CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001200360001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 2, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

~f..///////~/~P~~'~~se 20~'~~1Q$~b'~?I'9T009
25X1
25X1 ~'
~,
2 August 1953
25X1 ~/
opy oo ~
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
tiU~~'r-i:^i I^n 70.E
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Dept. review completed
TUP SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A001200360001-8 25X1
 Approved F elease 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A
25X1A
SUMMARY
25X1
GENERAL
USSR may not seek place in Korean political conference (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. ~: Viet Minh expands sabotage program in Tonkin (page 3).
WESTERN' EUROPE
5. New Communist moves expected to counter Berlin food relief
program (page 5).
6. France plans to send additional metropolitan battalions to Indochina
(pa e 6 .
25X1
25X1A
25X1A
2 August 53
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A001200360001-8
 Approved F elease 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A
25X1A
GENERA L
1. USSR may not seek place in Korean political conferenceo
25X1A
2. Viet Minh expands sabotage program in Tonkino
SOUTHEAST ASIA
25X1A
inability to understand the belief among UN delegates that the General
Assembly had the specific responsibility for naming participants in the
conference.
Soviet UN delegate Tsarapkin, in separate
conversations on 31 July with a UN Secretariat
member and a US delegate, pointed out that the
Korean armistice agreement calls for a political
conference "of both sides." He indicated his
Commento These statements suggest that the
USSR may wish to avoid playing na overt role in the political conference
called for by the Korean armistice. `Tsarapkin's remarks,after discussing
alternative possibilities a few days earlier, prob~.bly reflect Moscow's
instructions to express a preference for a limited conference.
The Kremlin may consider that overt parti-
cipation would have disadvantages overbalancing the propaganda
opportunities of the forum. 'Its alliance with Peiping would require it to
support fully China's demands concerning the UN and Formosa, and thus
jeopardize its attempts to improve relations with the Western powers.
The USSR may also calculate that it can better exploit differences among
the non-Communist powers over Far Eastern questions from a flexible,
behind-the-scenes positiono
can opera a sa e y only by excluding all Indochinese personnel. The
The chief of staff of the French air force in
Tonkin, commenting on the sabotage of a
military .DC-3 at Gialam airfield near Hanoi
by a time-bomb, states that Tonkin airfields
American consul notes that the pattern of sabotage has now been ex-
tended to include all forms of communication in Tonkin.
-3-
25X1A
2 A?gust 53
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A001200360001-8
 Approved" F
Gommenta The Viet Minh during the past few
months has stepped up~, its program of sabotage within the delta and has
demonstrated improved techniques against rail and road communications
and supply installations. The apparent ease with which such activities
are conducted illustrates the fundamental insecurity of this heavily in-
filtrated. area.
25X1
25X1A
2 August 53
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A001200360001-8
 Approved Fo~elease 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A0
25X1
WESTERN E~JROPE
25X1A
p1200360001-8 25X1A
5. New Communist moves expected to counter Berlin food relief programo
American officials in Germany believe that
the East German government may approach
High Commissioner Conant, directly or
tlirou~h.:. Soviet officials, to demand the
release of blocked East German funds in the
United States for the purchase of food.
Premier Grotewohl recently demanded
release of the funds and said his government
is willing to buy American food at world market prices.
-5-
25X1A
2 August 53
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A001200360001-8
 25X1A
Approved Fay-
US officials in Germany fear that any increased
attempt. to; publicize the American role in the Berlin food relief plan
might be~ used as an excuse snot only for further Soviet intimidation of
persons bringing food parcels across the border but also for the closing
of the East-West Berlin border and for new interference with food
shipments from West Germany into Berlin.
Comment: Communist retaliation has so
far been limited to isolated seizures of food and identity cards, pre-
sumably because harsher measures would seriously lzpset current Soviet
conciliatory policies. Officc.ial:~requrests.:to.:~rchas?e~foddu^f~oYn~:the~
blocked account might bolster the weak Communist propaganda response
to the food program, even though the account totals only about $1,400,000.
25X1A
French .commissioner general Dejean told.
Ambassador Heath in Saigon on 29 July that
Paris has agreed to initiate the "Navarre
plan," but cannot carry it out completely until
s are avai a e. ccording to the reported decision, nine battalions
will be sent from France on 1 October and the battalion now in Korea
will be added if the UN Command consents, Additional cadres, non-
commissioned officers, specialists and cargo planes will also be sent.
Dejean pointed out, however, that these
reinforcements and the formation of new Vietnamese battalions would
not enable Navarre to undertake an all-out offensive in the next few
months, but only a stepping up of limited offensive moves.
Comment: Navarre is reported to have
requested 15 battalions from France. The reinforcements now
promised are not scheduled to leave France until the time autumn
hostilities usually begin in Indochina.
This policy of reinforcing Indochina, apparently
a triumph for Foreign Minister Bidault, cannot be expected to survive
over the long term unless the military situation undergoes marked
improvement in the coming months.
-6-
25X1A
2 August 53
6. France plans to send additional metropolitan battalions to Indochina:
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A001200360001-8
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A001200360001-8
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A001200360001-8