CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001900470001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
C`OCUMENT NO.. 1
N:) CHANGE IN CLASS
L I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS: CHANGED TO. TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 202
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: q~
REVIE;Vi:
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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State Dept. review completed
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1 February 1955
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SUMMARY
SOUTHEAST ASIA
75A 1900470001-9
1. Viet Minh may submit. formal complaint on General Collins'
mission (page 3).
2. Nehru determined to use Indian influence to maintain Cambodian
independence (page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Comment on Israel's reaction to Egypt's execution of two Zionist
spies (page 4).
1 Feb 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
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SOUTHEAST ANA
. Viet Minh may submit formal complaint on General Collins' mission:
would probably charge the French with permitting American mili=
tary advisers to enter South Vietnam to train the Vietnamese army.
It would also charge that French adherence to the Manila pact guar-
antee for free Vietnam is incompatible with the Geneva agreement.
Comment. Such a move would appear to
be primarily designed for propaganda. The Geneva agreement pro-
hibits the introduction into Vietnam of "any troop reinforcements
and additional military personnel" but does not forbid rotation of
those already assigned. Although. under the truce terms South Viet-
nam may not adhere to any military alliance, it presumably is free
to accept such protection as is extended by the Manila pact signa-
tories without violating the letter of the agreement.
In early December, the Viet Minh sent
similar complaints to Eden and Molotov, in their capacity as co-
chairmen of the Geneva conference. The British refused to ac-
cept the complaint,, saying that it should be addressed to the Inter-
national Commission.
There is a strong possibility that the Viet
Minh will shortly submit a formal com-
plaint to the International Control Com-
mission concerning General Collins' mis-
sion, according to a anadian commission member. The complaint
2. Nehru determined to use Indian influence to maintain Cambodian
25X1 A independence:
happy to see Indian and American, policy coincide with respect to
this endeavor.
Prime Minister Nehru is determined
that Indian influence shall be used to the
utmost to assist Cambodia to maintain
its independence, according to the Indian
Chairman . e truce commission. He said his government was
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Comment: The state visit of the Cambo-
dian king to India on 16 Marc. be a tangible expression of
India's concern with the future of Cambodia, which New Delhi re-
gards as within its sphere of influence. The Indians are not likely,
however, to take any action in Cambodia that will openly offend the
Chinese Communists.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Comment on Israel's reaction to Egypt's execution of two Zionist
25X1 A spies:
Egypt's execution on 31 January of two
of the condemned Zionist spies may in-
duce the moderate Sharett government
to yield to popular clamor for-retalia-
tory measures against Egypt which might also involve other Arab
states.
Ambassador Lawson reported from Tel
Aviv on 29 January that the death sentences imposed by the Egyptian
court were generating progressively more serious popular resent-
ment, with a resultant public tendency to condemn the government's
policy of moderation. Lawson also reported that Israeli moderates
fear extremist elements may take drastic action against members
of the present government or inaugurate a series of border raids.
The Sharett government appears capable
of retaining control over any popular demonstration or demand for
an all-out war with the Arabs. Recent statements by Sharett and
Foreign Ministry officials, however, suggest that the government
is likely to yield to extremist and. "activist" groups by permitting
border reprisals.
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