CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001300490001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 7, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1
ease 2q")J/S419T0 001
7 November 1953
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
WMMENT NO. 49
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
C! DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _ 'O0 9
AUTH' HR 70-2
DATE:,a REVIEWER:
25X1
01 State
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Department review completed
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO01300490001-3 25X1
 ? Approved Felease 2003/11/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975
25X1A
SUMMARY
GENERAL
V* K. India reportedly decides against American position on prisoner
release (page 3).
2. Soviet note reaffirms position on Korean conference (page 3).
25X1
EASTERN EUROPE
4. Satellite industrial growth declines sharply (page 4).
WESTERN EUROPE
Comment on Trieste disorders (page 5).
25X1A
25X1A
7 Nov 53
Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A001300490001-3
 Approved F elease 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975 001300490001-3
25X1A
25X1A
GENERAL
1. India reportedly decides against American position on prisoner
release:
The Indian government has decided to
interpret the Korean armistice agree-
ment as requiring the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission to hold a full
90-day explanation period and to retain custody of the prisoners
until 30 days after the political conference meets. According to
the Swiss minister in New Delhi, who conveyed this information,
the Indian argument is based on the "humanitarian grounds" that
prisoners who desire to be sent to some country other than For-
mosa or South Korea would be denied that right if the conference
did not meet,
Ambassador Allen comments that Nehru
may have taken this position to exert pressure on the United States
to accept Peiping's terms for holding the conference.
Comment. Since interpretation of the
POW agreement rests with the NNRC Commission, India's atti-
tude could result in indefinite confinement of the prisoners. There
is no indication that any of them would reject Formosa or South
Korea as their final destination.
Any attempt to extend the explanation or
detention period is likely to provoke violent reactions from the pris-
oners and from the South Korean government. President Rhee has
already said that since India is violating the terms of the armistice,
South Korea is free to take any action it desires to protect the pris-
oners.
2. Soviet note reaffirms position on Korean conference.
The 3 November Soviet note did not
essentially change the already defined Communist position on a
Korean political conference. It made more explicit Moscow's
claim that the West's exclusion of neutral countries "makes the
participation of the USSR in the conference impossible."
25X1A
-3-
7 Nov 53
Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO01300490001-3
 Approved FQ $elease 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T009754001300490001-3
25X1A
The note provided additional evidence
that the Communists will persist in their rejection of the United
Nations recommendations on the composition of the conference.
It strongly suggested a desire to avoid substantive negotiations
for a Korean settlement at this time,
25X1A
EASTERN EUROPE
4. Satellite industrial growth declines sharply,.
Official reports published by the major
Satellites during the last week show that their rate of industrial
growth declined sharply this year, In Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Rumania, and East Germany the rate dropped from approximately
24 percent in 1952 to 12 percent in 1953, while in Poland it declined
from 21 to 18 percent.
25X1A
7 Nov 53
Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A001300490001-3
 Approved F elease 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T0097
25X1A
14001300490001-3
Heretofore the announced rate of
industrial growth of the Satellites has been approximately double
that of the USSR. However, the decline in rate of growth and the
downward revision of Satellite industrial goals since June indi-
cate that Satellite industrialization is now proceeding at about
the same rate as announced for the Soviet Union. The greater
availability of consumer goods called for by revised Satellite
plans is partly designed to increase the workers' incentives
and so to correct the decline in industrial productivity.
25X1A
WESTERN EUROPE
5. Comment on Trieste disorders:
Premier Pella's formal protest to
the United States and Britain against the shooting of Italian students
in Trieste strongly suggests that his government is interested in
keeping the situation stirred up and intends to make political
Pella probably considers that his chances
of remaining in office will be improved if he can exploit disturbances
to force early implementation of the 8 October decision or at least
the introduction of Italian police into Zone A.
The riots will certainly result in a harden-
ing of the Yugoslav attitude. Belgrade can now be expected flatly to
refuse to attend a five-power conference if Italy receives any addi-
tional authority in Zone A prior to or concomitant with a conference.
The Yugoslav press has already noted the failure of the Western-
controlled police to maintain order, and is emphasizing that further
grants of power to Italy in Zone A will create an impossible situation.
25X1A
25X1A
7 Nov 53
Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A001300490001-3
25X6