CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001400380001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 2, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

2 February 1954
opy Noo
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMEN r No.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
Li DECLASSIFIED
/ CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 209----
/ AUTH: HR 7Q
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. USSR may wish to avoid Korean political conference (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
2. Soviet statistics foreshadow continuing decline in rate of economic
growth (page 3).
FAR EAST
3. South Korea offers troops for Indochina (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. French intend to defend Luang Prabang (page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
6. Comment on Cominform approach to Yugoslavia (page 6).
LATIN AMERICA
7. Guatemala expected to raise charge of US "intervention" at Caracas
conference (page 6).
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GENERAL
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USSR may wish to avoid Korean political conference:
According to Secretary of State Dulles,
the USSR may have discarded the concept
of a Korean conference as envisaged in
the armistice agreement. As evidence
of this, he points to Molotov's statement on 27 January that the United
Nations' recommendations for the Korean political conference were
made over Soviet objections and without the participation of Chinese
Communist and North Korean representatives, and to the walkout on
26 January of Communist delegates from the preliminary Panmunjom
talks.
Secretary Dulles says it is somewhat sur-
prising for Molotov to take any onus for jettisoning the proposed
Korean conference now that Communist propaganda has made out a
fairly plausible case for American responsibility for the breakoff
of the Panmunjom talks.
Comment: Soviet bloc spokesmen have
sought to use widespread concern over the failure to convene the Korean
conference to reinforce Soviet demands for a five-power meeting. In
his opening statement at Berlin, Molotov attributed this failure to the
"absence of normal relations between certain powers" and suggested
that a five-power conference would aid in eliminating "a whole series
of difficulties" on the Korean question.
SOVIET UNION
2e Soviet statistics foreshadow continuing decline in rate of economic
growth:
Official Soviet statistics published on 31
January foreshadow a continuing decline in the rate of expansion of
the economy and highlight the efforts of the government to ameliorate
this basic problem by means of increased incentives. The announced
increases for 1953 of eight percent in national income, four percent in
state capital investment, and six percent in labor productivity are short
of the gains required by the Five-Year Plan. For 1952 these figures
were respectively eleven percent, eleven percent and seven percent.
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in October.
On the other hand, industrial production
increased 12 percent in 1953 compared with 11 percent in 1952. An
important part of the 1953 increase is attributable to the unusually
large increment of 3,100,000 workers to the nonagricultural labor
force. At the same time the ratio of the permanent farm labor force
to cultivated land area increased substantially. It seems likely, there-
fore, that large numbers of workers were made available to the non-
agricultural labor force through special releases under the amnesty
program and possible discharges from the army and MVD.
The government's attempt to increase worker
incentives is reflected by the announced 12-percent increase in produc-
tion of consumer goods and the still greater expansion claimed for re-
tail sales. Nevertheless, retail trade for 1953 fell at least four billion
rubles short of the supplementary target of 37 billion rubles announced
FAR EAST
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3. South Korea offers troops for Indochina:
South Korean prime minister Paek in a 28
January letter to General Taylor offered to
send an infantry division to help in the de-
fense of Laos. The offer was inspired by
the call for aid "implied" in the Christmas Day statement of the Laotian
premier,
The embassy in Seoul notes that this offer
should be assessed in the light of President Rhee's recent moves to
mobilize an anti-Communist front in Asia and his desire to broaden
the fight against the Chinese Communists.
Comment: Such an arrangement would be
unacceptable to the French, who have been at great pains to avoid
antagonizing the Chinese Communists.
Rhee may have discussed this with Chiang
Kai-shek, who is known to favor the formation of a Far Eastern anti-
Communist force, which could be committed wherever necessary.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
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French intend to defend Luang Prabang:
.Dien Bien Phu and believed to be of divisional strength. The defense
will be made even though it means further dispersing French forces
and foregoing attacks on now largely undefended Viet Minh base areas
near the Tonkin delta.
Commissioner General Dejean stated on
30 January that he and General Navarre
agree on the political necessity of defend-
ing Luang Prabang, the royal capital of
Laos, which is threatened by a Viet Minh force moving south from
Dejean further told Ambassador Heath that
the Viet Minh apparently plans to leave two divisions at Dien Bien Phu
to contain the French garrison there. The French Command, however,
is convinced that its forces could break out in such an event and inflict
damage on the enemy.
The commissioner general quoted General
Navarre as expressing confidence that he could contain a Viet Minh
movement into Laos, and that his timetable for a decisive offensive
beginning in the fall would not be upset by current operations.
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EASTERN EUROPE
6. Comment on Cominform approach to Yugoslavia:
The 30 January Cominform journal proposal
that Yugoslavia rejoin "the fraternal people's democracies" and restore
its "ancient bonds with the Russian people" is no more than the latest
manifestation of a recurring Cominform propaganda theme. As in the
past, Belgrade replied with a sharp rebuff.
Soviet and Satellite propaganda attacks on
Yugoslavia have recently slackened somewhat, and there have been fewer
calls for revolt in Yugoslavia than in previous years. It is probable
that the Cominform has revived this propaganda attack in order to ex-
ploit the doubts and confusion which have been aroused both. in Yugoslavia
and in the West as a result of the Djilas dispute.
LATIN AMERICA
7. Guatemala expected to raise charge of US "intervention" at Caracas
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The Bolivian foreign minister fears that
Guatemalan charges of American "inter-
vention" may split the Inter-American
Conference in Caracas next month. He
told Ambassador Sparks that Guatemala, which has been seeking
Bolivian support, plans to attend the conference in the role of an
accuser rather than as a country accused of Communist sympathies.
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Comment: Guatemala's white paper of
29 January, which strongly implied United States approval of a plot
against the Arbenz regime, could, if convincingly exploited, seriously
disrupt inter-American solidarity and reduce Latin American support
for the United States in the United Nations. The principle of noninter-
vention is regarded in Latin America as the cornerstone of the inter-
American system. Mexico, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay are par-
ticularly sensitive on the question of United States "interference" in
other American republics.
Communist propaganda can be expected to
continue its theme of the past two months that "imperialists and their
lackeys in Central America might make new efforts at open intervention
in Guatemala."
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