CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A001000060001-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 30, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 8, 1953
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A001000060001-3.pdf284.32 KB
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se 20CPR"9T00'/ 25 / DOS REVIEW / COMPLETED 8 January 1953 Copy No, 58 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN jCIJMENT NP- 9-No CFANGr_ W CL ASS. C I)EGLASS05D NEXT REVIEW DATE: CLASS. CHANGED-,(); TS Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25X1 4 25X12 25X1 se 20 T 'My W. 0 0 /////Z~ /K/Z mz F - llqk,,6wpr9 0 2&9?Wv SUMMARY GENERAL 1. Status of Egyptian-Soviet barter agreement uncertain (page 3). 2. Egypt softens attitude toward West German-Israeli .restitution agreement (page 3). 3. Turkish Foreign Minister favors Yugoslav membership in NATO (page 4). FAR EAST 4. Chinese Nationalists admittedly not ready for mainland invasion (page 5). SOUTHEAST ASIA 5. Burmese (page 5). seriously disturbed over Chinese Nationalists WESTERN EUROPE 25X1 9. Backing for Mayer in French Parliament uncertain (page LATIN AMERICA 10. Attempted coup strengthens leftists in Bolivia (page 8). 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001000060001-3 Xo'Ac1 GENERAL 25X1A 25X1A 1. Status of Egyptian-Soviet barter agreement uncertain, 25X1 Egypt has concluded a barter deal with the Soviet Union providing for an exchange of cotton valued at 3,000,000 pounds sterling in return for industrial materials, chiefly machinery, trade negotia- 25X1 tions were in progress with Poland, Czech- oslovakia, and Communist China. The Egyptian Government, however, has denied that the barter deal with the Soviet Union has gone "beyond the exploratory stages." It has also stated that it is not negotiating a cotton agreement with Poland, Czechoslovakia, or China. Comment, The Nagib regime is under in- creasing pressure to seek cotton markets because Britain, Egypt's major customer, is curtailing purchases. The Soviet Union and Egypt have had barter arrangements in the past. Aside from possible propaganda opportu- nities, the USSR. and Orbit nations may be particularly interested in cotton purchases, since the Soviet: crop in 1952 was poor and the Orbit has had an inadequate supply for several years. 2. Egypt softens attitude toward West German-Israeli restitution agree- ment.* tution agreement if Bonn agreed to buy appreciable quantities of cotton, to send an industrial mission to Cairo, and to have a "neutral" observer supervise goods going to Israel. ave stated Egypt would no longer a ac the German-Israeli resti- 25X1A 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001000060001-3 2 3 #*e I not to pass 25X1 this information to anyone in the Egyptian Government or in the Arab League. He added that he would probably have trouble in the forth- coming meeting of the League's Political Committee over this problem. Comment- This is the first time that any Arab state has made a conciliatory gesture on the Israeli restitution agreement. Any such arrangement between Cairo and Bonn is likely to be strongly criticized by the other Arab countries as well as by Israel. 3. Turkish Foreign Minister favors Yugoslav membership in NATO. 25X1A months, and that other countries would have no objection if Italy could be persuaded to approve. Turkish Foreign Minister Koprulu believes the time will shortly be ripe to attach Yugo- slavia to NATO. He believes the Yugoslavs would accept membership in two or three If direct admission is impossible, he be- lieves a Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav alliance with reciprocal guarantees with NATO would be an alternative. Comment. No other member has suggested that Yugoslavia be admitted, to NATO and Italy would be strongly opposed. While the Yugoslav attitude toward firm military planning with Western powers has changed markedly in the last two months, there have been no indications that the Yugoslav's would yet go so far as to become an actual NATO member. Koprulu's statement is in line with his desire to subordinate any agreement with Greece and Yugoslavia to Turkey's NATO commitments. The British Foreign Office has expressed a view that guarantees of assistance to Yugoslavia in case of attack can not be given by NATO, or by any member or groups of members of NATO. 25X1A Approv4d For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0010g0060001-3 25% *ve FAR EAST 4. Chinese Nationalists admittedly not ready for mainland invasion, 25X1 25X1A Chinese Nationalist leaders realize that an invasion of Communist China by their ore-es would require "Years" of prepara- tion, The American Embassy comments that many a ions is leaders have recently expressed this thought. Comment, Nationalist opinion on this question changed sharply during M,5_2. As late as last July, Chiang Kai-shek told an American official that he believed an early invasion of the mainland, with American support, to be feasible. In his 1953 New Year's statement, however, Chiang described the coming year as one of preparation for action. SOUTHEAST ASIA 25X1 5. Burmese seriously disturbed over Chinese Nationalists 25X1A enter. from Thailand and that he was undecided whether to concentrate Burmese forces, against the Communist insurgents or the Nationalists. Comment, In recent weeks, Burmese officials have been increasingly conc. enrce aver reports that the Chinese Nationalists are receiving supplies and reinforcements from Thailand. Their concern is aggravated by increasing Nationalist cooperation with the insurgent Karens. Burmese tated on 7 January that the problem resulting from the presence of Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma has "reached serious proportions." He saLd that additional Nationalist units have 25X1A 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001000P060001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO01000060001-3 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO01000060001-3 __Approved 9. Backing for Mayer in French Parliament uncertain: Although Radical Socialist leader R ene Mayer has been authorized to form n cabinet th e 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO01000p60001-3 has been a real meeting of minds with the Gaullists and the Popular Republicans. The Gaullists apparently believe that Mayer is willing to surrender the supranational character of the EDC; the Popular Republicans, however, are convinced that he intends to defend this aspect of the treaty and they may insist that the new Foreign Minister be from their ranks. Comment- Lack of Socialist support forced Mayer to effect an apparent reconciliation of Gaullist and Popular Republican views on the EDC in order to obtain a larger vote than Pinay. Disagreement between these two parties over Mayer's can- didate for Foreign Minister, however, could still result in the Na- tional Assembly's failure to approve his cabinet. If Mayer is confirmed as premier, he may have the advantage of alternative supporting majorities, one including the Gaullists on domestic issues, and the other without that party but including the Socialists on foreign policy. LATIN AMERICA 25X1A 10. Attempted coup strengthens leftists in Bolivia: The United States Embassy in La Paz be- lieves that the attempted revolt in Bolivia on 6 January was precipitated by the de- cision of President Paz to side with Juan Lechin and the left wing of the governing National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) in the army reorganization controversy. The "premature and abortive" coupat- tempted by right-wing military and civilian leaders of the MNR was frustrated by prompt government action, The Lechin group may now dominate the government. Appro 25X1A Ap2rJ rj For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO0100 060001-3 Comment: The right wing of the MNR had planned to reopen the military academy and recruit a new army in order to counterbalance the superior might of the armed laborers. Lechin, however, reportedly threatened a revolt if Paz supported this plan. -9, 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001g00060001-3