CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A001900490001-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 24, 2002
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 3, 1955
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
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3 February 1955
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS
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CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C J
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State Dept., JCS reviews completed. /
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SUMMARY
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SOVIET UNION
Comment on significance of Soviet central committee plenum
(page 3).
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Bao Dai disapproves of Vietnamese anticorruption drive (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
5. Bonn may ask Allies to act for it on Soviet-proposed war prisoner
release talks (page 6).
6. Communist-instigated labor trouble seen likely in Iceland (page 7).
LATE ITEM
7. Soviet UN delegates prepare ground for Sino-Soviet diplomatic
'maneuvers (page 7).
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SOVIET UNION
25X1A2. Comment on significance of Soviet central committee plenum
According to preliminary information,
the published decision of the 25-31.Janu-
ary plenum of the central committee of
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the Soviet Communist Party is devoted almost wholly to problems
of increasing agricultural and livestock production, with a brief
introduction reiterating the importance of heavy industry as the
basis of the economy. It gives agricultural goals for the Sixth
Five-Year Plan (1956-1960) which are very ambitious and proba-
bly unattainable, and which indicate that agriculture, on which
the "new course,, has concentrated, will continue to receive heavy
emphasis
It seems unlikely, however, that a plenum
would have been called at this time solely to discuss agricultural
and livestock production. The meeting took place shortly after the
regime had apparently reached a decision to reaffirm the emphasis
on heavy industrial production and at a time when decisions con-
nected with projected West German rearmament and the increas-
ingly sensitive Formosa situation may have been reached. The
recall to Moscow of a number of Soviet ambassadors supports the
possibility that foreign policy was one of the subjects discussed.
The plenum was apparently timed to pre- 25X1 A
cede the Supreme Soviet session, called for 3 February, at which
any shifts in policy may become evident,
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
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Bao Dai disapproves of Vietnamese anticorruption drive-,
very grave matter and wants to be consulted before any further
steps are taken,
Giao, who elude aragnet an flew to France, reportedly
told .Bao Dai that if Diem persisted, he would have to reveal Bao
Dai's receipt of embezzled funds.
Bao Dai has cabled Diem that he considers
the premier's action in placing corruption
charges against the former governor of
Central Vietnam, Phan Van Giao, to be
Meanwhile, Diem appears to have no in-
tention of consulting with Bao Dai and is believed to be seeking evi-
dence against four former premiers.
The embassy comments that. "hornets'
nests seem to have an irresistible fascination for Diem..,
Comment. Corruption has been rife in
all former Vietnamese governments, and Diem could probably
find evidence to incriminate the former premiers, all of whom have
been active in intrigues against him.
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Action in this direction, however, would
eventually almost certainly implicate Bao Dai, who as chief of
state has the authority to dismiss. Diem.
WESTERN EUROPE
5. Bonn may ask Allies to act for it on Soviet-proposed war prisoner
25X1 A release talks:
The West German government feels com-
pelled to take some action with reference
to the Soviet feeler, reported on 12 Janu-
ary, for talks with representatives of the
ocia Democratic an ree Democratic Parties on the release of
40,000 German war prisoners, according to State Secretary Hans
Globke. Bonn 'is considering sending a note to the Western allies
asking them to investigate the validity of the offer and to act on be-
half of the Federal Republic. Such a move, Globke believes, would
enable the government to say it had done everything it could.
The West German businessman used by the
USSR as an intermediary in putting out its feeler allegedly has stated
that Moscow would widen the scope of the proposed conversations to
include German reunification. According to Globke, neither the
Social Democrats nor the Free Democrats wish to become involved
in conversations linking reunification with the .prisoner problem.
Comment: This is the first report that
the USSR may attempt to nlthe eunification question with nego-
tiations on the return of German prisoners. The POW issue has
great popular appeal in West Germany and any mishandling of the
situation by Bonn--whether apparent or real--could have serious
consequences for Adenauer and Western interests in general.
At a recent party executive committee
meeting the Free Democrats voted overwhelmingly against taking
part in any negotiations with the USSR prior to final ratification of
the Paris accords.
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6. Communist-instigated labor trouble seen likely in Iceland:
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Labor trouble, possibly including strikes,
appears probable in Iceland by 1 March,
according to American Defense Force
officials in that country. The Communist-
dominated dockworkers' union is termi-
nating its contract as of .1 March, and a slowdown in unloading
operaa%ons has already begun. The factory workers' union, which
is also Communist-dominated, :is expected to follow the dock--
workers' lead, and 12 other unions in Reykjavik are serving
notice of contract termination.
American officials note that a strike by
the dockworkers would seriously hamper the supply of the Ameri-
can Defense Force in Iceland.
Comment. The Communists, who with
the help of left-wing Socialists i have gained control of the Icelandic
Federation of Labor, are preparing to launch an aggressive cam-
paign for large wage increases. They hope to enhance their repu-
tation among the rank and file by achieving concrete results. Since
the right-wing trade unionists seem to be leaderless and demoral-
ized, some Communist success seems likely.
LATE ITEM
7. Soviet UN delegates prepare ground for Sino-Soviet diplomatic
25X1 A maneuvers:
At a Security Council dinner on 31 January,
Soviet UN delegates expressed doubt that
the Chinese Communists could accept the
councils invitation. Sobolev, acting chief
of the Soviet delegation, also thought the
Security Council was too large a group for discussions with the
Chinese Communists. He added that if they did come it would be
necessary to set up secret talks with only a few participants.
Sobolev said that the Chinese Communists
were very slow-moving and that a good deal of time would have to
go by for them to "digest" the council proceedings.
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Comment: These hints of delays and of
other maneuvers to come indicate-that Peiping and Moscow have
no intention of seriously negotiating an early cease-fire at the UNe
They will probably delay negotiations while they attempt to obtain
favorable terms of reference. Their continuing objective is to
raise fears that American actions are leading the non-Communist
world into war.
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