CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001800390001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 14, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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14 25X1 December 1954
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUME.NrNO. _.,_
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 110
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NEXT REVIEW DATE: _ n /0
RUTH: HR 7/0.2
DATE:/Q- REVIEWER:
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O CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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.SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. East Germans reported planning post=ratification measures
against West Berlin (page 3).
. FAR EAST
2. Plans of new Japanese government outlined (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Comment on communique of Chinese Communist and Burmese
premiers (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Israeli seizure of Syrian airliner seen as retaliatory act (page 6).
5. Libya may present Fezzan dispute to UN (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
6. Adenauer incensed over French interpretation ofSaar agreement
(page 7).
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GENERAL
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1. East Germans reported planning post-ratification measures against
West Ber in:
the Political Section of the East German
Ministry of Transport conferred in early
December on propaganda activity to be
carried out within the next few weeks, as well as measures to be
taken against West Berlin after the ratification of the Paris agree-
ments in the spring of 1955.
These measures are reported to include
sharply increased border controls between West Berlin and East
Germany and between East and West Berlin, and the curtailment
of elevated train service between the two sectors. There might
also be interference with rail and road traffic between West Berlin
and West Germany, possibly affecting Allied military trains.
Eventually the East Germans may attempt to force the Western
powers out of West Berlin on the grounds that their presence in
the city is based on the Potsdam Agreement, which will become
invalid when West Germany is remilitarized.
Comment: This report is another
indication that before ratification of the agreements the Commu-
nists are planning to concentrate for the most part on propaganda.
After ratification the USSR would proba-
bly authorize East Germany to take measures to assure its internal
security, such as increased border controls, interference with
German rail and road traffic, and severance of the elevated serv-
ice between East and West Berlin. It would not be likely, however,
to risk hostilities by permitting efforts to force the Allies out of
Berlin or interference with Allied traffic.
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FAR EAST
2. Plans of new Japanese government outlined:
25X1 Al Plans of the new Japanese government,
as outlined by Shinsuke Kishi, secretary
general of the Japan Democratic Party,
emphasize continued co-operation with
the United -States. Kishi asserted to Ambassador Allison on
11 December that statements on normalizing relations with the
Communist nations were "mostly talk."
Kishi said that economic stabilization
and revision of the constitution, including the antirearmament
clause, were the government's two most important tasks. In or-
der to make the constitution "truly a Japanese document," his aim
was to stress Japanese "virtues, and give the emperor great pres-
tige and position, without political power." The government also
intends to take measures to meet the threat of internal Communist
subversion.
Kishi said that the Diet would be dissolved
in January and predicted that the Socialists would gain 20 seats in
the ensuing elections.
Comment: The expected short tenure of
the Hatoyama cabinet largely restricts any early alteration of
Japan's basic policies. Kishi's remarks suggest that the Demo-
cratic Party intends to honor its commitment to dissolve the Diet.
Thus statements of the new government's leaders probably are
designed for the coining political campaign.
A gain of 20 seats by the Socialists would
give the leftists more than one third of the lower house and enable
them to block any proposed constitutional amendment on rearma-
ment.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Comment on communique of Chinese Communist and Burmese
premiers:
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gained new opportunities to increase its influence in Burma
while avoiding commitments on political matters highly impor-
tant to Rangoon.
The joint communique issued on 12
December by Premiers Chou En-lai
and U Nu indicates that Peiping has
According to this communique, Commu-
nist China agreed to import from 150,000 to 200,000 tons of Burmese
rice annually between .1955 and 1957 in exchange for "such industrial
installations and equipment, as well as articles of daily use9 as
China could supply., The two premiers also favored inauguration
of a Sino-Burmese air service, restoration of Sino-Burmese high-
way traffic9 and the establishment of. consulates general. These
provisions appear to be Burmese concessions to induce Peiping,
a Tice exporter, to take Burmese rice. In any event, they will
facilitate Peiping's further interference in Burma's internal af-
fairs,
On sensitive political matters, the Commu-
nists continued to be evasive, following the precedent set by Chou
when he visited Rangoon last June. The communique merely reit-
erated mutual adherence to the "five principles." of nonaggression
and stipulated that such problems as the status of Overseas Chinese
in Burma and delimitation of the Sino-Burmese frontier should be
settled "through normal diplomatic channels." Moreover,,; Nu also
failed to obtain Peiping's repudiation of the insurgent Burma Commu-
nist Party.
a "small goat wandering aimlessly amidst elephants.'
(Concurred in by O/RR)
fere in China's affairs since such action would be similar to that of
The American embassy in Rangoon con-
siders Nu's visit a major Chinese Communist propaganda victory
as his grandiloquent praise of the Mao regime went "far beyond
the demands of either courtesy or coexistence." Moreover, the
Burmese leader went out of his way to assure the Chinese of his
country's continuing good will, stressing Burma's inability to inter-
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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4. Israeli seizure of Syrian airliner seen as retaliatory act:
The forcing down of a Syrian Airways plane
by Israeli jets on 12 :December, apparently
after it had been intercepted some 30
miles from the Israeli shore, may have
been "deliberately planned" by Israel in
retaliation for Syria's recent capture of
five Israeli. soldiers, in the opinion of the
American army attache in Tel Aviv. The
army attache in Damascus shares the be-
lief that the act was retaliatory.
Comment: This latest incident ends the
relative quiet which has existed on the Israeli-Syrian border since
early September and is likely to lead to protracted bickering.
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5. Libya may present Fezzan dispute to UN:
Ambassador Tappin in Tripoli warns that
unless France agrees to withdraw its
troops from the Fezzan.- -southwestern
Libyan province--the issue is certain to
go to the UN. The ambassador fears that such a development
would bring the American position in. Libya and the Arab-world
under attack and that the USSR might then widen the debate to
cover British and American bases in.Libya.
Comment-, Internal political considera-
tions in both France and Libya forced the two governments to
adopt unyielding positions on the Fezzan troop issue. At the open-
ing of the Libyan parliament on 9 December, Prime Minister Ben
Halim stated "regardless of what may happen, my government will
not permit the continuance of the stay of French forces in any por-
tion of the beloved homeland." Libya is incapable9 however, of
forcibly ejecting French troops from the Fezzan.
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WESTERN EUROPE
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Adenauer incensed over. French :interpretation of Saar agreement:
on 14 December. Adenauer told Ambassador'Conant on 13 Decem-
ber that on several points the ".explanation" is contrary to the agree-
ment reached in Paris and that he would repudiate these points in
the Bundestag on 15 December. He added that a debate between him-
self and Mendes-France on the interpretation of the Saar agreement
would "wreck the possibility of ratification in Paris and Bonn.'
Adenauer said that he intended to play down
the Saar question in the Bundestag, but that "unfortunately" Mendel-
France seemed intent on focusing attention on it. Adenauer expressed
suspicion that Mendes-France wants the Paris treaties to fail be-
cause of German intransigence on the Saar issue.
Chancellor Adenauer is incensed at the
,,explanation" of the Saar agreement which
French premier Mendes-France intends
to distribute to National Assembly deputies
Mendes-France's "explanation" states
that France will ask Britain and the United States to uphold the
Saar agreement in a German peace treaty "in accordance with ex-
press assurances which the French government received from these
two governments as early as 10 April 1947, and which have mean-
while been reaffirmed." Adenauer asked specifically for American
comment on the accuracy of this statement.
.Comment: The French "explanation" was
drafted in reply to a unilateral German preamble to the Saar agree-
ment which threatened to arouse a storm of opposition in the French
assembly.
Adenauer's ability to have the Saar agree-
ment ratified depends on his being able to maintain that it is subject
to revision in a peace treaty.
If French deputies opposed to German
rearmament learn of the differences between Adenauer and Mendes-
France, they may be able to delay approval of the Paris agreements
by insisting that ratification be conditioned on German acceptance of
the Saar accord without any preamble.
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