CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001600160001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 12, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

RUTH; HR 70-2
118d._ REVIEWER
DATE:2/
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. -
STATE REVIEW
COMPLETED
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NEXT REVIEW DATE:.DLQ_-__.__
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LI DECLASSIFIED
12 June 1954
Office of Current Intelligence
ARMY review(s) completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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ARMY review(s) completed.
SUMMARY
GENERAL
FAR EAST
3. Japanese Diet disturbance seen pro-Communist test of strength
(nape 4).
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NEAR EAST AFRICA
6. Comment on the Iraqi elections (page 5).
7. New French program for Morrocco unlikely to resolve differences
(page 6).
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LATIN AMERICA
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8. Chilean foreign minister fears OAS conference may backfire (page 7).
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FAR EAST
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3. Japanese Diet disturbance seen pro-Communist test of strength:
The Diet incident on 3 June was instigated
by pro-Communist elements of the left-
wing Socialist Party to test its techniques
of violence, according to the American
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are planning to discredit parliamentary institutions, invite "fascist"
repressions, and then win mass support for a drive to save "demo-
cracy."
embassy in Tokyo. Informed Japanese sources believe the leftists
The embassy believes the government's
general ineptness in handling the situation, and the failure of both
the press and government to pinpoint the blame on the extreme
leftists who directed the riot, are additional disturbing aspects.
The embassy also-:thinks, however, that the incident, together with
pressure from the business interests, will assist in unifying the con-
servatives and increase sentiment for firmer measures to deal with
such situations.
Comment: Continuing bitter opposition to
Yoshida in the conservative camp will hamper the government in deal-
ing with future outbreaks of violence, and in the development of con-
servative unity.
The press has aided the leftist cause through
irresponsible and inflammatory attacks on the government, while only
perfunctorily criticizing the Socialists. Such a policy may invite govern-
ment control, which the press greatly fears.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Comment on the Iraqi elections:
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Conservative pro-Western politicians
continue to rule in Baghdad as a result
of the parliamentary election _ofi 9 June,
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but their victory does nothing to lessen Iraq's increasingly dangerous
political and social tensions. It is not yet clear whether a new govern-
ment will be formed before late summer.
The balance of power is held by political
independents. However, many of them are so close to Nuri Said and
his Constitutional Union Party', which won only a plurality, that Nuri,
at present in London, remains the dominant parliamentary figure. No
significant domestic or foreign policy changes are expected.
The old guard won on the basis of palace
influence and Iraqi feudalism. Issues were trumpeted only by the
extremists, particularly by the Communist-directed National Front,
whose vigorous campaigning revealed unexpected strength and effec-
tive leadership, even though they won only 12 out of 135 seats, The
absence in the campaign of any liberal nationalist party reveals a
dangerous conservative-extremist polarization in Iraqi politics.
7. New French program for Morocco unlikely to resolve differences:
A high French Foreign Ministry official has .
said that the reform program for Morocco
shortly to be announced will stress Moroccan
sovereignty and the fact that the reforms of
last August were only one step toward the final goal. French partici-
pation in local government will also decrease as the Moroccans become
capable of greater responsibility.
The official stated that neither the time
factor of the program, nor the final Moroccan-French relationship,
will be specified. He added that no change of sultans is presently
anticipated because it would present new problems.
Comment: The new French.resident general,
Francis Lacoste, is scheduled to arrive in Rabat on 14 June. He will
be charged with implementing the program.
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Any settlement is unlikely under these
proposals and nationalist violence and terrorism will probably continue.,
The nationalists are seeking a public promise of independence with a
definite timetable and immediate steps toward autonomy as well as the
return of the former sultan. -
The issue of French participation in the
Moroccan government--the immediate cause of the removal of the
sultan in August 1953--will be a major stumbling block to both nation-
alists and French settlers.
LATIN AMERICA
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B. Chilean foreign minister fears OAS conference may backfire.-
Chilean foreign minister Aldunate told
Ambassador Beaulac on 9 June he had
"grave fear" that lack of agreement at
the proposed Organization of American
States meeting on Guatemala on 1 July would "create a worse situ-
ation than now exists."
Aldunate said Chile will attend the OAS
meeting in view of the willingness of a majority of other governments,
but it reserves "freedom to act at the conference in accordance with
its traditional policies."
Comment.- Uruguay and El Salvador have
also expressed fear that failure to agree on specific measures before
calling the OAS meeting would invite a propaganda disaster. Uruguay
urged on 10 June that this could be avoided by formulating a proposal
for action that does not mention Guatemala specifically. Thus far,
only four countries have formally approved the proposal put forward
by the United States on 5 June,, while three have questioned the
language.
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