CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A002000540001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 9, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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9 June 1955
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMEN`f NO. -?
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. _
Li DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _-2Ql __
AUTH: HR 70-2
6Q_ REVIEWER:
DATE: /L/
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
Office of Current Intelligence
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Comment on Soviet invitation to Adenauer (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
2. Yugoslav government believes USSR would compromise with West
(page 3)
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Comment on Vietnamese army's campaign against Hoa Hai) rebels
(page 4).
EASTERN EUROPE
5. Comment on Yugoslav attitude toward the Balkan pact (page 5).
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1. Comment on Soviet invitation to Adenauer:
West German chancellor Adenauer
will probably visit Moscow in response
to the Soviet invitation of 7 June. Some
preliminary exchanges may be necessary to arrange details.
Adenauer realizes the political necessity
of appearing to do everything possible for German unification, and
considers it equally essential for Bonn to avoid losing the confi-
dence of the Western powers. German leaders agree that diplo-
matic and trade relations with the Soviet Union should be estab-
lished, as proposed in Moscow's note. The Western Allies have
already expressed confidence in .Adenauer's ability to handle the
matter.
Moscow may hope to fan West German
interest in neutrality by presenting prior to the planned four-power
conference a new unification plan more attractive than past ones.
Adenauer would face heavy criticism from the opposition Social
Democrats if he turned down a neutrality plan which also provided
for free all-German elections.
Even if the USSR made no new unification
offer now, it would hope the West Germans would view a normaliza-
tion of relations as an indication that fruitful negotiations on the
unity subject are possible.
SOVIET UNION
2. Yugoslav government believes USSR would compromise with West:
Yugoslav leaders believe that with any
encouragement from the West, the USSR
would soon compromise in order to reach
an understanding, according to the Yugo-
Si7v un er secretary. The Yugoslav government believes
that more contact with the West will eventually lead to greater real-
ism on the part of the Soviet leaders and hence that negotiations are
more necessary than ever.
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The Yugoslav government thinks that
great changes have occurred in the USSR and that more are com-
ing, even though not overnight. It feels that the Soviet trip rep-
resented efforts to inaugurate a new policy, and that the Soviet
leaders recognize that the Stalin policy was often "stupid." Dur-
ing the Belgrade meetings, the Russians freely criticized Stalin-
ist policies, including the proposal for one-third all-around re-
duction of armaments.
Comment. Yugoslav officials, when
talking with Western representatives, have continued to back up
the oft-repeated Belgrade thesis that real changes for the better
are going on inside the USSR. There has been one report, however,
from good sources of the American -embassy in Belgrade that Tito
is in fact disillusioned about the real Soviet attitude and not nearly
so convinced as formerly of the USSR's peaceful intentions.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Comment on Vietnamese army's campaign against Hoa Hao rebels:
The Vietnamese army's campaign against
Hoa Hao leader General Soai appears to be
.thus far mainly a show of force. No major
fighting has yet developed. Soai's forces,
estimated at not more than 7,500, are said by Premier Diem to be
encircled southwest of Saigon, Some 24,000 national army troops
are deployed in the general area, American observers estimate
the combat effectiveness of the national army troops at more than
twice that of the rebels.
The premier, still hopeful that an all-out
campaign can be averted, states he has instructed his army com-
mander in the area to explore any possibility that Soai may yet be
brought to terms by peaceful means. Meanwhile, government troops
are moving cautiously against Soai's forces, and Soai himself is
said to be in hiding and out of contact with his troops. Thus far he
has received no aid from the 3,300 troops of Ba Cut, the only other
Hoa Hao commander still opposing the government.
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The campaign might end quickly as the
result of large-scale rebel defections or a decision by their com-
manders to come to terms. On the other hand, it could drag on
for weeks as a mopping-up operation, but the army's superiority
is such as to leave little doubt of the eventual outcome.
EASTERN EUROPE
5. Comment on Yugoslav attitude toward the Balkan pact,
Yugoslav foreign under secretary Prica,
in his 6 June briefing of the American,
British and French ambassadors, claimed
that the Yugoslav leaders went out of their
way to stress to the Soviet chiefs the sig-
nificance of the Balkan alliance as an in-
strument for long-term collaboration with
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Balkan states. When the Soviet delegation raised the question of
Bulgaria's admission to the alliance, the Yugoslavs rejected the
proposal as highly unrealistic.
some Yugoslav Communist Party members do not take the Balkan
pact seriously, especially in view of the current improvement in
Soviet-Yugoslav relations. The regime as a whole, however, can
hardly consider the pact insignificant. The current value of the
alliance to Yugoslavia arises from the prestige and international
support it furnishes as well as its proof of Belgrade's contention
that nations of differing social systems can co-operate in all fields.
While the Yugoslavs have been subordinating the military to the
economic and cultural aspects of the pact, they continue detailed
military planning with the Greeks.
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