CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A000600300001-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 16, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 29, 1952
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
State Departm tpw or er&t2JR/10S Rb ..91f00975A` 0600300001-1
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29 March 1952
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLAS"
CLASS. -^ r
AUTH: I11 ~+;-':
LATE.Q
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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2.
3.
SUMMARY
4.
5.
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FAR EAST
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North Korean Air Force increases activity at Sariwon (page 4).
NEAR. EAST - AFRICA
Iranian Prime Minister reportedly will remain in office (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
6. French weigh possibilities of new Berlin blockade (page 6).
7. French Cabinet seen safe until June (page 7),
LATIN AMERICA
8. Possible military coup in Colombia (page 7).
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3. North Korean Air Force increases activity at Sariwon:
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United Nations aerial reconnaissance on
24 March disclosed that two airfields in the
Sariwon area, 35 miles south of Pyongyang,
had been repaired and that their runways were
operational.
Comment:
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The enemy's unwillingness, thus far, to
provide adequate jet fighter coverage this far south would seem to rule
out Sariwon's utility as an operational Communist airfield. It is possi-
ble, however, that the Communists are seeking to establish operational
air installations within North Korea either in anticipation of a cease-
fire or in preparation for a renewed offensive.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Iranian Prime Minister reportedly will remain in office:
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Prime Minister Mossadeq apparently has
decided not to resign when the new Majlis
meets, according to Minister of Court Ala.
Mossadeq, in conversation with Ala, spoke as
though he intended to remain in office indefinitely, and indicated that he
will abandon efforts to revive Iran's oil industry and concentrate on
balancing the national budget without the oil income.
The Shah has left Tehran for a ten-day rest.
According to Ala, the Shah had been counting on Mossadeq's voluntary
resignation.
Comment: Mossadeq recently told a special
Iranian Senate committee that he intended to concentrate on the Iranian
budget and would in particular attempt to collect taxes from those
merchants and landlords who had so far evaded payment,
Meanwhile, Iran's financial situation is steadily
growing worse, and the funds available to the government for the month
ending 21 March barely covered government salaries and wage commit-
ments.
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WESTERN EUROPE
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6. French weigh possibilities of new Berlin blockade:
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the Russians are planning a blockade o
er in, possibly extended this time to include
the air corridors to the city.
French Foreign Office officials,; while not
unduly disquieted believe that there
is a possibility of some sort of blockade, but do not ink it would be
extended to air communication.
Comment: While a blockade now could serve
as pressure on the West to agree to a four-power conference on the whole
German question, such a move appears unlikely at this time.
Although the USSR can now by-pass the Western
sectors of Berlin by rail, the canal by-pass will not be completed before
fall. Combined, these two projects are designed to reduce vulnerability
to Allied retaliation. A blockade now might also destroy the appeal of
the current Soviet campaign for unification and a peace treaty.
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7. French Cabinet seen safe until June.
p
a
s will probably be approved by the As-
sembly early in April, in the opinion of the American Embassy in Paris.
He would then be assured tenure until June, because of public pressure
that he should be given time to apply his program.
bud etar Most of the deputies expected to vote for his
g y program have serious doubts, however, that it is practical
enough to avert a collapse later in the year, should his "confidence', policy
fail. The Embassy considers that, in this event, pressure for cutting
French commitments in Indochina would rise.
been pessimistic on Pinay's c ances: of successmpetent observers have
Wh the French
public's unprecedentedly active interest in the ecen
tiigovernment crisis
may temporarily avert a parliamentary showdown over partisan issues,
there is no evidence that his "climate of confidence" is a satisfactory
substitute for financial reform.
French Premier Pinay has been so successful
in obtaining public support for his "stability-
without-sacrifices'" program that his budget
pro
os
l
LATIN AMERICA
8. Possible military coup in Colombia:
Rodriguez,
President Gomez and President-designate
Urdaneta both fear that extreme rightists in
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issatisfac ion with government policy ? Increased
with guerrilla activities has reportedllled coping
group of high army officers, headed by Com-
mander of the
A
rmy Colonel Mariano Ospina
to plan a revolt.
The government now la
forces of officers whose loya
lty to the present re imeti purge the armed
g s doubtful.
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Comment: Despite heavy governmental
expenditures for anti-guerrilla action, insurgent strength has increased
in personnel, organization and arms, and has seriously lowered the
prestige of the present administration. The government's counter-
measures can be expected to avert any immediate threat, but political
instability will continue. because of increased army dissatisfaction with
failure to suppress guerrilla activities.
Some individual Communists have been reported
cooperating with guerrilla bands, which in general, support the Liberal
Party, To date there has been no indication that the Communist Party
has adopted cooperation as a policy.
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