CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001100450001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 23, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 20, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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20 May 1953
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
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Office of Current Intelligence
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. Comment on appointment of new Soviet charge in Yugoslavia
(page 3).
FAR EAST
Comment on prospects for new Japanese government (page 3).
3. Decline in Chinese Communist agricultural output foreseen
(page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Thailand to appeal to UN on Communist threat (page 4).
V? Li Mi reportedly seeking to return to Burma :(:page 5).
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WESTERN EUROPE
West German populace seen standing firm against Moscow's
unity overtures (page 6).
8. Belgian EDC ratification seen unlikely before fall (page 7).
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SOVIET UNION
1. Comment on appointment of new Soviet charge in Yugoslavia:
The appointment of S. P. Kirsanov as new
Soviet charge in Yugoslavia may foreshadow a Soviet effort to
resume normal diplomatic relations. Kirsanov was minister to
Bulgaria from August 1945 to late 1947 and ambassador there until
March 1948. He was chief of the Southeastern European department
of the Soviet Foreign Ministry from March 1949 to August 1952.
It is unlikely that the USSR would go so far
as to offer to reestablish closer economic and cultural relations,
which could have serious repercussions throughout the Orbit.
Probably realizing that Yugoslavia would reject any such attempts,
the USSR is more likely to indulge in tactics designed to undermine
Yugoslav relations with the West.
FAR EAST
2. Comment on prospects for new Japanese government.
The loss of control by Prime Minister
Yoshida's Liberal Party of the top parliamentary positions in the
Diet and the party's minority position in the Diet's standing commit-
tees emphasize the weakness of Yoshida's position. as newly re-
elected Japanese premier.
Yoshida is expected to seek the support of
the Progressive Party in forming the new government, or failing
this, to gain its cooperation from outside the cabinet. Business
and financial interests have been exerting strong pressure for a
rapprochement between the Liberals and the Progressives in the
interests of a stabilized political scene.
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Should Yoshida and Shigemitsu, the leader
of the Progressives, fail to agree on terms for cooperation, ,it is
possible that one or more of the factions within; the, Progressives
could be weaned away from their party to give Yoshida a tenuous
working majority. In any event, the government seems destined
for a short and stormy life.
3. Decline in Chinese Communist agricultural output foreseen:
was preaictea ny Peiping in a 17 May
broadcast which stated that poor weather
had affected crops throughout China.
Comment: Wheat and other winter grains
,
due for harvesting soon, constitute 25 to 30 percent of China's
total crops. Adverse weather also may have affected crops planted
in the spring.
Although an increase of nine percent in
grain production was planned for 1953, this report indicates that
production may fall below the 1952 level. Peiping has reiterated
the need for bumper crops to provide revenues and exports to
support an expanded industrial construction program.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Thailand to appeal to UN on Communist threat:
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invasion of Laos.
Premier Phibun told Ambassador Stanton
on 19 May that he and his cabinet have
decided to place before the UN the threat
posed to Thailand by the Communist
Drafting of the resolution is now under way.
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Phibun said that the French ambassador, on instructions from Paris, was
exerting great pressure to forestall Thailand's contemplated action.
Comment. Thailand's aim in :approaching the UN
would be to obtain a greater American or UN commitment to defend Thai-
land from any future Communist aggression.
5. Li Mi reportedly seeking to return to Burma:
According to General Phao of the Thai police,
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return to his Mong Hsat base in Burma through
Thailand. American ambassador Stanton ad-
vised Phao that permission should be granted
only if Li indicated that he would facilitate the
evacuation of his troops.
On 18 May the Chinese Nationalist assistant
milita y attache in Bangkok said that Li's deputy in Burma had just
cabled that "all loyal" Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma would evac-
uate "under proper orders."
Comment: Li's presence in Mong Hsat could
contribute more than any other factor to a successful evacuation. There
is much evidence, however, that with the support of Chiang Kai-she.k,
he would seek to prevent the mixed committee set up to consider the
problem of evacuation from achieving any substantial success.
There is reason to believe that the Chinese
Nationalist representative on the mixed committee is being used to
mask the intentions of Li and Chiang not to permit the removal of the
troops from Burma, despite his assurances to Ambassador Stanton
that he has been instructed to do everything possible to implement
the TIN resolution calling for evacuation.
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WESTERN EUROPE
7. West German populace seen standing firm against Moscow's unity
overtures:
unity offers which would leave Germany neutralized without general
European disarmament. Even the opposition Social Democrats now
admit that Germany must be armed.
American officials declare that in the past year the West German
populace has become convinced of the importance of ignorin Soviet
According to American officials in Bonn,
West German public opinion would support
an Allied rejection of any Moscow offer for
a neutralized unified Germany These
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Comments French foreign minister Bidault,
fearing that Moscow might propose the unity of Germany at the price
of its neutralization, plans soon to send a note to Britain and the
United States. recommending four-power talks with disarmament as
the first agenda item followed by the Austrian and German problems.
Although West German opinion would prob-
ablty support a rejection of a Soviet unity offer, there is still general
public desire for four-power talks. Few West Germans, however,
believe that such talks would result in an agreement.
8. Belgian EDC ratificaaton seen unlikely before fall,.
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An influential and strongly pro-EDC member
of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives'
EDC committee considers ratification ex-
tremely unlikely before the fall session. He
ce a posse e y o peace talks, France's lethargic attitude, and
Foreign Minister van Zeeland's equivocal support of the treaty as
delaying factors,
He plans to present, on behalf of his party,
a proposal endorsing the opposition view that the treaty requires
constitutional revision, and believes that this will later assure
ratification.
Comment,. This is the first indication that
the government may concede the need for constitutional amendment,
which requires pew elections.
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