CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001700420001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 2, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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2 October 1954
Copy
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 4-%- - -
NO CHANGE IN CLASS
C! DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: -J-~
,-70. x2~
AUTH: HR
DATE: 1s REVIEWER
State Department review
completed
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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.SUMMARY
GENERAL
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1. Comment on the new Soviet disarmament proposal (page 3)0
2.. USSR reported planning to permit emigration to Israel (page 3).
3. Comment on.Khrushchev's speech at China's fifth anniversary
celebration (page 4).
FAR EAST
4. Comment on Chinese offshore islands (page 5).
SOUTHEAST ASIA.
5. Cambodia concerned over truce implementation (page 6).
6.
7.
Bao Dai orders premier to give .cabinet. posts to opponents (page 7).
NEAR EAST' - AFRICA
9. Iranian prime minister reported threatening to resign (page 9;
WESTERN EUROPE
10. French seen vulnerable to any new Soviet proposals (page 10).
11. Bonn Foreign Ministry regards French arms plan as discrimi-
natory (page 10)
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GENERAL
1. . Comment on the new Soviet disarmament proposal:
a.studied attempt to give -a "new look" to Moscow's position on dis-
armament, while retaining maximum maneuverability for future
negotiations. It will afford an opportunity to make effective prop,-
aganda in an international forum, and will probably look new
enough to attract additional support:
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'be to influence the French. Foreign Minister Molotov gave French
ambassador Joxe an advance copy of the proposal on 29 September.
Molotov told Joxe that "account must be taken of the German prob-
lem," clearly hinting that disarmament talks would be a good ex-
cuse for further delaying German rearmament plans.
Vyshinsky told the General Assembly, as
Molotov had told Joxe, that plans for the prohibition of nuclear and
other weapons of mass destruction should be based on the British-
French proposal made on 11 June. In contrast to that proposal,
however, which provided for the establishment and functioning of
the control organ as the first step, the Soviet plan provides for
permanent control only as the final step?
Although the Soviet proposal provides for
a temporary and, later., a permanent control organ, including
"permanent inspection," the proposal carefully avoids committing
the USSR to allowing free inspection inside its borders.
The new Soviet proposal appears to be
The immediate purpose of the new Soviet
proposal. on disarmament presented by
UN delegate Vyshinsky to the General
Assembly on 30 September appears to
2. USSR reported planning to permit emigration to Israel:
A Syrian newspaper reported on.30 Septem-
ber that Israel and the USSR have agreed
to the emigration of .3,000,000 Russian
Jews to Israel.
An Israeli newspaper had published on
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8 September a report from its American correspondent stating
that Soviet and Satellite diplomats had told Israel's UN represent-
atives that. their governments might permit Jewish emigration to
Israel if it proved its "independence" of the United States by not
co-operating with American Middle East policy.
Comment: Normally such newspaper
stories would not be credible. Wise, however, may have some
plausibility in view of current Soviet efforts to improve relations
with .Israel.
The USSR has overcome Israeli bitterness
engendered by the "doctors' plot" of 1953. It has markedly stepped
up its diplomatic, economic, cultural and social contacts with
.Israel. The real test of Soviet sincerity, however, was sharply
defined by Israeli prime minister _ Sharett on 1.September when he.
publicly declared that the USSR could have Israel's friendship if
Jewish emigration were permitted.
It is most unlikely that the USSR would
permit a mass exodus of its 2,500,000 Jews; nevertheless, an
Israeli-Soviet agreement providing for the resettlement of a sig-
nificant number of Jews in Israel is at least possible. Such a
resettlement would further strain. the.Israeli economy and would
probably lead to an.Israeli request for American financial assist-
ance.. This development would also raise problems for the
United States in its relations with. the Arab states.
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3. Comment on Khrushchev's speech at China's fifth anniversary cele-
bration:
munist regime contained three major emphases: a reaffirmation
of Sino-Soviet friendship, a restatement of the current Soviet
stress on coexistence, and an endorsement of the general line
adopted by China in its transition to Socialism. Khrushchev's
.Khrushchev's speech in Peiping on 30 Sep-
tember in celebration of the fifth anniver-
sary of the founding of the Chinese Com-
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address, like the companion-speech of Chou En-lai, laid more
stress on pride in past accomplishments than on threats of future
.conquests.
Khrushchev's pledge of Soviet support of
the .current Chinese campaign.for the liberation of . Formosa was . a
statement of Soviet sympathy for "anticolonialism" aspirations
rather than a pledge of military aid. It was, however, the first
public statement by a .top-ranking Soviet leader endorsing current
Chinese demands on Formosa. Any mention of the Sino Soviet
treaty in.this context was scrupulously avoided. China's eventual
victory was portrayed as an inevitable triumph of right rather than
as a result of a military campaign..
In his treatment of the .coexistence
theme, Khrushchev cited Chou En-tai's call for consultations
among Asian powers based on his five principles of mutual re-
spect for sovereignty, nonaggression, noninterference in internal
affairs, . equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence as
a policy which might be extended to all international dealings. He
noted that such an extension would require international accept-
ance of the role of-China as_a peaceful world power.
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FAR EAST
4. Comment on Chinese.offshore islands:
Press reports indicate that the- Commu-
nists resumed day-long shelling of the
Quemoys on 1 October following a week
of relative quiet during which the Com-
munists fired less than 1.00 rounds aday. Nationalist air and sea
strikes tapered off during this period, but patrolling and recon-
naissance. continue. Communist aircraft still have not been re-
ported in the area,
Communist logistical capabilities in the
area may have been improved as a result of the reported comple-
tion of a causeway linking the northern tip of Amoy.Island with
the mainland. Supplies were previously ferried to Amoy.
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. Communist aircraft continue to conduct
aggressive patrols near the Nationalist-held Tachen islands, and
"unident' i 'rcraft" have recently been reported over the Matsu
Islands
port, however, that there is no known Communist activity w c
suggests that an invasion of either the Tachens or the Matsus is
imminent,
Despite the current lull near the offshore
islands, the Communists retain the capability of mounting major
assaults on any of the Nationalist-held islands with little warning.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
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Cambodia concerned over truce implementation:
out the country.
and they are not surrendering their arms a The government is
convinced the Viet Minh will continue its subversive tactics through-
Cambodian officials have informed the
American embassy that they are dis.-
satisfied with the manner and degree of
the. Geneva agreement implementation.
The Indian chairman of the international
states that progress has been "reasonably satisfactory." He ex-
plains the failure to disarm the Khmer dissidents by saying that
this is not stipulated in the Geneva agreements,
Comment: The cease-fire agreement,
while not specifically sta ing a The Khmer dissidents shall be
disarmed, requires that they be demobilized.
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The Khmer. Communist. forces, numbering
about 1,000, can be expected to cache their arms in preparation
for future action. Apparently the Viet Minh also expects to retain
.some of its Vietnamese personnel in Cambodia despite. the ,22 Octo-
ber deadline for the withdrawal of these forces as stipulated in the
cease-fire agreement
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6. . Bao Dai orders premier to give cabinet posts to opponents:
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Bao Dai has directed Premier Ngo Dinh
Diem to give cabinet positions to Gen-
feral Nguyen Van Xuan, Chief of Staff
Hinh, and General Le Van Vien, leader
of the.Binh Xuyen organization, the American embassy in Saigon
reports, Telegrams to Hinh and Vien confirming this order have
been published in Saigon.
Both. Diem and a senior French official
in. Saigon have privately questioned the authenticity of these tele-
grams. The American charge in Saigon believes, however, that
unless Diem avoids the appearance of flatly repudiating Bao Dai's
order there is a possibility that opposition elements will take
forcible action .over the week end.
Acting Commissioner General Daridan
is advising Diem either to comply with .Bao Dai's instructions or
play for time. In answer to an American embassy officer's com-
ment that acceptance would. make Diem a mere figurehead, Dari-
dan professed. to believe that such had been the American objec-
tive from the .outset.
Comment: Strict. adherence by Diem
to Bao Dai's orders would change . he political picture from one
of a weak government contending with powerful out-of-office
groups to one of powerful groups fighting for influence within
the government. The attraction of the government for honest
nationalists would be greatly diminished. Diem will probably
seek a compromise solution whereby his opponents will be given
prestige without real power.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
9. Iranian prime minister reported threatening to resign:
Iranian prime minister Zahedi has twice
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Zahedi is reported to
object to the Shah's cal ing weekly cabinet meetings and to the
promotion without consulting him of a cabinet minister to lieuten-
ant general.
Comment: Zahedi has frequently been
irritated by the Shah's attempts to extend his influence in the gov-
ernment and particularly by the monarch's apparent determination
to handle army affairs without consulting him, The foreign minis-
ter has also been reported as saying that the Shah sometimes adds
to the futility of cabinet meetings by advancing ideas which are
"sheer nonsense."
by the Maj lis
oil: agreement is ratified
Zahedi is not 4kelv to resign before the
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WESTERN EUROPE
10. French seen vulnerable to any new Soviet proposals:
d
1.1 Bonn Foreign Ministry regards French arms plan as discrimi-
natory:
ment, could cause considerable difficulty in France. They be
lieve a plausible Soviet initiative might result in parliamentary
pressure.to defer, pending four-power talks, final ratification
of a Western agreement on the German question.
Comment: French UN delegate Jules
Moch has already suggested the UN disarmament subcom-
mittee be instructed to report on the new Soviet disarmament
proposal before the close of the Ninth General Assembly. Ac-
cording to another French delegate, Moch hopes to prevent agree-
ment on German rearmament in the current London talks.
Mendes- France may feel that an agree-
ment at London, together with the Soviet note of 30 September,
would set up conditions favorable to four-power talks. . The
premier told Ambassador Dillon in early August that prelimi-
nary acceptance by the French assembly of German rearmament
would,put the West in a strong position, and make negotiations
with Moscow desirable.
American officials in Paris fear that any
new Soviet proposals on Germany an
European.security, in addition to Mos-
cow's note of 30 September on disarma-
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.Commenting to American officials on
30 September on the first two days of
the London conference, West German
Foreign Ministry spokesmen said it was
their impression that, despite the reassurances of Premier Mendes-.
France, the French proposals on control of arms production go
far beyond the EDC formula and discriminate seriously against
the -Germans. They believe the French objective is to concentrate
arms production in..France, -leaving German troops separated from
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their production base. Bonn officials fear that while pressure
in London may force Mend-es-France to a satisfactory agreement,
the working out of details by experts may become bogged down
and slow down the initial momentum of Western planning.
The American officials note, on the
other hand, that Christian Democratic Party circles are .encour-
aged by the reports from London, and the opposition.SocialDemo-
cratic attitude remains favorable. Nevertheless, there is still
skepticism regarding the good faith of Mendes-France.
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