CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001300240001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 9, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

004/9UPCM9RMA%M097 00,
9 October 1953
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Copy No. 67
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 2:
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
LI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS, CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 6 9
AUTH; HR 70-2
DATE. 2g42/7Z9 . REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Dept. review completed
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SUMMARY
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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Britain emphasizes additional requirements for Suez agreement
(page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
7. French suspect secret Turkish-American agreement (page 6).
bB. Reactions to the Anglo-American announcement on Trieste (page 7).
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6. Britain emphasizes additional requirements for Suez agreement:
The British Foreign Office considers that
provisions for the automatic availability
of the Suez base in event of war and for
-5-
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Ambassador Caffery in Cairo states
that Egypt was so close to breaking off the negotiations on 7 October
that Vice Premier Nasr had already informed the Egyptian ambassador
in Washington that the rupture would occur that day and had instructed
Cairo editors in the line they were to follow. At Caffery's urging, the
plan was changed.
WESTERN EUROPE
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British air force staging fields are the two crucial points still at issue
in the Anglo-Egyptian talks.
Other unresolved issues include the
time when the evacuation of British troops is to start, the ques-
tion of uniforms for the British technicians, and the number of
technicians to remain during the final phase of the agreement,
Britain also considers that the British assistant to the Egyptian
base commander must be able to give orders to the technicians.
The cabinet insists that the agreement
specifically mention freedom of transit of the canal, in order to
ensure parliamentary approval.
Comment: This suggests that the
negotiations will be protracted. To date there has been little
discussion of such technical points as the staging fields and the
authority to be exercised by the British assistant to the base
commander.
7. French suspect secret Turkish-American agreement:
were trying to determine whether there were any Turkish-American
understandings outside of the NATO framework.
Statements made by French premier
Lantel and Foreign Minister Bidault
on 3 October in Ankara led Turkish
officials, to believe that their visitors
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the French complained that the NATO countries were not
equaLly trusted or sufficiently informed on the development of secret
weapons by certain NATO members. They reportedly proposed with-
out success that they and the Turks agree to exchange any information
they obtain on such secret weapon development.
Comment: This is further evidence of
sensitivity over France's subordinate role in NATO matters in rela-
tion to Britain and the United States. General Juin has publicly ex-
pressed his dissatisfaction over the lack of adequate atomic weapons
information.
The Turkish government's refusal to
commit itself to Bidault and Laniel offers further confirmation of
its determination to avoid compromising its relations with the
United States.
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8. Reactions to the Anglo-American announcement on Trieste:
British announcement on Trieste is highlighted by the threat to bring the
affair before the United Nations. This threat is indicative of the serious-
ness with which the Yugoslavs view this move; at the same time it sug-
gests that they intend to protect their interests by diplomatic measures
rather than by military force. Every practical means, however, includ-
ing troop movements, is likely to be used to intimidate the Western
powers in plans to carry out their proposal,
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The bitter Yugoslav reaction to the American-
Tito may go so far as to threaten to intervene
militarily in Zone A, under the terms of the Italian Peace Treaty, if
Italian troops are brought in. It is unlikely, however, that he would
carry out this threat.
Yugoslav relations with the West will be
temporarily exacerbated, but no rapprochement with the Soviet Union
is to be anticipated as a result.
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In Italy, the reaction of the government-
controlled radio suggests that the government is interpreting the
American-British announcement as a victory for the policies of
Premier Pella, Though the proposal falls short of Pella's latest
public demand for a plebiscite in the entire free territory and has
provoked some hostile Italian demonstrations in Trieste, it is
actually in line with what Italian leaders have privately urged.
It will probably prolong the tenure of the Pella government and
help halt the recent deterioration in official Ital.-American rela-
tions. In any case, Italian parliamentary leaders have lost a major
excuse for delay in ratifying EDC.
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