CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001900190001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 15, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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15 March 1955
Copy No. 88
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS
C1 DECLASSIFtED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _.-2----
AUTH: HR 70.2
DATE: ?.QREWEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Dept., JCS reviews completed.
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. Gromyko apparently modifies Soviet position in disarmament
talks (page 3).
2. Molotov's prestige possibly waning (page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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4 Egypt prepared to sponsor military regime in Syria (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
5. Icelandic strikes set for 18 March expected to tie up Reykjavik
docks (page 6).
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SOVIET UNION
25X1? Gromyko apparently modifies Soviet position in disarmament talks:
In response to a strong attack on the Soviet
position by French delegate Moch at the dis-
armament subcommittee meeting, Andrei
Gromyko modified the Soviet position by
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"casually" suggesting that the subcommittee should henceforth take
the Soviet proposal of 30 September 1954 as a basis for discussion.
Gromyko stressed that the proposal included the terms of the Anglo-
French memorandum of 11 June 1954 and claimed that proceeding
on this basis would facilitate calling a disarmament conference. .
Comment: At the beginning of the talks,
Gromyko took a position at variance with the 30 September Soviet
proposal, under which other aspects of disarmament would be put
into effect before the destruction of atomic stockpiles. The return
to the 30 September proposal probably is designed to keep the pres-
ent talks going so that Moscow will not bear the onus for breaking
off the discussions.
Gromyko's prompt response to Moch's
rejoinder suggests that Moscow continues to believe that its posi-
tion on the question of disarmament can be used to influence the
French against ratification of the Paris agreements.
Molotov's prestige possibly waning:
The American embassy in London reports
that a number of unofficial observers there
believe that Soviet foreign minister Molotov's
political position is deteriorating, and that
he will probably be removed following ratifi-
cation of the Paris and London .accords. The
Foreign Office, however, considers the
question of Molotov's status to be still "highly
speculative."
One British expert on the Soviet Union inter-
prets Bulganin's offer to receive all leaders of foreign delegations in
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Moscow as a snub to Molotov. He also notes that a speech made
by Molotov on 17 February to a publishing conference was not
published in the Soviet press, although speeches of far lesser fig-
ures were carried. Finally, this expert points out that the omis-
sion of Molotov from the high-level Soviet delegation which traveled
to China last October demonstrated that he is "not indispensable" to
the conduct of Soviet foreign policy.
The American embassy in Moscow is in-
clined to believe that Soviet press treatment of Tito's recent attack
on Molotov indicates that there was a difference of opinion in re-
gard to relations with Yugoslavia between Molotov and, presumably,
Khrushchev and Bulganin. The embassy suggests that the "slap"
at Molotov implicit in the original Soviet publication of Tito's re-
marks may have been a warning to Molotov against resisting these
leaders' views on foreign affairs.
Comment: There is no concrete evidence
that Molotov's position hasbeeen impaired, but these signs of a de-
cline in his prestige suggest that his status is not secure.
Ambassador Bohlen commented earlier that
Molotov's "sullen" and "glacial't appearance on several occasions in
November and December suggested that he may have been under fire
for miscalculation of the prospects for German rearmament,
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25X1 A4. Egypt prepared to sponsor military regime in Syria:
Prime Minister Nasr told Ambassador
Byroade on 10 March that Egypt had
exerted "great effort" to counter Iraq's
designs for union with Syria. Nasr said
he was not "sure" the Syrian army was with him and added, "we
will have a little Revolutionary Command Council there if trouble
really comes."
Nasr indicated he is principally concerned
with the isolation of Egypt and the future primacy of Iraq among the
Arabs as a result of the Turkish-Iraqi pact. He sees the pact as an
Iraqi move.to achieve union with Syria. Nasr declared that the new
Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian pact had no military significance and
was "entirely political;" aimed at preventing Iraq from "grabbing
Syria."
Comment. Nasr's statements lend sub-
stance to the recently expressed fears of Syrian president Atasi, who
believes Egypt is planning to "protect" Syria's present leftist cabinet.
Egypt, which has claimed credit for the fall of the previous Syrian
government, would probably take steps in this direction if Syrian
conservatives, in league with Iraq, attempt the political or military
overthrow of Prime Minister Asali. The Cairo government would
probably work through Syrian chief of staff Shuqayr, who furnishes
the Asali government the military support which maintains it in power.
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WESTERN EUROPE
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5. Icelandic strikes set for 18 March expected to tie up Reykjavik
ocks-:
Thirteen Icelandic unions representing
7,300 workers have served notice of
their intention to strike on 18 March.
According to American Defense Force
officials in Iceland, negotiations will
cur on schedule. The work stoppage, which is expected to last
from three to five weeks, will completely tie up the docks in
Reykjavik and have the effect of a general strike.
con ue, but no so ution appears likely, and the strikes will oc-
airlift of essential supplies has been requested.
American officials in Iceland believe
there may be some sympathetic walkouts at the American-manned
base at Keflavik two or three weeks after the initial strikes. An
Comment: Government action to avert
a strike so far has been ineffectual. The unions are under the
domination of Communist elements which are directing the con-
certed campaign for wage increases. The Communists, who
together with left-wing Social Democrats now control the Icelandic
Federation of L.bor, evidently hope to extend their control of the
labor movement and to use their influence for political purposes.
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