CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001100620001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 10, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
S State Department review completed
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. USSR reverses stand on Soviet dependents of US citizens in Russia
a e3.
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FAR EAST
'~;"' South Korean government to launch intensive new antiarmistice campaign
a e3.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
Yunnanese Nationalist troops in Burma reportedly opposed to evacuation
(page 5).
NEAR EAST -AFRICA
Commonwealth prime ministers fail to urge British concessions to
Egypt (pale 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
8, East Germans reverse decision on physical-military training for
party members (page 6).
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SOVIET UNION
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1. USSR reverses stand on Soviet dependents of U5 citizens in Russia:
he Soviet government informed the US embassy
'n Moscow on 6 June that it would approve the
ong-standing application for exit visas .for the
oviet wives and. children of some US citizens.
Comment: This decision amounts to only a
minor concession. The removal of such long-
standing irritants constitutes a step toward the
appearance of more normal diplomatic relations.
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FAR EAST
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3. South Korean government to launch intensive new antiarmistice campaign:
mbassador Briggs reports that the South Korean
overnment is about to launch a new and more
' ntensive antiarmistice campaign. It will maintain
-3-
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that the United States is "responsible" for Korean unification, demand
the immediate release of all anti-Communist POW's, and urge the use
of force to prevent the entry of neutral supervisory troops.
The ambassador believes that the new drive
will be more explosive than previous ones since it will coincide with
final armistice negotiations, hamper measures to implement a truce
and generate open UN-South Korean conflicts, especially if Rhee at-
tempts to effect immediate prisoner releases,. He notes that a few
Communist agitators might convert orderly demonstrators into an
unruly, destructive mob. The campaign might also lead some South
Korean army generals, convinced that present policies are leading
toward national disaster, to overthrow the Rhee governments
Comment This new campaign could prevent
the establishment of the propose~?neutral supervisory commission. Both
India and Switzerland have indicated that they will not serve unless the
South Korean government agrees to the armistices
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SOUTI~EAST ASIA
5, Yunnanese Nationalist troops in Burma reportedly opposed to evacuation;
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Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma who are
natives of the neighboring province of Yunnan
are opposed to being evacuated. to Formosa
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These troops are reported to be organ-
izing into separate ban s an to have been responsible for a significant
resurgence of banditry, They are expected to become even more trouble-
some if direction and support from Taipei are terminated,
Comment: Although no accurate statistics
are available, the great majority of Nationalist troops in Burma ar. e
believed to be Yunnanese, Withdrawa], of non Yunnanese troops, however,
and elimination of Taipei's direction and support would permit Burmese
forces ultimately to overcome those remaining.
NEAR EAST ?AFRICA
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6, Commonwealth prime ministers fail to urge British concessions to Egypt,
None of the participants in the commonwealth
prime ministers' discussion of the Egyptian
situation urged Britain to made further con
cessions in order to facilitate an agreemeixt
wit gypt, genera ly supported the British position., accordixag to
a British Foreign Office official who saw the record of the meeti.ng~
This official told the American embassy in
London that there is no basis for the Egyptian press statements that
the Asian prime ministers were sympathetic to' Cairo's demands fo~?
unconditional evacuation of British troops,
The Foreign Office is hopeful that Nehru and
Mohammed Ali will urge on Nagib the necessity for continued restraint
and for reaching a practical solution by negotiationo
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Comment: If this .report is accurate it is
unlikely that Churchill wi agree ~o any significant modif ication of
the British position.
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WESTERN EUROPE
8e East Germans reverse decision on physical-military training for
part members:
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attributed by American observers in Berlin both to Soviet objections
and to technical difficulties,
Abandonment by the Socialist Unity Party
of previously announced plans for physical-
military training of party members and
candidates in the 18-30 year age group is
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While cost of the program, lack of party
enthusiasm, and the general sports program may have influenced
the decision, these observers believe that the suddenness of the
reversal points to Soviet objections to a plan in conflict with the
"peace offensive."
Comment: Previous instances of Soviet
restraint in East German military matters have appeared directed
more at curbing ostentation than at curtailing the program as a whole.
No signs have been noted of restraint on such programs as the current
harassment of the churches. "
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