CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A002100300001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP79T00975AO02100300001-3
01 OF OOOF
TOP SECRET
25X1 2 August 1955
0
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r/
copy NO.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. ?
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
Li DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2610
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: _,LL~1fsda_ REVIEWER:~
Office of Current Intelligence
/ State Dept. review completed
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/TOP SECRET j//
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 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP79T00975AO02100300001-3
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. Molotov may be retired as Soviet foreign minister before October
conference (page 3).
FAR EAST
Resignation of Sun Li- j en may weaken Chinese Nationalist re-
gime (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Viet Minh changes attitude toward American consular personnel
(page 4).
EASTERN EUROPE
5. Comment on planned expansion of Yugoslav-Soviet trade (page. 5).
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SOVIET UNION
1. Molotov may be retired as Soviet foreign minister before October
co erence.
Bulganin said at Geneva that "perhaps it
will be necessary to get rid of Molotov
as foreign minister before the October
conference,"
It is improbable that there are any serious
policy disagreements between Molotov and the other Soviet leaders
and he will probably, therefore, retain his position on the party
presidium.
Gromyko, as the senior first deputy for-
eign minister, would appear the most likely candidate to succeed
Molotov. If the USSR wishes to repudiate the "hard" approach to
foreign relations, however, Gromyko might be passed over for
someone more "reasonable" and conciliatory, such as Molotov's
other first deputy, V. V. Kuznetsov.
FAR EAST
2. Resignation of Sun Li- j en may weaken Chinese Nationalist regime:
General Sun Li-jen, who was forced to re-
sign an 29 July, as personal chief of staff
to Chiang Sal-shek, told the American
charge in Taipei on 30 July he expected
to be arrested on charges of involvement in an army plot to stage a
mass protest demonstration during a presidential review on 6 June.
Sun said that "confessions" implicating him had been extracted by
torture from young officers seized when their plan was discovered.
The charge believes that the de en on o un wou not only aamage
the prestige of Nationalist China in the United States and elsewhere,
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particularly among Overseas Chinese, but would arouse "dis-
sension If not disaffection" in the Nationalist army. It would
also provide the Chinese Communists with a propaganda bonanza
in their campaign to induce defections from the Nationalists.
Comment: General Sun has the reputa-
tion of being the most co:npe en o fiver in the Chinese National-
ist army. He has been outspokenly critical of the dictatorial
qualities of the generalissimo and the Nationalist regime. His
following in.the army has probably been reduced since he was re-
lievdd, as groundforce commander last year and may be confined
to younger officers at division level and below.
Should the younger officers attempt a
coup at some future date;, they might receive support from offi-
cers in the Nationalist high command who are anxious to remove
the unpopular Peng Meng-chi as chief of staff.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Viet Minh changes attitude toward American consular personnel:
27.July to affability on 30 July. The British vice consul has also
experienced this change. The Communists are no longer denying
status to the consulate and have begun to deliver mail, including
an official Viet Minh document addressed to the. "Consul of the
United States of America.
The American consul in Hanoi reports
that the attitude of Viet Minh officials in-
volved in the registration of consulate
personnel changed from surliness on
Comment: Since assuming control of
Hanoi in February, the Vi-e Mi'n has constantly harassed the con-
sulate. Efforts to force the withdrawal of the consulate evidently
have been put aside in order to bring Viet Minh policy in line with
that of Peiping and Moscow.
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EASTERN EUROPE
5. Comment on planned expansion of Yugoslav-Soviet trade:
Yugoslavia announced on 30 July a supple-
mentary trade agreement with the USSR
which will increase trade between the two
countries in 1955 from $10,000,000 to $16,000,000 each way. This
increase will bring Yugoslavia's planned over-all trade with the
Soviet bloc to $52,250,000 each way, or to approximately 17 per-
cent of its total annual foreign trade.
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Yugoslavia may have sought this increase
in trade with the USSR because of the deterioration in its balance
of payments position. Belgrade is still being forced to use some of
its available financial resources. in the West for the import of food-
stuffs. The shortage of food has recently necessitated an increase
in domestic prices.
Tito will probably show increasing inter-
est in Soviet bloc trade as a means of obtaining a balance between
exports and Imports, thereby avoiding the credit problems con-
nected with trade with the West. Tito Is speech on 27 July revealed
considerable concern over Yugoslavia's economic situation.
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