CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001500600001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 21, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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21 May 1954 C-- i
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Copy No. 76
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. G/ 111
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
Cl DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE; - _aa g
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: XIIWa~W REVIEWER
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
~
DOreview(s) completed.
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SUMMARY
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Tonkin governor suggests direct US-Vietnamese relations (page 3).
3. Viet Minh offer to consider joining French Union may be serious
(page 4).
4. British official sees more realistic Burmese appraisal of Commu-
nist danger (page 4).
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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7. Comment on appointment of new resident general in French
Morocco (page 6).
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
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2. Tonkin governor suggests direct US-Vietnamese relations-
ar
rove
when Vietnam must deal directly with the United States. According to
the consul, Tri has urged Premier Buu Loc to return from Geneva
"to reactivate the central government and initiate necessary measures."
Comment: There has been a growing
tendency among Vietnamese officials to look on the United States as
Governor Tri of Tonkin told the American
consul in Hanoi on 16 May that the French
were rapidly losing control of the situation
in Vietnam and that the time had
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the key to Vietnam's survival. The expression of this feeling is
particularly significant when voiced by Governor Tri, in view of his
sound judgment and high prestige among Vietnamese leaders.
3. Viet Minh offer to consider joining French Union may be serious-,
tially supplanted by the thought that the offer may be genuine. The
French now consider it possibly part of a serious Communist plan to
strengthen the French Communist Party through the creation of a
"peoples republic" within the French Union.
Ambassador Dillon reports that the initial
tendency in France to dismiss the Viet Minh
offer to consider joining the French Union
as a mere propaganda gesture is being par-
It is also pointed out that a Communist
member of the French Union might influence over-all policy, as does
"neutralist" Nehru in the British Commonwealth.
Comment: Ho Chi Minh's regime accepted
membership in the French Union in 1946 and would have much to gain
by suggesting that it again become a member. The Viet Minh offer
would undercut the argument of those Frenchmen who oppose a peace
which would detach the Associated States from the French Union. This
in turn would increase pressure for a cease-fire on Viet Minh terms.
4. British official sees more realistic Burmese appraisal of Communist
anger:
months had developed a "surprisingly realistic" appraisal of the Commu-
nist danger. He referred to a conversation with the Burmese acting
foreign minister in which the latter expressed fear of Communist
Malcolm MacDonald, British commissioner
general in Southeast Asia, told Ambassador
Sebald in Rangoon on 19 May he believed the
Burmese government during the past two
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encirclement of Burma and showed deep concern over the possibility
of a Communist takeover in Indochina. The minister had stated that
Burma would join in supervising a cease-fire in Indochina if requested
to do so by the Geneva conference.
Neither MacDonald nor the British ambassador
in Rangoon believed, however, that Burma would join a Southeast Asia
collective security arrangement at this time. Both thought Burma should
be carefully "nursed along."
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7. Comment on appointment of new resident general in French Morocco:
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to be an attempt to re-establish French-Moroccan co-operation. Lacoste
is believed to be an exponent of a conciliatory policy and may be able to
reconcile French and Moroccan views. The report that another candidate
for the post was refused permission to replace the present sultan suggests,
however, that Lacoste is not empowered to carry out a bold new policy.
Lacoste, who has a reputation for being pro,
American, is a member of the French delegation at Geneva. In 1947-
1950 he was the Foreign Ministry's representative to the Residency in
Morocco.
The appointment of Francis Lacoste, an able
and experienced diplomat, as successor to
General Guillaume as resid t
s
P e o be followed immediately by steps toward autonomy.
His task will be difficult. Constant friction
and frustration engendered during the term of his two military predeces-
sors have divided and hardened the positions of both the nationalists and
local French settlers. It is unlikely that the nationalists will settle for
less than a public promise of independence with a definite timetable.. the
romi
t
_g?
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