CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A001900490001-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 24, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 3, 1955
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A001900490001-7.pdf279.9 KB
Body: 
R se 20ft 12 "CfQ=RDP79T00 3 February 1955 25X 25X1 0 Copy oo 0 000' 0- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS ^ DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C J lov NEXTREVIEW DATE: ';k-010 25X1 ! A TH HR 7 2 : U 0. DATE: $ rft M REVIEWER: 25X1 00 Office of Current Intelligence J CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25X1 Ox s State Dept., JCS reviews completed. / TOP '00 se 2002/10/21 O : CIA- DP79T0 25X1A Approved Forwease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T0097;V01900490001-7 SUMMARY 25X1 SOVIET UNION Comment on significance of Soviet central committee plenum (page 3). 25X1 SOUTHEAST ASIA 4. Bao Dai disapproves of Vietnamese anticorruption drive (page 5). WESTERN EUROPE 5. Bonn may ask Allies to act for it on Soviet-proposed war prisoner release talks (page 6). 6. Communist-instigated labor trouble seen likely in Iceland (page 7). LATE ITEM 7. Soviet UN delegates prepare ground for Sino-Soviet diplomatic 'maneuvers (page 7). 3 Feb 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved For Relea;~xdh/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001900490001-7 25X1A Approved For, 4Dlease 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A 01900490001-7 SOVIET UNION 25X1A2. Comment on significance of Soviet central committee plenum According to preliminary information, the published decision of the 25-31.Janu- ary plenum of the central committee of 3 Feb 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved For ReIe S6'2/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001900490001-7 25X1A Approved For,; r,Jease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975401900490001-7 the Soviet Communist Party is devoted almost wholly to problems of increasing agricultural and livestock production, with a brief introduction reiterating the importance of heavy industry as the basis of the economy. It gives agricultural goals for the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-1960) which are very ambitious and proba- bly unattainable, and which indicate that agriculture, on which the "new course,, has concentrated, will continue to receive heavy emphasis It seems unlikely, however, that a plenum would have been called at this time solely to discuss agricultural and livestock production. The meeting took place shortly after the regime had apparently reached a decision to reaffirm the emphasis on heavy industrial production and at a time when decisions con- nected with projected West German rearmament and the increas- ingly sensitive Formosa situation may have been reached. The recall to Moscow of a number of Soviet ambassadors supports the possibility that foreign policy was one of the subjects discussed. The plenum was apparently timed to pre- 25X1 A cede the Supreme Soviet session, called for 3 February, at which any shifts in policy may become evident, 3 Feb 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved For Rele s 25X1 25X1A Approved For4e) ez2002/10/21- CIA R 975W1900490001-7 SOUTHEAST ASIA 25X1K' Bao Dai disapproves of Vietnamese anticorruption drive-, very grave matter and wants to be consulted before any further steps are taken, Giao, who elude aragnet an flew to France, reportedly told .Bao Dai that if Diem persisted, he would have to reveal Bao Dai's receipt of embezzled funds. Bao Dai has cabled Diem that he considers the premier's action in placing corruption charges against the former governor of Central Vietnam, Phan Van Giao, to be Meanwhile, Diem appears to have no in- tention of consulting with Bao Dai and is believed to be seeking evi- dence against four former premiers. The embassy comments that. "hornets' nests seem to have an irresistible fascination for Diem.., Comment. Corruption has been rife in all former Vietnamese governments, and Diem could probably find evidence to incriminate the former premiers, all of whom have been active in intrigues against him. 3 Feb 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved For RelUIIeli02/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001900490001-7 25X1 25X1A Approved Fo~eIeas - P79Tav9r,p01900490001-7 Action in this direction, however, would eventually almost certainly implicate Bao Dai, who as chief of state has the authority to dismiss. Diem. WESTERN EUROPE 5. Bonn may ask Allies to act for it on Soviet-proposed war prisoner 25X1 A release talks: The West German government feels com- pelled to take some action with reference to the Soviet feeler, reported on 12 Janu- ary, for talks with representatives of the ocia Democratic an ree Democratic Parties on the release of 40,000 German war prisoners, according to State Secretary Hans Globke. Bonn 'is considering sending a note to the Western allies asking them to investigate the validity of the offer and to act on be- half of the Federal Republic. Such a move, Globke believes, would enable the government to say it had done everything it could. The West German businessman used by the USSR as an intermediary in putting out its feeler allegedly has stated that Moscow would widen the scope of the proposed conversations to include German reunification. According to Globke, neither the Social Democrats nor the Free Democrats wish to become involved in conversations linking reunification with the .prisoner problem. Comment: This is the first report that the USSR may attempt to nlthe eunification question with nego- tiations on the return of German prisoners. The POW issue has great popular appeal in West Germany and any mishandling of the situation by Bonn--whether apparent or real--could have serious consequences for Adenauer and Western interests in general. At a recent party executive committee meeting the Free Democrats voted overwhelmingly against taking part in any negotiations with the USSR prior to final ratification of the Paris accords. 3 Feb 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved For Relea_ bY10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO01900490001-7 25X1A Approved ForJ1 975 01900490001-7 6. Communist-instigated labor trouble seen likely in Iceland: 25X1A Labor trouble, possibly including strikes, appears probable in Iceland by 1 March, according to American Defense Force officials in that country. The Communist- dominated dockworkers' union is termi- nating its contract as of .1 March, and a slowdown in unloading operaa%ons has already begun. The factory workers' union, which is also Communist-dominated, :is expected to follow the dock-- workers' lead, and 12 other unions in Reykjavik are serving notice of contract termination. American officials note that a strike by the dockworkers would seriously hamper the supply of the Ameri- can Defense Force in Iceland. Comment. The Communists, who with the help of left-wing Socialists i have gained control of the Icelandic Federation of Labor, are preparing to launch an aggressive cam- paign for large wage increases. They hope to enhance their repu- tation among the rank and file by achieving concrete results. Since the right-wing trade unionists seem to be leaderless and demoral- ized, some Communist success seems likely. LATE ITEM 7. Soviet UN delegates prepare ground for Sino-Soviet diplomatic 25X1 A maneuvers: At a Security Council dinner on 31 January, Soviet UN delegates expressed doubt that the Chinese Communists could accept the councils invitation. Sobolev, acting chief of the Soviet delegation, also thought the Security Council was too large a group for discussions with the Chinese Communists. He added that if they did come it would be necessary to set up secret talks with only a few participants. Sobolev said that the Chinese Communists were very slow-moving and that a good deal of time would have to go by for them to "digest" the council proceedings. 3 Feb 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved For ReIea l664/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO01900490001-7 25X1A Approved For, &Iease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T0097WA 01900490001-7 Comment: These hints of delays and of other maneuvers to come indicate-that Peiping and Moscow have no intention of seriously negotiating an early cease-fire at the UNe They will probably delay negotiations while they attempt to obtain favorable terms of reference. Their continuing objective is to raise fears that American actions are leading the non-Communist world into war. 3 Feb 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 25X1A Approved For Rel CIA-REM 5AO01900490001-7