CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001900050001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 23, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 6, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

6 April 1955
E- ~) 7
Copy No. 94
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
NO CHANGE IN CLASS (4
Cl DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C 7-O ( O
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: ? SKID REVIEWkR:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CP-7
0 State Department review completed
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se AM-PIAA-11 - 79T0
0 /0& "'.. 4
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. New Soviet ministry possibly associated with guided missile pro-
duction (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
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2. Faure urges intervention by Sao Dai in South Vietnam (page 3).
WESTERN EUROPE
4. Adenauer offers immediate deposit of Saar and Paris treaties
(page 5).
LATE ITEM
5. Comment on Moscow's note regarding Japanese-Soviet relations
(page 6).
THE FORMOSA STRAITS
(page 7) _
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SOVIET UNION
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1. New Soviet ministry possibly associated with guided missile pro-
duction:
The new Soviet Ministry of General Ma-
chine Building, formation of which was
announced by Moscow radio on 2 April,
will probably control production of military materiel and may
possibly undertake or supervise the serial production of guided
missiles. The new minister, P. N. Goremykin., has held numer-
ous high posts'. in the Soviet armaments industries and is one
of the founders of the Academy of Artillery Sciences, an organi-
zation of prime importance in Soviet weapon research and devel-
opment.
The Ministry of Defense Industries, of
which Goremykin was a deputy minister for at least the last 18
months, was probably the organization charged with over-all con-
trol of the missile program. In the past the USSR has set up spe-
cial organizations to handle the serial production of new weapons.
Several recent developments suggest that large-scale production
of missiles may be imminent or may actually have commenced.
tic missile with a 500-nautical--mile range.
Current estimates credit the USSR with
having the capability to produce, at least in small numbers, cer-
tain types of guided missiles, including a surface-to-air missile
with a 35,000-yard slant range and a surface-to-surface ballis-
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
25X1A 2.
Faure urges intervention by Ba.o Dai in South Vietnam.
French premier Faure told Ambassador
Dillon on 4 April that intervention by
Bao Dai was essential to prolong the
truce between the sects and Vietnamese
premleruLem. tie hat if fighting broke out in Saigon on
6 April, when the present truce is scheduled to lapse, it would
end all hope of saving South Vietnam.
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Faure's personal adviser on foreign
affairs had earlier told the American embassy that Commis-
sioner General Ely in Saigon feared civil war could not be
avoided "unless Bao Dai intervened immediately, not merely
with the sects, but with Diem as well." This spokesman denied
that the French have abandoned .Diem and suggested that the
United States, France and Bao Dai might find a way to strengthen
Diem's government.
Comment: Bao Dai's "hold over the
sects" is largely a myth smear he Hoa Hao and Cao Dai are
concerned.. His intervention at this point would reduce Diem's
stature in relation to the sects, and hence have the effect of
inhibiting the development of a strong nationalist government?
The fate of the Binh Xuyen is more
strongly bound up with Bao Dai's position than is that of the
other sects. A reported directive from Bao Dai to Diem not
to use the Imperial Guard at DalLat in the present crisis may
be another indication that the emperor is determined to protect
the Binh Xuyen.
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WESTERN EUROPE
4. Adenauer offers immediate deposit of Saar and Paris treaties-.
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Chancellor Adenauer has informed
French foreign minister Pinay that
he is willing to deposit at once the Paris
treaties and the French-German accord
on the Saar. Adenauer told Ambassador Conant on 4 April that
he had made it clear to the French that the West German Social
Democrats' suit challenging the constitutionality of the Saar ac-
cord is no excuse for delay in depositing the treaties.
Pinay is reported to have agreed on the
need to expedite the depositing of the treaties. He pointed out,
however, that Premier, Faure had promised the Council of the
Republic that France would not deposit the treaties until the French-
Saar economic agreement is completed. .
Comment. A spokesman for the French
foreign minister has informed the embassy in Paris that
the economic agreement with the Saar would be completed in the
near future. Adenauer will meet Pinay in mid-April, at which
time general problems of Franco-German relations, including the
Saar, will be discussed. Agreement on deposit of the Paris trea-
ties may be reached at that meeting.
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LATE ITEM
097jW01900050001-5
25X1A' Comment on Moscow's note regarding Japanese-Soviet relations:
In its note, to the Japanese government on
4 April, Moscow apparently rejected New
York as the site of contemplated nego-
tiations on the resumption of Soviet-
Japanese relations and reverted to its earlier proposal that such
talks be held in either Tokyo. or Moscow.
The latest communication made no ref-
erence to Moscow's note on 16 February agreeing to that site of
negotiations which the Japanese government should consider the
most suitable." It also ignored Tokyo's suggestion of New York as
a site in its reply of 23 February.
The Soviet government probably feels
that it can afford to stall, counting on domestic pressure in Japan
to force Hatoyama into negotiations on Soviet terms. The shift
from the 16 February position may indicate that Soviet "reason-
ableness" was primarily an attempt to commit Hatoyama prior to
the 27 February Japanese elections.
If the negotiations were held in Tokyo,
Moscow would probably try to obtain official status for its un-
recognized mission there and thus pave the way for full diplomatic
relations without making concessions on broader issues. For this
reason, Japanese Foreign Ministry officials do not wish to hold the.
talks in Tokyo. They also fear that Hatoyama's eagerness for a
diplomatic triumph would lead him to interfere in negotiations,
and force them to accept unfavorable conditions.
In reporting the Soviet note tb Ambassa-
dor Allison,. Foreign Ministry adviser Tani said that Tokyo was
"impossible" as a site and that the Japanese government might
propose New York again. Hatoyama, however, may be too far
committed to refuse either Moscow or Tokyo.
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THE FORMOSA STRAITS
Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group
for the Formosa Straits Problem
This report is based on information received in Washington
up to 1100 hours 5 April 1955.
1. Amplifying reports have confirmed only a minor portion
of the apparent total of 39 Chinese Communist vessels in the Matsu
area reported yesterday. As 67 hours have elapsed since the ini-
tial sighting, it is increasingly likely that the six to eleven LST's
reported yesterday were improperly identified.
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A build-iup of minor naval vessel types, including two
LST's, is accepted for the Matsu area,
2. A Chinese Nationalist naval force of one destroyer, two
destroyer escorts, and one gunboat reportedly. conducted a sweep
into the waters some 30 miles northeast of the Matsu islands at
dawn on 5 April. This is the first offensive sortie by a Nationalist
destroyer since the evacuation of the Tachens. Aggressive employ-
ment of Nationalist destroyers could interfere, perhaps decisively,
with Chinese Communist naval activity in this area.
6 Apr 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
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