Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 8, 2003
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Publication Date: 
March 11, 1952
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A000600140001-9.pdf213.4 KB
Approved Foe e~3/1 rip -&T0097 000600140001-9 25X1 11 March 1952 25X1 Copy No- J CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. _ ._- -.1 - ---a~ NO CHANGE - V'! ':j HEXT OEVI l';' Car'' AUTH: Nfi 70-2 25X1 25X1 25X1 State Department review completed office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25X1 Approved For Release-' SECRET : IM- oAMM600140001-9 25X1 Approved For 25X1A SUMMARY 25X1 FAR EAST 1. Political tension in Thailand continues (page 3). NEAR EAST - AFRICA 0140001-9 o. britisn ore gn Office studying revision of Anglo-Iraqi military treaty (page 5). EASTERN EUROPE . lan in Trieste plan demonstration favoring Territory's return to Italy (page 6).. 8. French and British Ambassadors oppose pressuring Yugoslavia on Trieste issue (page 7). SCANDINAVIA 9. US Minister fears Icelandic political crisis (page 7). LATIN AMERICA 10.. Comment on Cuban coup (page 8). 25X1A Approved Ff 25X1A 25X1 25X1 Approved Fo 25X1A 25X1A FAF EAST 1. Political tension in Thailand continues: Police Director General Phao was primarily responsible for forcing the King of Thailand to sign tha new constitution and thereby ca- pitulate to the ruling military cliqu 25X1 25X1 The American Embassy in Bangkok, states. that although the militarist group is "only one step away" from the ultimate goal of complete power, competition for Phibun' s office between Phao and his chief rival, Assistant Army Commander Sarit, would create a serious internal conflict, possibly resulting in violence. Comment: The Phao-Sarit rivalr has 25X1 been a threat to Thai stability. 25X1 as a result of events in the past tew aays, e chances of violence between followers of these two leaders before 12 March are "even. " In the past, compromise agreements on Phibun as Premier have prevented the outbreak of violence between rival 25X1 political groups, 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000400140001-9 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000600140001-9 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000600140001-9 Approved Foil 25X1A 5. British Foreign Office studying revision of Anglo-Iraqi military treaty: 25X1A The British Foreign Office is now formulating tentative proposals for a revision of the Anglo- Iraqi Defense Treaty in case the Iraqi Prime Minister should feel compelled by domestic pressure to initiate discussions on the subject. The Foreign Office is considering modifications which would turn the two air bases now operated by the RAF over to the Iraqis who would then invite Britain to use them. Other suggestions are also under study. Comment: The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, which provides Britain with the use of two air bases in Iraq and any necessary facilities in time of war, expires in 1955. In 1948 the Iraqi government which initialled a revision of this treaty was forced out of office. Since that time the issue has been dormant except for sporadic outbreaks of nationalist agitation, specifically following denunciation by Egypt of its treaty with Britain. 25X1A Approved ForiRelease 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000400140001-9 25X1A 25X1A Pro-Italian elements in Trieste are planning a demonstration for 20 March to mark the fourth anniversary of the tripartite declaration calling for a return of the entire territory to Italy. The American Political Adviser comments that this action is obviously designed to commit the United States and Britain to support of the tripartite declaration through the local Allied Military Government's approval of the demonstration. -6- Approved Fo 25X1A 7. Italians in Trieste plan demonstration favoring Territory's return to Italy: Approved F 25X1A Approved Fo 25X1A Comment: 25X1A Premier a Gasperi is undoubtedly giving uno icia up- port to the proposed demonstration as a means of strengthening popular support for his Western-oriented government in face of the forthcoming Italian elections. 8. French and British Ambassadors oppose pressuring Yugoslaviaon Trieste issue: about a solution of the Trieste issue. They believe that the application of pressure would undermine the current Western policy of buttressing Yugoslav independence by supplying aid with no political conditions. According to the American Charge, the.French and British Ambassadors in Belgrade are very much opposed to the employment of economic pressure on Yugoslavia in order to bring SCANDINAVIA 25X1A 9. US Minister fears Icelandic political crisis: that "a serious political situation must be anticipated.," A withdrawal of the Progressives, particularl on the eve of Admiral McCormick's visit to Iceland next week, would gravely prejudice current US efforts to con- clude detailed arrangements for additional defense facilities. The American Minister to Iceland reports that party conflicts within the Conservative- Pro- gressive coalition government over the balance of payments situation have become so bitter The Minister strongly urges granting Iceland's request for immediate American economic aid. 7 Approved F~ 25X1A 25X1 Approved Fob- Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0006g0140001-9 25X1A Comment: The Progressive Party,. which has for some time been seeking issue on which to withdraw from the Cabinets violently opposes the imposition of additional import restrictions to meet the balance of payments crisis. LATIN AMERICA 10. Comment on Cuban coup: The almost bloodless revolt precipitated by General Fulgencio Batista is still in progress. Batista's success cannot be determined at this time, inasmuch as he controls all communications in Havana. All police and military officials in the Havana area appear to on his side. Batista, former dictator of Cuba, and a senator since 1948, has been a candidate for the presidency in the coming June elections. He headed the United Action Party, which placed third in t4 e October 1951 party listings with less than 10 percent of the total registered voters. Since that time, his chances for attaining the presidency had diminished considerably, and it may have been his deteriorating position which impelled him to strike this sudden blow. 25X1A Approved ForlRelease 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00060p140001-9