CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001800110001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 7, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

7 November 1954
25X1
25
opY 1,40.
DOS REVIEW
CflMPI FTFD
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. I / -
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I. DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
=li' RDVLIW CATh. Q~
AUTH: HH 70-2
DA -E: REVIEWER: ] I
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 25X1A
Approved For Rele a 2003/10/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A001 D0110001-9
SUMMARY
25X1
2.
FAR EAST
3. Political crisis in Japan seen certain after Yoshida's return (page 4
25X1 4?
11 1
NEAR EAST AFRICA
LJ/\ I Vo
7. French Communists seen prorno ng .North African "liberation
(page 7).
LATE ITEM
8. Comment on October Revolution ceremonies in Moscow (page 8).
25X1A
7 Nov 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release ?D%&%/15: CIA-RDP79T00975AO01800110001-9
 25X1
61 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO01800110001-9
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO01800110001-9
 25X1A
Approved For Rele 2003/10/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A001 110001-9
25X1
FAR EAST
25X1A
3. Political crisis in Japan seen certain after Yoshida's return:
bassy sources see no prospect for a reunion of the split conserva-
tive forces, and believe that a no-confidence motion will be intro-
duced when the Diet reopens in December.
A political crisis is virtually certain to
occur within a month after Prime Minis-
ter Yoshida returns to Japan, according
to the American embassy in Tokyo. Em-
The embassy believes that Yoshida might
defeat the motion by a bold appeal for unity accompanied by a firm
promise to retire at the end of the Diet session in May. If he re-
fuses to compromise, a no-confidence vote and new elections ap-
pear certain.
If Yoshida decides to retire immediately,
there will be a struggle for succession centering around Ogata and
Hatoyama, with a good possibility that a compromise candidate
might become prime minister.
Comment: Yoshida's retirement could
bring temporary political stability, and avoid elections in which
leftist gains would be likely. The underlying factional rivalries
among the conservatives would remain, however, and any politi-
cal truce would probably be short-lived..
Reports on 6 November that Yoshida had
approved the expulsion from his Liberal Party of two leaders of
7 Nov 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved For Release 2WK11615 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001800110001-9
 25X1A
25X1
4.
5.
Approved For RelWe 2003/10/15: CIA-RDP79T00975AO04800110001-9
the anti-Yoshida new party movement suggest that he will fight
rather than compromise with his opposition.
7 Nov 54
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
Approved For Release 2a3?IdA5 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO01800110001-9
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO01800110001-9
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO01800110001-9
 25X1A
25X1A
Approved, For Releawe 2003/10/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A00i' 00110001-9
25X1
7. r Tench .Communists seen promoting North African "liberation":
cided on an all-out campaign to promote a "North African libera-
tion movement" as a weapon against Mendes-France's support of
German rearmament. The embassy feels the violence in Algeria
reflects more organization than might be expected from local
nationalists alone.
The American embassy in Paris believes
the French Communists, to avoid repres-
sive countermeasures which might follow
demonstrations in France, may have de-
Comment: French officials have long
charged, without evidence, that of er North African disturbances
were Communist-backed.
The fact that current French retaliatory
measures seem aimed primarily at the nationalist Algerian Move-
ment for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties suggests the French
hold this organization responsible for the recent outbreaks. This
organization, however, has been inactive in recent years, is torn
by internal strife, and has no widespread following. It has a fit-
ful history of co-operation with Communists, but there is no indi-
cation that Communists engineered or inspired the recent disturb-
ances
The current roundup of members of the
organization in France and Algeria will probably lead to strong
Communist press attacks on France's North African policy.
7 Nov 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
Approved For Release 2MI 15 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO01800110001-9
 25X1A
Approved For Relea 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0018 110001-9
LATE ITEM
8. Comment on October Revolution ceremonies in Moscow:
25X1A Soviet Deputy Premier M. Z. Saburov
delivered the major speech on the an-
niversary of the October Revol
ti
i
u
on
n
Moscow. Saburov devoted the first half of his address to a rou-
tine summary of Soviet economic progress in 1954, The last
half was a recapitulation of Soviet foreign policies which gave no
hint that any change is to be expected in Soviet tactics.
Saburov lei,eled relatively moderate
criticism at some weaknesses in the economy, particularly agri-
cultural difficulties and the continuing lag in the growth of labor
productivity. His figures on economic performance expected
during 1954 call for continuing rapid growth in heavy industry and
manufactured consumer goods. Total industrial output is expected
to increase 12 percent this year over last. Gains in industrial pro-
duction thus far this year have been attained only with a labor force
larger than that originally planned.
In agriculture, the key to the present
drive for expanding consumer goods supplies, Saburov admitted
that severe drought in the Ukraine and Volga regions had kept crops
close to last year's level, which was relatively poor. He also
revealed another upward revision in the "new lands" program.
The goal of 37,000,000 acres to be reclaimed by 1955 has been
raised to at least 49,000,000.
On foreign policy, Saburov devoted spe-
cial attention to the USSR's current policy line promising peaceful
coexistence, co-operation and negotiation, contrasting' this with the
"position of strength" taken by the United States. At the same
time, he again warned that there will be no four power conference,
and that Germany will not be unified for a long time, if the West
persists in rearming West Germany. The USSR is counting heav-
ily on this line to arouse opposition to ratification of the London
agreements in France and West Germany which could create
serious divisions within the Western alliance.
Saburov t he USSR and emphasized da the
improvement of relations between
as an
7 Nov 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
Approved For Releas 2jh~ 3 0/15 ? CIA-RDP79TOO975 n01800110001-9
 25X1A
Approved For Re4,se 2003/10/15: CIA-RDP79T00975A08.1800110001-9
example of Soviet willingness to solve "controversial interna-
tional questions on the basis of agreement between the interested
countries" The stress on this example appears intended to im-
press Yugoslavia with the sincerity of the USSR's desire to es-
tablish normal relations It may also be designed to cause sus-
picion of Tito in the Western camp.
7 Nov 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9
Approved For Release AMOA5 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO01800110001-9