CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001200330001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 30, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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30 July 1953
Copy No. 67
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
dication of Soviet position on postarmistice political conference
membership (page 3)0
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
5. Burmese set time limit on Bangkok negotiations (page 5)0
SOUTH ASIA
ehru refuses to accept Battle Act conditions as binding on India
(page 6)0
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GENERAL
1. Indication of Soviet position on postarmistice political conference
membership.
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kind of voting procedure would have to be worked out."
Comment. The noncommittal remarks of the
Soviet representative suggest that Moscow is waiting for a clearer
indication of Western thinking before taking a firm position on the
membership questions
participate, there would have to be a larger membership and "some
Soviet UN delegate Tsarapkin told General
Assembly president Pearson that he contem-
plated a postarmistice political conference
limited to the "two sides" in the Korean dis-
pute. He also indicated that, should the USSR
The reference to "two sides" suggests that
the Soviet Union has not excluded negotiations in which each side has
one vote. Any Communist proposal for a multilateral conference
would probably follow the Soviet UN resolution of 10 November 1952
which called for the creation of an 11-nation commission in which the
Communist members would exercise a virtual veto. This resolution
received the support of Chou En-lai, who said that the commission
"is of the same nature as the political conference provided for in the
armistice agreement."
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
5. Burmese set-: time, limit on Bangkok negotiations:
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Burmese commander in chief Ne Win states
that Burma's delegate to the four-power
committee in Bangkok will be withdrawn
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when the next regular UlT General Assembly convenes on 17 September
unless some progress toward the evacuation of Chinese Nationalist
troops is achieved in the meantime, Ne Win expressed confidence that
his forces could wipe out the Nationalists, but he said a campaign
against them would delay operations against the Communists and other
insurgents for probably a year.
Comment: Past performances indicate that
the Burmese armed forces are incapable of eliminating the Nationalists
in the foreseeable future by their own efforts. Recognition of this
situation was probably the primary basis for the recent statement by
the acting foreign minister that Burma may be forced to seek Chinese
Communist assistance in dealing with the Nationalists.
SOUTH ASIA
6. Nehru refuses to accept Battle Act conditions as binding on India:
Prime Minister Nehru on 28 July categorically
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Delhi that he would not attempt to stop the
previously reported shipment of thorium
nitrate rom om t ay to communist China. He further stated em-
phatically that India never would jeopardize its national sovereignty
by permitting an American law to determine with whom and in what
commodities India should trade.
He could not accept the conditions! of the
Battle Act as binding on his country, and would never be willing to
give guarantees as to the nature of India's commerce.
Comment: Nehru's remarks presumably
end all hope of halting the shipment, thus making it mandatory for
the United States immediately to terminate all military, economic,
and financial aid to India.
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