CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A001000060001-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 30, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 8, 1953
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
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Body:
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/ DOS REVIEW
/ COMPLETED
8 January 1953
Copy No,
58
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
jCIJMENT NP-
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C I)EGLASS05D
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
CLASS. CHANGED-,(); TS
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Status of Egyptian-Soviet barter agreement uncertain (page 3).
2. Egypt softens attitude toward West German-Israeli .restitution
agreement (page 3).
3. Turkish Foreign Minister favors Yugoslav membership in NATO
(page 4).
FAR EAST
4. Chinese Nationalists admittedly not ready for mainland invasion
(page 5).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
5. Burmese
(page 5).
seriously disturbed over Chinese Nationalists
WESTERN EUROPE
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9.
Backing for Mayer in French Parliament uncertain (page
LATIN AMERICA
10. Attempted coup strengthens leftists in Bolivia (page 8).
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GENERAL
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1. Status of Egyptian-Soviet barter agreement uncertain,
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Egypt has concluded a barter deal with the
Soviet Union providing for an exchange of
cotton valued at 3,000,000 pounds sterling
in return for industrial materials, chiefly
machinery, trade negotia- 25X1
tions were in progress with Poland, Czech-
oslovakia, and Communist China.
The Egyptian Government, however, has
denied that the barter deal with the Soviet Union has gone "beyond the
exploratory stages." It has also stated that it is not negotiating a cotton
agreement with Poland, Czechoslovakia, or China.
Comment, The Nagib regime is under in-
creasing pressure to seek cotton markets because Britain, Egypt's
major customer, is curtailing purchases. The Soviet Union and
Egypt have had barter arrangements in the past.
Aside from possible propaganda opportu-
nities, the USSR. and Orbit nations may be particularly interested in
cotton purchases, since the Soviet: crop in 1952 was poor and the Orbit
has had an inadequate supply for several years.
2. Egypt softens attitude toward West German-Israeli restitution agree-
ment.*
tution agreement if Bonn agreed to buy appreciable quantities of cotton,
to send an industrial mission to Cairo, and to have a "neutral" observer
supervise goods going to Israel.
ave stated Egypt would
no longer a ac the German-Israeli resti-
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this information to anyone in the Egyptian Government or in the Arab
League. He added that he would probably have trouble in the forth-
coming meeting of the League's Political Committee over this problem.
Comment- This is the first time that any
Arab state has made a conciliatory gesture on the Israeli restitution
agreement. Any such arrangement between Cairo and Bonn is likely
to be strongly criticized by the other Arab countries as well as by
Israel.
3. Turkish Foreign Minister favors Yugoslav membership in NATO.
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months, and that other countries would have no objection if Italy could
be persuaded to approve.
Turkish Foreign Minister Koprulu believes
the time will shortly be ripe to attach Yugo-
slavia to NATO. He believes the Yugoslavs
would accept membership in two or three
If direct admission is impossible, he be-
lieves a Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav alliance with reciprocal guarantees
with NATO would be an alternative.
Comment. No other member has suggested
that Yugoslavia be admitted, to NATO and Italy would be strongly opposed.
While the Yugoslav attitude toward firm military planning with Western
powers has changed markedly in the last two months, there have been
no indications that the Yugoslav's would yet go so far as to become an
actual NATO member.
Koprulu's statement is in line with his desire
to subordinate any agreement with Greece and Yugoslavia to Turkey's
NATO commitments. The British Foreign Office has expressed a view
that guarantees of assistance to Yugoslavia in case of attack can not be
given by NATO, or by any member or groups of members of NATO.
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FAR EAST
4. Chinese Nationalists admittedly not ready for mainland invasion,
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Chinese Nationalist leaders realize that
an invasion of Communist China by their
ore-es would require "Years" of prepara-
tion,
The American Embassy comments that many a ions is
leaders have recently expressed this thought.
Comment, Nationalist opinion on this
question changed sharply during M,5_2. As late as last July, Chiang
Kai-shek told an American official that he believed an early invasion
of the mainland, with American support, to be feasible. In his 1953
New Year's statement, however, Chiang described the coming year
as one of preparation for action.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
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enter. from Thailand and that he was undecided whether to concentrate
Burmese forces, against the Communist insurgents or the Nationalists.
Comment, In recent weeks, Burmese officials
have been increasingly conc. enrce aver reports that the Chinese Nationalists
are receiving supplies and reinforcements from Thailand. Their concern
is aggravated by increasing Nationalist cooperation with the insurgent
Karens.
Burmese tated
on 7 January that the problem resulting from
the presence of Chinese Nationalist troops
in Burma has "reached serious proportions."
He saLd that additional Nationalist units have
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9. Backing for Mayer in French Parliament uncertain:
Although Radical Socialist leader R ene Mayer
has been authorized to form n cabinet th
e
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has been a real meeting of minds with the Gaullists and the Popular
Republicans. The Gaullists apparently believe that Mayer is willing
to surrender the supranational character of the EDC; the Popular
Republicans, however, are convinced that he intends to defend this
aspect of the treaty and they may insist that the new Foreign Minister
be from their ranks.
Comment- Lack of Socialist support forced
Mayer to effect an apparent reconciliation of Gaullist and Popular
Republican views on the EDC in order to obtain a larger vote than
Pinay. Disagreement between these two parties over Mayer's can-
didate for Foreign Minister, however, could still result in the Na-
tional Assembly's failure to approve his cabinet.
If Mayer is confirmed as premier, he may
have the advantage of alternative supporting majorities, one including
the Gaullists on domestic issues, and the other without that party but
including the Socialists on foreign policy.
LATIN AMERICA
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10. Attempted coup strengthens leftists in Bolivia:
The United States Embassy in La Paz be-
lieves that the attempted revolt in Bolivia
on 6 January was precipitated by the de-
cision of President Paz to side with Juan
Lechin and the left wing of the governing National Revolutionary
Movement (MNR) in the army reorganization controversy.
The "premature and abortive" coupat-
tempted by right-wing military and civilian leaders of the MNR was
frustrated by prompt government action, The Lechin group may now
dominate the government.
Appro
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Comment: The right wing of the MNR had
planned to reopen the military academy and recruit a new army in
order to counterbalance the superior might of the armed laborers.
Lechin, however, reportedly threatened a revolt if Paz supported
this plan.
-9,
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