CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A001900610001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 25, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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25 January 1955
Copy No. 79
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. i
NO CHANGE IN CLASS .
f7 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 42.0 10
AUTH: HR 770.22
DATE: $T. .REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Dept. review completed
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SUMMARY
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FAR EAST
3. Probable Chinese Communist reaction to presidential message
(page
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Comment on advancement of Cambodian election schedule
(page 6).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. Iraqis close ranks behind Prime Minister Nuri Said (page 7).
8. New outbreak of Tunisian terrorism anticipated by French offi-
cial (page 7).
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FAR EAST
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3. Probable Chinese Communist reaction to presidential message-
Past Chinese Communist policy suggests
that Peiping is more likely than not to
move cautiously in response to President
Eisenhower's 24 January message to the Congress requesting au-
thority to assist in the redeployment of Chinese Nationalist forces
and to "take into account" localities and actions related to the de-
fense of Formosa and the Pescadores.
The Chinese Communists are capable of
a large-scale military effort to disrupt an American-assisted with-
drawal of the Nationalist garrison from islands of the Tachen de-
fense command. Peiping has thus far refrained, however, from
directly challenging American naval and naval air power, and
would probably confine itself to harassing action, if any, during
an evacuation of the Tachens.
The Communists have long been capable
of taking the Matsu and Quemoy island groups against Nationalist
opposition alone. In the light of the President's message, Peiping
will probably follow its recent Tachens policy of probing for indi-
cations of American intentions by gradually increasing the scale
of its military activity against the Matsus and Quemoys..
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With respect to the President's statement
that the United States would welcome United Nations action to end
hostilities in the China area, it has always been Peiping's position
that the "liberation" of Formosa and other Nationalist-held terri-
tory is an "internal affair" in which foreign interference will not
be tolerated, Chou En-lai emphatically reaffirmed this view on
24 January, rejecting any UN-sponsored "so-called cease-fire:
This is not necessarily Peiping's final position, however, as the
Chinese Communists may come to believe that agreement would
gain them a seat in the UN and permit them to deal with Formosa
later.
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25X1 A6? Comment on advancement of Cambodian election schedule:
The Cambodian government decided on
22 January to hold national elections
on 17 April rather than in June. This
decision reflects the king's determina-
tion to head off the budding political campaign of the ex-rebel
leader Son Ngoc Thanh.
The king's belief that the opportunistic
Thanh is the principal threat to himself and to the Cambodian
monarchy has been stimulated by the sympathy which Indian.offi-
cials have shown Thanh. Indian interest in Son Ngoc Thanh is out
of proportion to his real status in Cambodian politics, and is prob-
ably based on the belief that, as an antimonarchist, he exerts a
desirable influence.
As early as October, an Indian truce
official said he and his colleagues felt Thanh would be an ideal
national leader, under whom the country could experience the
kind of democracy which India favored. A recent letter from
Thanh to the king was reported drafted by the Indians.
The Cambodian government attaches
great importance to Indian friendship, and is thus restrained
from taking direct repressive measures against Thanh. The king
is planning to meet this dilemma prior to the national elections by
holding a popular referendum on 7 February on whether or not the
king has fulfilled his pledge to achieve peace and independence.
The probable affirmative results will have the effect of reducing
Thanh's influence and discouraging Indian support.
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NEAR EAST m AFRICA
25X1 A 7, Iraqis close ranks behind Prime Minister Nuri Said-
Ambassador Gallman in Baghdadt. He says the Iraqis are be-
coming conscious that the difference is not merely over the
projected Iraqi-Turkish treaty but that it also represents another
round in the Iraqi-Egyptian struggle for Arab leadership.
Iraqi political leaders agree on the need
for the treaty, and the press has strongly attacked Egyptianhos-
tility. Opposition in Iraq from neutralist and Communist circles
remains largely inarticulate, and the threat of a student strike
was quickly dissipated by prompt government action,
Egypt's vituperative campaign against
Iraq has produced resentment locally
and the closing of ranks behind Prime
Minister Nuri Said, according to
Comment- Egypt and. Saudi Arabia are
clearly working for the overthrow of Nuri as a means of defeat-
ing the current. Iraqi-Turkish proposals. Seldom in recent years
has an Iraqi government been so fully prepared as Nuri's for a
test of strength with its Egyptian rival.
It appears that Cairo will not be able to
marshal the Arab world against Iraq on this question. A compro-
mise formula of delay is the most likely immediate result. The
present Iraqi government appears determined nevertheless to ob-
tain a formal agreement on the proposed pact before parliament
adjourns in early summer.
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8. New outbreak of Tunisian terrorism anticipated by French official:
The French minister delegate in Tunis
has inquired about American reaction
to French military suppression of the
terrorism which he anticipates if nego-
tiations in Paris break down.
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The Tunisian negotiators have returned
to Paris with instructions not to make further concessions. The
atmosphere in Tunis is pessimistic, and there is little hope.that
France will give in to Tunisian demands on the issues of police
and defense. French authorities have, therefore, taken precau-
tions against terrorist outbreaks.
Comment: French officials in Paris have
also indicated the possibility o rbreakdown in the negotiations for
Tunisian autonomy which opened on 11 September. Premier Mendes-
France probably will attempt to delay a showdown with the Tunisians
until after the 2 .February National Assembly debate on North Africa.
Should the talks fail and terrorism resume,
incidents probably would be limited to isolated assassinations.
This approach by the minister delegate
suggests that the French are prepared to take even tougher meas-
ures than heretofore in the event that the talks break down.
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