CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001200410001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 8, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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8 August 1953
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Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT N
NO ^11AN E It CA S
To 8
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A ,
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Department review completed
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
/Recall of ambassadors suggests Chinese Communist policy
review (page 3)0
SOUTH ASIA
3. Comment on reported Soviet agreement to negotiate barter
deal with India (page 4)0
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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5. Saudi Arabia reported considering diplomatic break with
Britain (page 5)0
WESTERN EUROPE
West German officials comment on Soviet note (page 6)0
French government reaction to Soviet note pessimistic
and cautious (page 6)0
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FAR EAST
1. Recall of ambassadors suggests Chinese Communist policy review:
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Radio broadcasts from Peiping reveal
that Chinese Communist ambassadors
to the USSR, Poland, Bulgaria, East
Germany, North Korea and Outer Mon-
golia are all absent from their posts. The whereabouts of the
ambassadors to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Viet Minh is
not known. Of the Chinese envoys to Orbit countries, only the
ambassador to Rumania is known to be at his post.
Comment: This recall of Peiping's
envoys to Soviet bloc states began with the return to Peiping of
the ambassador to the USSR just before Stalin's death last March.
It suggests that the Chinese Communist leadership has been con-
ducting a lengthy review of its policies toward other Orbit states,
including the USSR, in the light of developments since early March.
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SOUTH ASIA
3. Comment on reported Soviet agreement to negotiate barter deal
with India:
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The proposed three-year Soviet-Indian
barter agreement providing for the exchange of unspecified
amounts of Soviet wheat for Indian products could be used by the
Soviet Union as an indication of its interest in the well-being of
backward nations. The Indian government, meanwhile, probably
views such an exchange as a means of showing its neutrality,
saving dollar and sterling exchange, and demonstrating its fore-
sight to the Indian people.
On the basis of past Soviet agreements
with India and Afghanistan, it is not likely that the final agreement
will be for as long as three years or that it will be fully implemented.
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5. Saudi Arabia reported considering diplomatic break with Britaino
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sentative that the possibility of a break was being discussed by
King Ibn Saud and the Foreign Ministry.
The American charge in Jidda, in report-
ing this, observed that by furnishing this information to the embassy,
the Saudi government may hope for a stronger American attitude to-
ward Britain. The charge does, however, believe that the Saudi
government may be exploring more drastic methods of solving the
issue than those presently employed.
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Saudi Arabia is considering breaking diplo-
matic relations with Britain because of
British stubbornness on the Buraimi ques-
tion.
told a US embassy repre-
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WESTERN EUROPE
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6. West German officials comment on Soviet note,.
problems.
ability to deal realistically with the German problem. The only
possible success the note might have, in their opinion, would be
to widen disagreement between Britain and the US on Far Eastern
Experts in the West German Foreign
Ministry believe that the Soviet note of
4 August reflects the continued indecision
of the present Soviet regime and its in-
The German officials regard the refer-
ences to German unity and a peace treaty as indicating Soviet
agenda conditions for any talks but consider the references to
Chinese participation, disarmament, and military bases merely
as Soviet counterproposals. In the opinion of these German offi-
cials, Moscow will never agree to discussing free elections first.
Comment., The Soviet regime does not
appear to want negotiations on the German question at this time
and may continue to use such issues as disarmament and military
bases to avoid such negotiations.
7. French government reaction to Soviet note pessimistic and
cautious.,
The French government sees the Soviet
note of 4 August as indicating "less de-
sire than ever" for East-West talks and
as offering no evidence of a willingness
to make concessions on Germany. According to a high Foreign
Ministry official, the government believes that the note was de-
signed further to divide the Allies.
The French foresee a prolonged "battle
of notes" and consider that the West's reply should be delayed
until just before the 6 September West German elections.
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The Foreign Ministry official gave the
American embassy no indication of French interest in Chinese
participation in East-West talks as a means of broadening the
discussion to include Indochina.
Comment., Despite its known interest
in promoting any talks wit ommunist China as a direct means
to peace in Indochina, Paris now appears to be awaiting develop-
ments on the forthcoming Korean conference before pushing this
position.
The French government has previously
insisted that it will not push for EDC ratification until the possi-
bility of four-power talks has been thoroughly explored. Hence
It may welcome a long period of note exchange as giving it time
to prepare for the anticipated parliamentary battle.
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