CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A000600300001-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 16, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 29, 1952
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A000600300001-1.pdf207.64 KB
Body: 
State Departm tpw or er&t2JR/10S Rb ..91f00975A` 0600300001-1 25X1 completed 29 March 1952 25X1 25X1 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLAS" CLASS. -^ r AUTH: I11 ~+;-': LATE.Q 25X1 Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For 0. 12M srrvr "-: "'" ""-00975A000600300001-1 2. 3. SUMMARY 4. 5. 25X1 FAR EAST 25X1 25X1 5X1A Approved For Release 2003/10/22: CIA-RDP79T00975A0006 North Korean Air Force increases activity at Sariwon (page 4). NEAR. EAST - AFRICA Iranian Prime Minister reportedly will remain in office (page 5). WESTERN EUROPE 6. French weigh possibilities of new Berlin blockade (page 6). 7. French Cabinet seen safe until June (page 7), LATIN AMERICA 8. Possible military coup in Colombia (page 7). 25X1A 25X1A Approved F 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000600300001-1 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000600300001-1 25X1A Approved Fo 25X1 25X1A 3. North Korean Air Force increases activity at Sariwon: 0300001-1 United Nations aerial reconnaissance on 24 March disclosed that two airfields in the Sariwon area, 35 miles south of Pyongyang, had been repaired and that their runways were operational. Comment: 25X1 25X1 The enemy's unwillingness, thus far, to provide adequate jet fighter coverage this far south would seem to rule out Sariwon's utility as an operational Communist airfield. It is possi- ble, however, that the Communists are seeking to establish operational air installations within North Korea either in anticipation of a cease- fire or in preparation for a renewed offensive. Approved Fo 25X1A 0300001-1 25X1 Approved NEAR EAST - AFRICA 4. Iranian Prime Minister reportedly will remain in office: 25X1A Prime Minister Mossadeq apparently has decided not to resign when the new Majlis meets, according to Minister of Court Ala. Mossadeq, in conversation with Ala, spoke as though he intended to remain in office indefinitely, and indicated that he will abandon efforts to revive Iran's oil industry and concentrate on balancing the national budget without the oil income. The Shah has left Tehran for a ten-day rest. According to Ala, the Shah had been counting on Mossadeq's voluntary resignation. Comment: Mossadeq recently told a special Iranian Senate committee that he intended to concentrate on the Iranian budget and would in particular attempt to collect taxes from those merchants and landlords who had so far evaded payment, Meanwhile, Iran's financial situation is steadily growing worse, and the funds available to the government for the month ending 21 March barely covered government salaries and wage commit- ments. 25X1 50 25X1A 25X1A ApprovediFer Release 2003 2' CI RDP79Tnna Approved Fo 25X1 25X1A WESTERN EUROPE 25X1 25X1A 6. French weigh possibilities of new Berlin blockade: 25X1 the Russians are planning a blockade o er in, possibly extended this time to include the air corridors to the city. French Foreign Office officials,; while not unduly disquieted believe that there is a possibility of some sort of blockade, but do not ink it would be extended to air communication. Comment: While a blockade now could serve as pressure on the West to agree to a four-power conference on the whole German question, such a move appears unlikely at this time. Although the USSR can now by-pass the Western sectors of Berlin by rail, the canal by-pass will not be completed before fall. Combined, these two projects are designed to reduce vulnerability to Allied retaliation. A blockade now might also destroy the appeal of the current Soviet campaign for unification and a peace treaty. Approved F~ 25X1A 25X1 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A 25X1 Approved Fo 7. French Cabinet seen safe until June. p a s will probably be approved by the As- sembly early in April, in the opinion of the American Embassy in Paris. He would then be assured tenure until June, because of public pressure that he should be given time to apply his program. bud etar Most of the deputies expected to vote for his g y program have serious doubts, however, that it is practical enough to avert a collapse later in the year, should his "confidence', policy fail. The Embassy considers that, in this event, pressure for cutting French commitments in Indochina would rise. been pessimistic on Pinay's c ances: of successmpetent observers have Wh the French public's unprecedentedly active interest in the ecen tiigovernment crisis may temporarily avert a parliamentary showdown over partisan issues, there is no evidence that his "climate of confidence" is a satisfactory substitute for financial reform. French Premier Pinay has been so successful in obtaining public support for his "stability- without-sacrifices'" program that his budget pro os l LATIN AMERICA 8. Possible military coup in Colombia: Rodriguez, President Gomez and President-designate Urdaneta both fear that extreme rightists in __ -VVII U, I issatisfac ion with government policy ? Increased with guerrilla activities has reportedllled coping group of high army officers, headed by Com- mander of the A rmy Colonel Mariano Ospina to plan a revolt. The government now la forces of officers whose loya lty to the present re imeti purge the armed g s doubtful. 25X1A Apprq -7- ved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975 000600300001-1 Approved Fo Release 2003/10/22: CIA-RDP79TOO975A00069 Comment: Despite heavy governmental expenditures for anti-guerrilla action, insurgent strength has increased in personnel, organization and arms, and has seriously lowered the prestige of the present administration. The government's counter- measures can be expected to avert any immediate threat, but political instability will continue. because of increased army dissatisfaction with failure to suppress guerrilla activities. Some individual Communists have been reported cooperating with guerrilla bands, which in general, support the Liberal Party, To date there has been no indication that the Communist Party has adopted cooperation as a policy. 25X1A Approvefd For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975Ag00600300001-1