CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001400530001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 18, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

2004ffW:SJff9JN&ff0097"VA1
18 February 1954
?py NO. 84
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. -3 3
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
1-1 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: ZOO 9
AUTH: HR 7 %
DAT'E:.~ REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Department review completed
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Pravda outlines plan for five-power discussion of Korea and
Indochina (page 3).
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Ambassador Heath sees alarm over Indochina as unwarranted
(page 5).
5. Philippine president aware of difficulties with party leaders
(page 5).
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WESTERN EUROPE
8. Pleven reportedly lacks authority to "deal with" United States
on Indochina (page 7).
9. Heuss may delay approval of EDC (page 8).
LATIN AMERICA
10. Outlawed Venezuelan party may attempt revolution during
Caracas conference (page 9).
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GENERAL
1. Pravda outlines plan for five-power discussion of Korea and Indochina:
Pravda on 16 February outlined a plan for a
five-power conference on Korea, Indochina and "other urgent matters"
to which "other interested countries" could be invited to discuss specific
issues. North Korea, South Korea and "other countries concerned"
should participate in the discussion of the Korean question, Pravda said,
and "representatives of the respective areas" could be invited to consider
"the question of restoring peace in other parts of Asia."
This article apparently was designed to show
the USSR's willingness to make concessions in order to secure a five-
power conference. It attempts to create the impression that Moscow
would accept an agenda restricted chiefly to Asian questions. There is
no suggestion, however, that the USSR will go further and compromise
in its fundamental demand that Communist China be accorded equal
status with the other four great powers.
The article was focused primarily on the
Indochina question and charged that American propagandists were
distorting accounts of the restricted meetings at the Berlin conference
in order to deceive the French people, who urgently desire peace in
Indochina.
The Communist tactics on Indochina appar-
ently are to maintain military pressure on Franco-Vietnamese forces
while holding out hopes to the French for a settlement throu
power conference with the aid of Peiping.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Ambassador Heath sees alarm over Indochina as unwarranted:
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Ambassador Heath in Saigon believes
that an alarmist view of the Indochina
situation is unwarranted. He states
that the increasing French advantage
in military manpower during the past year is being obscured by
the current dispersal of troops throughout Indochina and believes
that General Navarre's plan for breaking Viet Minh resistance
within 15 months can be realized.
He observes, however, that Navarre
is worried by the Vietnamese army's lack of fighting spirit and
efficiency, which forces him to assign all difficult tasks to French
and colonial units. Other matters of concern are that Navarre may
be restrained by Paris from taking the chances necessary for a suc-
cessful operation, and the defeatist attitude of some Paris military
chiefs.
Comment.- The development of an effec-
tive Vietnamese army, as mu c endent on the political climate in
Indochina and French concessions of military responsibility as on
adequate training, appears far from realization. With the military
initiative in Viet Minh hands, forcing the French to expend their
forces in a primarily defensive role,, there likewise appears to be
no early prospect of consolidating and directing French Union strength
against major enemy concentrations.
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25X1 A 5. Philippine president aware of difficulties with party leaders
President Magsaysay is now fully aware
of the difficulties presented by the strongly
nationalist group within his own party, whose
spokesman is Senator Recto. Magsaysay considered firing Undersecre-
tary of Foreign Affairs Guerrero, a Recto protege, after he recently
made a much publicized "Asia for Asians" speech, but decided not to
risk breaking with such an important faction of his party.
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Comment- The two top Nacionalista
party stalwarts, Senators Recto and Laurel, were largely responsible
for getting Magsaysay the nomination9 but their views have little in
common with the progressive platform on which he based his campaign.
In making many of his key appointments,
however, Magsaysay willingly accepted their advice on the grounds
of their greater political experience. He will probably find it increas-
ingly difficult to overcome obstructionism by his executives in his
attempts to institute badly needed reforms.
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WESTERN EUROPE
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8. Pleven reportedly lacks authority to "deal with" United States on
Indochina:
French defense minister Pleven, now in
Indochina, is acting under direct instruc-
tions from Premier Laniel and has no
authority to "deal with the United States"
before reporting to the Paris cabinet,
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The American embassy in Parts believes
that the restrictions on Pleven's activity reflect the "suspicions"
within the French cabinet, which is reluctant to have any minister
discuss Indochina "except within the limits of a previously approved
position."
Comment,. The split in the French cabinet
over Indochina policy has been apparent since last October. Laniel
reportedly reprimanded Secretary of State for the Associated States
Jacquet when he publicly discussed the "offer" of Ho Chi Minh last .
November without prior cabinet approval. ,
Pleven has been reluctant to increase the
military effort in Indochina because of its effect on the build-up of
French forces in Europe.
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9. Heuss may delay approval of EDC:
President Heuss will not sign the b onn an
Paris treaties until the Western occupation
powers either approve the constitutional
amendment authorizing rearmament which the Bundestag is expected
to pass in early March, or state that their approval is unnecessary.
Ambassador Conant believes the latter
course may be impossible, since the proposed amendment is generally
regarded as "new material" rather than as "clarification" of the exist-
ing constitution. Approval of the amendment would be accompanied by
notice that the Allies do not thereby waive the power they retain over
armament, and that the amendment must be implemented only within
the framework of EDC.
Conant doubts that the French high commis-
sioner will agree to either course unless a tripartite understanding is
reached at the highest level.
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LATIN AMERICA
10. Outlawed Venezuelan party may attempt revolution during Caracas
con erence:
The outlawed Venezuelan Democratic
Action Party (AD) may be planning a
revolution in the western oil city of 25X1
Maracaibo next month,
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Comment-
party has been plotting to regain power ever since was over rown
in 1948 but is not believed to be sufficiently recovered from the govern-
ment's campaign of suppression to stage a successful revolt. There may
be disturbances, however, fomented by the AD or either of two other
disaffected groups.
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