CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A002000480001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 2, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

se 20(j2&78QF..El6PT004
2 June 1955
Copy No 0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. _ S.
NO O CHANGE IN IN GASLASS.
LI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: ._._ QLO
AUTK-I: HR 70-2
DA I E: -9"ao - REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Dept. review completed
se 2dU0&1AFx6M4
 25X1
SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Japan reaches tentative agreement with Philippines on repara-
tions (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. F ench considering early repatriation of all troops from Indochina
(page 3).
WESTERN EUROPE
3. Trieste Communists critical of Soviet approaches to Yugoslavia
(page 4).
4. Italian Communist reaction to Soviet-Yugoslav talks (page 5).
2 June 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page `'
Approv
25X1
 Approved For
1. Japan reaches tentative agreement with Philippines on repara-
tions:
Prime Minister Hatoyama has accepted
the Philippines' latest proposal, that
Japan pay $550,000,000 in reparations,
provided the chief negotiator for the
ivniiippines can urnish assurance that it has his government's
fu.ll.approval. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu told Ambassador
Allison that payments would extend over 20 years, at the annual
rate of $25,000,000 for the first ten years and $30,000,000 for the
second ten. All payments would be in goods and services, except
for $20,000,000 in Philippine pesos.
Shigemitsu commented that this settle-
ment would be most difficult for Japan but would be beneficial in
the long run.
Comment: Any increase over Japan's
original offer of $400,00051 0~would automatically increase its
obligations under its reparations agreement with Burma and re-
sult in higher demands from Indonesia. Hatoyama may have over-
ridden Finance Ministry opposition to the agreement in the hope
that a settlement would pave the way for full diplomatic relations
with the Philippines and Indonesia,, and for expanded trade and in-
vestments in Southeast Asia.
There is no assurance that the Philippine
Senate would approve a settlement on the basis of a $550,000,000
payment.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. French considering early repatriation of all troops from Indochina:
The chief of staff of France's armed forces,
General Guillaume, told Ambassador Dillon
in Paris on 31 May that he personally favors
2 June 55
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
25X1
Approved Fora Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002P00480001-6
25X1
 25X1
Approved F4
rapid repatriation of the entire French Expeditionary Corps from
Indochina for use in Europe and North Africa. To help in reaching
a decision on how rapidly repatriation can continue, and on whether
to leave some French troops, possibly 20,000, in Indochina until
the summer of 1956, Guillaume is planning a trip to the Far East
next month, returning by way of Washington in July,
The secretary general of the French Foreign
Ministry told Dillon on 31 May that one of the strong arguments with'a
the government in favor of prompt and total repatriation of the expedition-
ary corps was the desire to bring NATO forces back to strength as
promptly as possible.
Comment: Premier Faure raised the ques-
tion of complete withdrawal with Secretary Dulles in early May. At
that time the French planned to continue repatriating troops until mid-
summer, when the corps would be down to 75,000 men, and to decide
in the meantime on the withdrawal rate thereafter. France has been
making strenuous efforts to get additional helicopters for North Africa,
and the question of accelerated troop withdrawals may have been
raised now as a bargaining point.
WESTERN EUROPE
Trieste Communists critical, of Soviet approaches to Yugoslavia:
Vittorio Vidali, secretary general of the
Trieste Communist Party, has declared
he will not change his party's hostility
toward Tito and the local Titoists even
if the Italian Communists try to force him
to do sod I
Khrushchev's Belgrade speech
admitting Soviet responsibility for the break with Tito was the
greatest political debacle in the history of world communism. Com-
munist trade unions in Trieste reportedly have decided to give their
full support to Vidali's position.
2 June 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
25X1
Approved Fo4 Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002090480001-6
25X1
 25X1
Approved
:nr RPIPasP 2002/07/30 - C1A-RfP79T00975A002000480001-6
On 1 June Luigi Longo, acting chief of
the Italian Communist Party, publicly expressed "amazement" at
the position taken by Vidali's party and appealed to it to reconsider
"its hasty and superficial judgment."'
Comment: Following Tito's break with the
Cominform in 1948, Vidali's party maintained intransigent opposition
to the pro-Tito Communist Party in Trieste and to all other local
groups that sided with Tito. There has been some abatement in this
opposition, at least publicly, since last fall.
There appears to be no other situation where
the party leadership would follow the example of the Trieste party
and take the extraordinary step of publicly balking at following Soviet
leadership.
4. Italian Communist reaction to Soviet-Yugoslav talks:
Italian Communist leaders are speculating
that Moscow's current attitude toward Tito
may portend a new policy of officially cut-
ting ties between the Soviet Communist
Party and the Communist parties of other countries,
They believe such a break, which might include dissolution
of the Cominform, would serve both to lessen world ensigns'.
further and to render the Western European Union purposeless as
an anti-Communist instrument. It would also allegedly facilitate
the entrance of the Communist parties into the national life of their
respective countries.
Comment: A dissolution of the Cominform,
whose functions apparently have been largely informational, would be
in line with the approaches to Tito and current Soviet foreign policy
tactics. Any "official" termination of Soviet ties with foreign Commu-
nist parties would be only pro forma.
2 June 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved or Release 200210/130 : - 0001-6
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO02000480001-6
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO02000480001-6