CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001600220001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 19, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

19 June 1954
Copy No.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
lei DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: ~tl /O
AUTH: HR 70-2
PATE: -1/&0-._REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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/ STATE review completed
AGENCY A!tiC;l-II`1L.
DIA review(s) completed. Z '- 7 7)--6 V
//O/z 004166i' I0975ry~
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Cambodia plans appeal to UN (page 3).
2. Burma willing to serve on Indochina armistice commission (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
3. Khrushchev possibly identified with hard foreign policy line (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Developing threats to Hanoi and Haiphong reported (page 5).
5. French officers doubt Haiphong beachhead could be held (page 5).
6. President Sukarno cites Communist support on Dutch New Guinea
problem (page 7).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. Johnston sees Arabs more co-operative on Jordan River develop-
ment plan (page 7).
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GENERAL
1. Cambodia plans appeal to UN:
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The acting foreign minister of Cambodia
told the American charge in Phnom Penh
on 17 June that his government considered
the Geneva conference "dead;" and will
a ress an appea to the Security Council. The appeal will denounce
Viet Minh aggression and request that a peace observation commission
be sent to Cambodia.
Comment- The Cambodian government was
on the point of appealing to the UN following the Viet Minh incursion
into northeastern Cambodia last April, but deferred this appeal pend-
ing the outcome of the Geneva conference. The king is known to be
planning an ambitious publicity program for directing world attention
and sympathy to Cambodia's problem. He plans to visit numerous
Western and neutral nations, where he has a good chance of gaining
support.
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2. Burma willing to serve on Indochina armistice commission.,
Premier Nu has informed Foreign Secretary
Eden that Burma would agree to serve on an
Indochina armistice commission comprised
of the Colombo powers if requested to do so
by the eneva powers an if the terms of reference were satisfactory,
according to the British ambassador in Rangoon.
The ambassador says Acting. Foreign Minister
Kyaw Nyein also indicated his government's willingness to join a com-
mission composed of three Colombo powers and one European and one
Communist government, provided the same conditions were met. Nyein
further implied that Burma favors separating the problem of Laos and
Cambodia from that of Vietnam.
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Comment. Burma in the past has con-
sistently avoided becoming involved in conflicts of interest between
the two "power blocs." Its present willingness to do so indicates the
serious concern with which it views the deteriorating Western posi-
tion in Indochina.
SOVIET UNION
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3. Khrushchev possibly identified with hard foreign policy line-.
foreign affairs was reminiscent more of the strident notes of Stalin-
ist propaganda than of most current Soviet pronouncements. The
revised version was substantially calmer in tone, and the inflam-
matory passages were rewritten or omitted entirely.
The text of an apparently extemporaneous
speech given by party secretary Khrush-
chew at a 15 June mass rally in Prague
was substantially altered before being
rebroadcast by the Czech home service.
As originally delivered and broadcast,
the portion of the speech devoted to
This harsh line, which Khrushchev has
now twice taken when apparently speaking extemporaneously, may
reflect his actual thinking. This would reinforce Ambassador Bohlen's
earlier speculation that Khrushchev appears to take a more radical
and extreme position on both international and domestic problems than
does Malenkov.
The changes in the speech, which certainly
would not have been made without specific orders from Moscow or
Khrushchev himself, suggest that, despite his earlier departure from
the official line, Khrushchev is either unwilling or unable to main-
tain this extreme position.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
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The French anticipate attacks shortly on
the Hung Yen-Ke Sat route in the Tonkin
delta by three Viet Minh battalions, the
IrAmerican army attache in Saigon reports.
(see map, p. 6). He comments that this
route, frequently sabotaged in the past,
runs through areas heavily infiltrated by
enemy troops, and the anticipated attacks
could be the first step in the isolation of
Hung Yen. The loss of Hung Yen would be a crippling blow to the
defense of the southern delta and would greatly increase the vul-
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nerability of the Hanoi-Haiphong areas.
possible enemy plans for an attack in the Hai Duong
area, about miles east of Ke Sat, where bridges across the
Thai Binh River constitute the most vulnerable link in the Hanoi-
Haiphong supply route. Enemy antiaircraft defenses there, indi-
cated by a French pilot's report of 37mm antiaircraft fire, suggests
preparations in anticipation of French air action.
5. French officers doubt Haiphong beachhead could be held-
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of the F-re-n-cH officer corps. The officers
generally believe that the Tonkin delta
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scale attack without reinforcements of two
or three divisions from France. These,
they feel, will not be sent. French forces
4. Developing threats to Hanoi and Haiphong reported:
probably would be forced to withdraw to a small perimeter around
Haiphong, in which case virtually all Vietnamese troops would desert.
They further believe the Haiphong beachhead could be held for only a
limited period.
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