CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001200670001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 9, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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9 September
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1953
Copy No. 67
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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CLA>' C NC. TO. TS s C W
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E:
NEXT REVI_W DA
AUTH HR 7,1
OAT _._REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
or, ARMY and DOS review(s) completed.
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
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1. Molotov again seeks French support on German rearmament
question (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
French postpone fall offensive plans in Indochina (page 5).
Burma denies Peiping pressure for settling Chinese Nationalist
problem (page 6).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Shah and Zahedi reportedly disagree over control of Iranian
army (page 6).
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Anglo-Egyptian talks on Suez base seem headed for deadlock
(page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
Rome government seeks Italian de facto "occupation" of Zone A
of Trieste (page 8).
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GENERAL
1. Molotov again seeks French support on German rearmament question:
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the fear that Germany would break out of "the shell of EDC" and embark
on a militaristic course. He stated that the Soviet Union was primarily
interested in safeguarding itself from Germany and preventing German
rearmament.
Soviet policy of opposition to German rearmament. Molotov expressed
Ambassador Bohlen has reported another
attempt by Foreign Minister Molotov, in a
2 September interview with French ambas-
sador Joxe, to win French support for the
Joxe reiterated the French position that the
German problem was not one to be discussed by France and the USSR
alone, and that there was no possibility of dividing the Allies on this
question.
Comment: Both Molotov and Soviet ambas-
sador Vinogradov in Paris nave approached Joxe during the last two
months with similar arguments on the German problem.
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6. French postpone fall offensive plans in Indochina:
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The 1 September progress report on the
Navarre plan from the chief of the Mili-
tary Assistance Advisory Group in Saigon
states that the French are now planning to
counterattack in the event of a Viet Minh attack on the delta in late
September or early October. If the Viet Minh does not attack in
the delta, the French will undertake a diversionary action against
enemy forces north of that area.
Comment: This planning differs from
the original Navarre prograich called for an "offensive to
forestall the enemy attack."
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7. Burma denies Pei
ressure for settlin
Chinese Nationalist problem-.
The Burmese foreign minister has informed
the American ambassador that the Chinese
Communist attitude toward the presence of
Nationalist troops in Burma is one of "dis-
interested correctness" and that his government has not been pressed
to expedite their removal. The minister admitted, however, that he
had fully explained to Peiping his government's proposed courses of
action, including its pending appeal to the United Nations.
Comment: Such forebearance would create
confidence among the Burmese and might encourage them to approach
Peiping for aid in settling the Nationalist problem if other methods fail.
This course is known to be under consideration by some influential
Burmese leaders.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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8. Shah and Zahedi reportedly disagree over control of Iranian army:
Ambassador Henderson reported on 7 Sep-
tember that the shah's insistence that he,
not the prime minister, should control the
Iranian armed forces has led to disagreement
between the two. The difference apparently
arose when Zahedi opposed the shah's plan
to appoint Deputy Minister Vosuq as minister
of national defense.
Zahedi allegedly said that as long as he is
prime minister, orders to the armed forces would come through him.
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Comment-. Dispute over control of the armed
forces, constitutionally ve`sFe-E the crown, was a major cause of the
break between former prime minister Mossadeq and the shah.
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Although an open rift is not expected at
this time, disagreements between the shah and Zahedi, whom the
monarch does not fully trust, will probably increase.
10. Anglo-Egyptian talks on Suez base seem headed for deadlock:
Egyptian vice premier Nasr has indicated to
Caffery that he would accept an agreement
with Britain which allowed one year for the
British to evacuate troops from the Suez base
in addition to a the-year agreement covering base operations. He also
agreed to modify his position on the procedure for gradually reducing
the number of technicians at the base. Nasr emphasized that these
concessions were "his last word."
An official of the British embassy in Cairo,
on the other hand, believes Anglo-Egyptian talks are "still in a poker-
game stage" and that the offer of a five-year duration will be lengthened
if Britain stands firm. The British embassy also discounts Nasr's
statement that political opposition makes it impossible for the Egyptian
military regime to accept a longer agreement.
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Comment. The position as outlined by
the British official would support an intention to remain adamant
on a duration period of ten years for the agreement,
There is no indication, however, that the
Egyptian military regime is willing to go much beyond its present
position.
WESTERN EUROPE
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11. Rome government seeks Italian de facto "occupation" of Zone A of
Trieste:
According to a high official of the Rome
Foreign Ministry, a de facto occupation
of Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste
by Italian forces on the same terms as
Yugoslavia's present "occupation" of Zone B would satisfy Italian
public opinion. Such a move, he told Ambassador Luce, would
also strengthen the Rome government, pave the way for Tito-Pella
negotiations, and enable Premier Pella to continue pro-NATO
policies when parliament reconvenes on 22 September.
The Foreign Ministry official believes
that Pella would order the withdrawal of the troops dispatched to
the vicinity of the Yugoslav border if he were assured of the West's
immediate acceptance of his plan. He stated that otherwise Pella
would probably resign or be defeated on a vote of confidence, either
of which might result in Italy's withdrawal from NATO and an increase
in neutralist and extreme rightist influence.
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