CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A002100080001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP79T00975AO02100080001-8 or
TOP SK(,'W.~ [ zz~
29 June 1955
Copy No.
CURRENT :QNTELUGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. ____
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
[ I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: OC2 __.
AUTH: HR 7Q-2
DATE: J/11C/8O__REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1 State Dept. review completed
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP79T00975AO02100080001-8 -
25X1
7
25X1
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP79T00975A002100080001-8
*me
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Malik terms further discussion of Japanese territorial claims
futile (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Comment on cleavage in South Vietnam Revolutionary Committee
(page 4).
3. Army insubordination may lead to fall of Indonesian cabinet
(page 4).
EASTERN EUROPE
4. Italian views on Albanian purge (page 5).
29 June 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP79T00975A002100080001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP79T00975AO02100080001-8
GENERAL
1. Malik terms further discussion of Japanese territorial claims
uieo
In the fifth meeting of Soviet and Japa-
nese negotiators- in London, Soviet'
delegate Malik on 24 June expressed
"disappointment" that Japan was un-
willing -taTeccept the ov~ et position that the disposition of
Habomai, Shikotan, the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin had
already been settled, according to a senior official of the Japa-
nese embassy in London. Malik said the original Soviet pro-
posals of 14 June were magnanimous in comparison to the
provisions of the San Francisco treaty and that any further dis-
cussion .of Japanese delegate Matsumoto's outline of Japan's
historical and geographical claims would be futile.
The Japanese embassy official said that
before Japan would agree to normalize relations it would require
(1) a recognition of Japanese sovereignty over Habomai and
Shikotan, (2) abandonment of the Soviet thesis that the Sea of
Japan must be closed to war vessels of all but riparian powers,
and (3) repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war.
Comment: It is unlikely that the USSR
will relinquish the strategical y ski uated Habomai and Shikotan
Islands or withdraw its argument for a "closed" Japan Sea
at this point. in the negotiations. On the issue of the return of
the Japanese prisoners of wary however, Moscow has less rea-
son to be inflexible.
The Japanese believe that the forth-
coming four-power meeting will favorably affect their negotia-
tions with the USSR and probably are willing to prolong the talks.
Japanese press accounts of Moscow's terms are having a salutary
effect on Japanese public opinion, which had been misled by Prime
Minister Hatoyama to expect a quick, favorable settlement.
29 June 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP79T00975AO02100080001-8
 it Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP79T00975AO02100080001-8
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Comment on cleavage in South Vietnam Revolutionary Committee.
A cleavage has developed between the Cao
Dai sect and nonsectarian elements on
the Revolutionary Committee, which sup-
ports Premier Diem, according to the
American embassy in Saigon. Diem can
expect considerable trouble from the Cao
Dai when his efforts to consolidate his
regime pass from a primarily military
to a political phase.
The Cao Dai elements look forward to a
drastic reorganization of Diem's cabinet in which most of the in-
cumbents would be replaced by "revolutionary" elements. They
would apparently like to see the Revolutionary Committee develop
into a political party which they could use to prevent Diem's sup-
porters from moving against Cao Dai interests. The non-jCao Dai
elements in the committee, on the other hand, favor only slight
cabinet changes to brine; into the government some pro-Diem com-
mittee leaders in order to block extremist elements
3. Army insubordination may lead to fall of Indonesian cabinet:
If the Indonesian army continues to stand
firm in its opposition to the installation
of the new chief of staff, General. Utoyo,
the result may be the fall of the Ali cabi-
net, according to the American embassy
in Djakarta. The acting chief of staff and
top territorial commanders apparently are
continuing in their opposition to Utoyo.
Comment. The chairman of the defense
committee of parliament has announced that unless the government
has solved the army situation by 29 June, he will introduce a mo-
tion of no confidence. In order to be passed such a motion would
require the support of government parties,
the army's show of firmness is likely to
draw a concession from the government. It is unlikely that any
armed conflict will ensue.
29 June 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP79T00975AO02100080001-8
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP79T00975AO02100080001-8
The switch of enough votes to carry
the motion is quite possible in view of the increasing conviction
in Indonesia that the Masjumi, Indonesia's chief opposition party,
will poll more votes in the September elections than the National
Party which now heads the government.
EASTERN EUROPE
4, Italian views on Albanian purge-.
The Italian Foreign Ministry told the
American embassy on 27 June that
Albanian deputy premier Tuk Jakova
and Minister of Education and Culture
e ri Spam were dismissed because they were too anti-Tito
and opposed a rapprochement between Albania and Yugoslavia.
The Italians feel that some Albanian Communist leaders now
fear for their own lives and are greatly opposed to a Balkan
federation, which they think Moscow will allow Tito to head.
The Italian Foreign Ministry suggested
that the United States "raise the question of Albanian neutrality:'
Comment-. Both these men were instru-
mental in purging the Alba ari n Titoist--Koci Xoxe--in 1949, but
prior to that, Jakova at least, who served one year as minister
to Belgrade, was reported to have been pro-Yugoslav. While
they may have been dismissed to facilitate improvement of rela-
tions with Yugoslavia, their demotion probably is more closely
related to the long-reported rivalry between Premier Shehu and
party first secretary Iioxha.
Italy's suggestion that the question of
Albanian neutrality be raised at this time probably stems from
Italy's long-standing desire to re-establish its influence in
Albania.
29 June 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP79T00975AO02100080001-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP79T00975AO02100080001-8
Next Page (s) Next 2 = Page,(s) In Doc
u
ment Denied
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP79T00975AO02100080001-8