CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001500320001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 17, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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DOS REVIEW
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17 April 1954
Copy Noe
76
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.~T
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I i DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: U X19
AUTH: HR 7Q-2
[DATE: ' /R/ -- REVIEWER:II-
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Soviet official hints at possible Chinese counteraction in Indochina
(page 3).
2. Indian policy announcement on Indochina reported in preparation
(page 3).
3. India reported pressing Argentina to request UN session on H-bomb
(page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
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Dien Bien Phu air supply threatened age
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. Iranian officials find initial oil consortium proposals unacceptable
(page 7).
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GENERAL
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1. Soviet official hints at possible Chinese counteraction in Indochina:
under which fighting would cease and each side would retain possession
of the areas it now holds. He said the Chinese were sincere in their
desire to have a period of peace and were prepared to "accept a com-
promise," but that just as in Korea,, when MacArthur approached the
Yalu River, they "could not be blind" to the threat of French and now
American action.
A member of the Soviet UN delegation in
a conversation with an American official
on 15 April suggested "on a personal basis"
the possibility of a compromise settlement
in Indochina similar to the Korean armistice,
Comment: This is the most specific Com-
munist suggestion to date on cease-fire terms. Soviet diplomats have
twice previously suggested that partition would meet China's security
needs and that the Korean precedent might be followed in Indochina.
The hint of possible Chinese counteraction
is much less threatening than statements by the Chinese Communists
prior to their intervention in Korea, but it is somewhat stronger than
the cautious Soviet and Chinese press statements that United Nations
intervention in Indochina would end in "defeat for the aggressors."
While these statements may eventually culminate in an explicit warn-
ing such as Chou En-lai's in October 1950, it appears that Moscow and
Peiping are not contemplating any major military moves in Indochina
at this time and that their future actions will depend primarily on the
course of the Geneva negotiations.
2. Indian policy announcement on Indochina reported in preparation:
as an alternative to what he will term the "Western-dominated front"
proposed by the United States. This is also likely to be Nehru's chief
theme at the Colombo meeting of Asian prime ministers, which will
take place simultaneously with the Geneva conference.
Ambassador Allen believes that Prime
Minister Nehru, in a forthcoming statement
to the Indian parliament, may call for a
united front of "independent" Asian nations
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The Australian high commissioner in
New Delhi understands that Nehru's statement will be based on a
policy paper now being prepared, apparently by V. K. Krishna
Menon.
Comment: A policy statement drawn
up by Menon, India's chief legate, would almost certainly
have strong anti-American overtones. He would be the logical
person to handle this question for Nehru,
3. India reported pressing Argentina to request UN session on H-bomb,.
that it was trying, by holding out the possibility of an Indian purchase
of 3,000,000 tons of wheat, to induce Argentina to request such a meet-
ing.
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An official of the Indian embassy in Buenos
Aires told on 25X1
15 April that his government had obtained
the support of 28 countries for a special UN
session on the hydrogen bomb. He added
The Latin American countries mentioned
as supporting the Indian proposal are Argentina, Chile, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Comment: An Indian proposal now before
The UN Disarmament Commission includes provisions concerning the
hydrogen bomb. This is the first indication, however, that India is
seeking a special General Assembly session to discuss it. Convoca-
tion would require 31 votes.
Indian pressure influenced Argentina's vote
on at least one previous occasion, in January 1954, on the question of
recalling a session on Korea. Argentina's financial difficulties have
been aggravated by its inability to dispose of agricultural surpluses,
which now include about 3,000,000 tons of wheat. India is a major
customer for Argentine wheat, but this amount far exceeds its imme-
diate requirements.
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. Dien Bien Phu air supply threatened:
for resupply. In response to expressions of gloom by Dejean
over the "deteriorating situation" at the fortress, Heath sug-
gested a French attack against the rear of the Viet Minh. Dejean
said the French already had such a maneuver in mind and had
moved four battalions from northern Laos to a point near Dien
Bien Phu. He feared, however, that the enemy was alert to this
and he was not optimistic that such an attack could be carried out.
Commissioner General Dejean told
Ambassador Heath on 16 April that
continued Viet Minh occupation of
entrenchments across the landing
strip at Dien Bien Phu would greatly constrict the drop area
Comment: The accuracy of air drops
at Dien Bien Phu has been hampered heretofore by enemy antiair-
craft, which forces planes to high altitudes, and by dropping areas
that were already very small.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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7. Iranian officials find initial oil consortium proposals unacceptable:
day was unacceptable to Iran. They were extremely discouraged and
considered the situation grave. They stated that the volume of oil to
be produced--30,000,000 tons by the end of the third year.--was too
small and insisted that Iran should have at least as much output as
other Middle East producers.
Foreign Minister Entezam and Finance
Minister Amini told Ambassador Henderson
on 15 April that the memorandum presented
to them by the oil consortium the previous
The officials also objected to the vagueness
of the proposed 50-50 profit-sharing formula and expressed belief that
the consortium intended to manipulate the price of Iranian, oil before
determining the profits to be split.
Comment: One of the obstacles to satis-
factory negotiation of the of di pute is Iranian officials' lack of knowl-
edge of international oil pricing and marketing procedures. Although a
full discussion may overcome these particular objections, more diffi-
culty can also be expected on the management problem as well as on the
question of the duration of any agreement with the consortium. 25X1
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