CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A000900420001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 30, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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30 November 1952
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. New Delhi sees Moscow and Peiping at variance on Korean truce
(page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. French commander estimates situation at Na San (page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. British Ambassador sees need for concessions on Sudan (page 5).
5. Ambassador Caffery advocates British cotton purchases to ease
Egypt's crisis (page 5).
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GENERAL
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Y, New Delhi sees 11oscow and Peiping at variance on Korean truce:
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Ambassador Bowles has found that Prime
Minister Nehru, Indian Foreign Office
officialsrand most chiefs of diplomatic
missions in New Delhi believe that the
Soviet Union and Communist China have
not seen "eye to eye',' on the Korean truce question.
The Indian officials maintain that Peiping
led them to believe that their truce plan "might" be acceptable. The
violence of Vyshinsky'' attack on their plan is construed as Soviet
pressure to prevent Peiping's acceptance.
Comment: As far as is known, Peiping's
encouragement of the Indian proposal amounted to no more than an
indication that removal of the POW's from American control would
be a step in the right direction. Soviet and Satellite spokesmen at
the UN were hinting at the same time that a compromise was possible.
Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai
echoed Vyshinsky's rejection of the Indian plan, and there, is still no
evidence of Sino-Soviet disagreement on Korean truce issues.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2e French commander estimates situation at Na San:
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The commander of French-Vietnamese
troops in the Na San sector believes that
the Viet Minh must attack within two or
three weeks or withdraw, owing to its
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inability to maintain supply routes in the face of air interdiction.
According to the Assistant US Army Attache in Hanoi, the commander
states that his forces are prepared to hold Na San for one month, re-
pulsing any Viet Minh attack. When the enemy begins to withdraw, he
plans to drop paratroop units across their lines and gradually retake
the Son La sector.
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The attache comments that this estimate appears
optimistic, in view of the Viet Minh's ability to maintain supply lines thus
far, and.maintenance difficulties of the French Air Force. He points to
the possibility.'.that the Viet.Minh may'not attack until a period of bad
weather deprives French Union forces of air supply and fighter-bomber
support.
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4. British Ambassador sees need for concessions on Sudan.-
The British Ambassador in Cairo believes
that his discussions with the Egyptian Govern-
ment on the future of the Sudan have reached
the breaking point unless Britain makes some
concessions.
According to the Ambassador, General Nagib
feels he has made his major concession in abandoning the concept of
"unity of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian crown. " In Nagib's view
there must now be some public recognition of Egyptian control in
Sudanese affairs through Egyptian representation on a Governor Gen-
eral's council having administrative authority.
Comment.- A breakdown of these discussions,
in addition to prejudicing the s owly developing good relations between
Egypt and. the West, would cause internal political difficulties in the
Sudan. All the major political groups there, with the possible exception
of those in the primitive tribal south, are united in support of the agree-
ments they worked out with Egypt in late October.
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5. Ambassador Caffery advocates British cotton purchases to ease Egypt's
crisis:
American Ambassador Caffery in Cairo believes
that it is. imperative for Great Britain to buy
cotton from Egypt immediately as a stopgap
measure to relieve its economic crisis. Such
action, Caffery feels, would also assist the
Anglo-Egyptian. negotiations, now at a critical
stage.
The British Foreign Office, according to the
American Embassy in London, is worried over Egypt's financial situation
and is considering the possibility of economic aid.
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Comment: On 23 November the Egyptian
Government decreed the indefinite closing of the Alexandria cotton
market because of the heavy recession in prices.
General Nagib has previously indicated that
he believes Great Britain is putting economic pressure on his regime
by withholding cotton purchases.
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