CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A002200120001-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 22, 2004
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 15, 1955
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP79T00975A002200120001-3.pdf | 210.67 KB |
Body:
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15 September 1955
Copy NO.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
F J
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70:
DATE;
REAMER; L--1
Office of Current Intelligence
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State Dept. review completed
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONTENTS
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2. YUGOSLAV VICE PRESIDENT OUTLINES ECONOMIC
RELATIONS WITH USSR (page 4).
3. KHRUSHCHEV COMMENTS ON SOVIET GUIDED
MISSILE AND AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS (page 5)
4. VIET MINH OUTLINES PLAN FOR UNIFICATION
(page 6).
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2. YUGOSLAV VICE PRESIDENT OUTLINES ECONOMIC
RELATIONS WITH USSR
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Yugoslavia's economic boss, Vice
President Vukmanovic-Tempo, who
negotiated the recent economic agree-
ments with the USSR, told an Ameri-
can official that he went to Moscow with firm instructions
not to agree to the delivery of strategic materials, as
this would be an unfriendly act against the United States.
Vukmanovic stated that while his government was opposed
to embargoes under existing world conditions, he had made
it clear to First Deputy Premier Mikoyan that Yugoslavia
would continue to comply with the terms of the Battle Act.
He said that under the recent trade
agreement Yugoslav exports to the USSR for the next three
years would actually increase only slightly, since Soviet
credit would be used to offset a Yugoslav trade deficit.
He said further that he did not expect much of an increase
in the scheduled volume of exchange with the Satellites,
but did expect some decrease in West European trade as
Yugoslavia's trade eastward developed.
Regarding the Soviet offer of atomic
assistance, he said that the USSR would not provide a
complete reactor, but would supply Uranium 235, graph-
ite, and technical assistance. The parts for the reactor
are to be built in Yugoslavia and assembled by Yugoslav
technicians with Soviet technical assistance.
Comment Vukmanovic's reassuring statements,
which contrast with his previous asser-
tion that Yugoslavia could no longer abide by Battle Act
restrictions, are probably dictated by Yugoslavia's desire
to continue receiving US aid. (Concurred in by ORR and
OSI)
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3. KHRUSHCHEV COMMENTS ON SOVIET GUIDED
MISSILE AND AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS
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According to a statement by Chan-
cellor Adenauer to the three Western
ambassadors in Moscow, Khrushchev,
in conversation with him, indulged in
boastful claims concerning Soviet strength. The Soviet
leader emphasized in particular new long-range aircraft
and other jet planes, atomic weapons and guided missiles.
The chancellor felt that Khrushchev was exaggerating in
an attempt to impress him. Khrushchev said for example
that the USSR had planes that could go from Moscow to
Peiping in six hours,whereas subsequently Bulganin ad-
mitted to him such planes were still in the future. Fur-
ther claims were made that the USSR was ahead of the
United States in preparations for space satellites and that
the American conception of a satellite was little more than
a "guided missile for military purposes."
Comment These "boastful claims" are probably
based on fact. Statements made by
high Soviet officials concerning their nuclear and aircraft
programs in the past have been generally accurate.
The Soviet claim that the USSR is ahead
of the United States in preparations for a space satellite
is probably correct. It is considered that an uninstru-
mented satellite could be launched by the Soviet Union in
early 1957 if a crash program were instituted.
Khrushchev's claim that the USSR has
planes that could go from Moscow to Peiping in six hours
is considered to be only slightly exaggerated, since both
the BISON and BADGER could cover the 3,200 nautical
miles in six hours flying at top speed. Khrushchev prob-
ably did not take into consideration the fact that top speeds
cannot be maintained for such a length of time.
(Prepared by OSI)
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4. VIET MINH OUTLINES PI,AN FOR UNIFICATION
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A program ostensibly giving South
Vietnam a large measure of autonomy
after unification was outlined by a
Viet Minh united front congress that met in Hanoi from
5 to 10 September. The program calls for election next
year of a national assembly which would appoint a coali.
tion government. There would also be separate assem-
blies for the North and the South that would have wide
executive, administrative,,, and legislative powers.
The Viet Minh program proposes that
fusion of the military forces of the two zones take place
by phases through negotiations between the two commands.
Comment The final declaration of the 1954 Geneva
conference specified that free elections
would be held in July 1956 to bring about Vietnam's unifi-
cation, but left all details to consultations between the two
sides.
This is the first time the Viet Minh
has made any specific proposals on unification. The sug-
gestion of regional autonomy is obviously designed to win
popular support in the South, and approval abroad. It
would not, however, be attractive to the Diem overnment.
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