions may compel the government to come to some
agreement on the oil question, have been less worried than the US by the
possible political effects of the Iranian financial situation. Ever since
the first difficulties in 1949 over the ratification of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Campany',s Supplementary Agreement, however, the British have con-
sistently maintained that finani~ial considerations would restrain Iranian
actions.
7. Tunisians state willingness to accept gradual reforms:
The Tunisian Cabinet and the Bey are united
and undismayed by threats to depose the Bey
and other forms of French pressure. According
to an influential member of the Cabinet, the
Tunisians are moderate in their demands for greater autonomy and would
accept a gradual transfer of authority. They would not, for example, in-
sist on the immediate replacing of all the French department directors by
Tunisian Ministers.
Comment: The current riots, an outgrowth
of demonstrations staged by Tunisian nationalists, are an indication of the
strong resentment against France felt by all segments of native opinion.
;Although North Africans generally display little interest in developments
in foreign countries, incidents such as the brutal dispersal of crowds .are
creating restiveness in neighboring Algeria and Morocco...
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WESTERN EUROPE
8, West Berlin trade permits again rejected by USSR:
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Soviet authorities in aerlin on 22 January once
again rejected a large number of export permits
submitted to them by West Berlin manufacturers
for clearance.
United States High Commissioner McCloy states
that unless further investigation reveals a satisfactory explanation, the
Allies will probably drop their plan to permit the West Germans to renew
interzonal trade..
Comment: This is the first rejection of export
permits since 3 November. The renewal of Soviet harassing tactics suggests
that the Communists might risk further restrictions on interzonal trade,
provided the USSR could derive the necessary political benefits, such as
division of the Allies and increased West German sentiment for East-West
German rapprochement.
9, Eden fears parliamentary criticism on Far East policy:
ous additional British commitments on Far Eastern issues were made during
the recent Washington talks, and that the country's foreign policy remains
substantially as it was under the Labor government. The United States
Embassy reports that not only Labor Party leaders, but also important
Conservative interests with business connections in the Far East are deeply
concerned, 'The government will be severely cross-examined and criti-
cised regardless of Eden's success or failure in winning Attlee over to
continued. support of a bipartisan foreign policy.
Expecting heavy criticism from elements of
both parties when Parliament reopens on 29
January, Foreign Secretary Eden is trying to
convince Opposition leader Attlee that na seri-
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10. Government crisis reported impending in Italy:
C:i~,U~C 1,110 1L111 Vl/~Ji CaCi1L V Yct tlallcal,J., laic ~V Y G1 lliilG+3V ~ ,avuwa n.+a.l+l+v+ w= .+,
who favor larger increa an-die bill~w~rfid pro"vie, are divided on this
issue.
The United States Embassy in Rome believes
there is a possibility that the Italian Farliament
will defeat the government's bill to increase
_=the vtrages of state employees, and that this will
The fact that a parliamentary crisis is threatened
over this relatively minor issue demonstrates the d~ficulties facing Premier
d~ Gasperi and the serious opposition to the government's general financial
policy.
Comment: The proposed bill for increased
wages, which is considered inadequate by both Communist and non-Commu-
nist labor, points up only one aspect of this general discontent with the
present regime, Both the right and left wings of the Christian Democratic
Party have long been dissatisfied with the government's financial program,
and bosh, for different reasons, object to the deflationary effects of Budget
Minister Pella's conservative policies,
SCANDINAVIA
11. Comment on Finnish Premier's plea for Scandinavian neutrality:
Finnish Premier Kekkonen's published interview
in his party's newspe,per urging Finland's Scandinavian neighbors to "establish
and secure neutrality" follows hints by a Soviet diplomatic official late last
fall that the USSR would view favorably .the formation of an independent
Scandinavian defense allianceo Kekkonen emphasized the benefit to Finland
of having neutrality assured in the north, since this would remove even a
theoretical threat to the USSR of invasion through Finland.
While Prime Minister Kekkonen has not hesitated
in the past to use his ability to deal with the Russians for personal internal
political reasons, his recent successes in the Finnish Parliament would make
it unnecessary for him at this time to make his statement for such reasons.
It is possible, ,therefore, that Kekkonen put out this feeler at the behest of the
USSR.
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