CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A002200480001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 27, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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27 October 1955
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. dLli .
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NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
rJ DECLASSIFIED W,.
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: .Q 2 Cd
ALJIH: HR 742..,tti(9
'DATE: NEVIEWER:
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
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CONTENTS
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1. BRITAIN WANTS TO REOPEN CYPRUS TALKS WITH
GREECE (page 3).
2. COMMUNIST CHINA REASSERTS CLAIM TO MACAO
(page 4).
3. SOUTH VIETNAM REFERENDUM SEEN AS POSSIBLY
REFLECTING VIET MINH WEAKNESS (page 5)?
4. INDONESIAN LEADER SEES SMALL PARLIAMENTARY
PLURALITY FOR MASJUMI (page 6).
5. INDONESIA FAVORS ANOTHER AFRO-ASIAN
CONFERENCE (page 7).
6. ISRAEL EXPECTED TO MAKE RETALIATORY ATTACK
ON EGYPT (page 8).
7. EL GLAOUI IN MOROCCO ANNOUNCES SUPPORT FOR
FORMER SULTAN BEN YOUSSEF (page 9).
27 Oct 55 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
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1. BRITAIN WANTS TO REOPEN CYPRUS TALKS WITH
GREECE
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British foreign secretary Macmillan
intends to notify the Greek foreign
minister on 26 October that Britain
wants to reopen discussions on the
Cyprus situation. Britain would offer self-government
now and a promise to consider self-determination later.
The British aim at elections within the next year or so,
and believe the anticipated strong Communist vote might
help sober moderate Cypriots like Archbishop Makarios.
Macmillan said he had indications. that
Greece would like to have the Cyprus situation calm down.
He mentioned the need for handling the situation carefully
so as not to arouse the Turks.
Comment A British promise to consider self-
determination would be an advance
over the position taken during the London conference but
would fall short of Archbishop Makarios, subsequent. re-
quest for a definite date for implementing the promise.
The new Greek government has been
seeking a way out of the impasse on Cyprus and probably
would welcome such a British overture as a basis for
further discussion.
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The Turks will probably react strongly
to any consultation on the Cyprus situau"i which does not
include Turkey.
27 Oct 55 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
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2. COMMUNIST CHINA REASSERTS CLAIM TO MACAO
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gainst Macao on 26 October marks
he first occasion in some three years
hat the Chinese have taken a menacing
Communist China's propaganda blast
line toward the Portuguese colony, However, it is un-
likely that Peiping will compromise its present "peace"
line by resorting to military action against Macao in the
near future
The Peiping broadcast declared that
the Chinese people have the "right to demand" the return
of Macao. While the broadcast did not include such a de-
mand, it argued that Macao is China's "very own territory,"
so that a campaign to "liberate'" Macao could be justified
as a purely domestic question.
The Portuguese attitude toward Com-
munist China has been conciliatory. Following the border
clash in 1952, the Macao authorities apologized and paid
a financial indemnity. On 21 October, the Portuguese on
Macao again sought to mollify the Chinese by canceling
the fourth centennial celebrations, to which the Peiping
regime had taken exception.
The friendly discussions between the
governor of Hong Kong and Premier Chou En-lai in Peiping
earlier this month suggest that no propaganda campaign
against Hong Kong is imminent.
27 Oct 55 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4
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3. SOUTH VIETNAM REFERENDUM SEEN AS POSSIBLY
REFLECTING VIET MINH WEAKNESS
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The heavy voter participation and the
orderly manner in which the 23 Octo-
ber referendum was carried out in
South Vietnam may indicate that the
Viet Minh potential for creating political disorder in the
south has been generally overestimated, according to the
American embassy in Saigon.
There were no significant incidents
during the voting and in most areas over 90 percent of
those registered voted. The embassy doubts the Viet
Minh would have willingly permitted such an impressive
show of the government's strength to go unchallenged.
Comment The Viet Minh strongly denounced the
referendum from the time the plans
for it were announced, asserting the Vietnamese people
would be absent from the polls and the results would be
arranged in Washington. With Diem's victory assured well
in advance, the Viet Minh may have preferred not to put
its strength to the test.
27 Oct 55 Current Intelligence Bulletin
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4. INDONESIAN LEADER SEES SMALL PARLIAMENTARY
PLURALITY FOR MASJUMI
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Chairman Natsir of the Masjumi
Party has told an American embassy
official in Djakarta that he expects
his party will have a small plurality
in the new parliament and that the main task will be to
form a government coalition with the National Party and
to exclude the Communists.
Natsir said the task would not be easy
owing to accumulated bitterness in the National Party
against the Masjumi, particularly his own wing of the
party.
Comment Although the National Party has main-
tained a slight numerical lead in the
almost complete election returns, parliamentary seats
are so allocated that the Masjumi's majority in areas other
than Java may give it slightly more seats than the Nation-
alists.
The task of forming a cabinet will be
complicated also by opposition to Natsir within his own
party. The Nahdlatul Ulama, a conservative Moslem
party which both the Nationalists and the Masjumi are
eager to include in the next cabinet, is likewise opposed
to Natsir.
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5. INDONESIA FAVORS ANOTHER AFRO-ASIAN
CONFERENCE
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The Indonesian ambassador in New
Delhi told the press on 21 October
that the time is ripe for a second
Afro-Asian conference. The Indo-
nesian foreign minister later told reporters in Djakarta
that the ambassador's statement was in accord with the
views of his government. Both made it clear, however,
that Indonesia would not take the initiative in calling such
a meeting.
Comment The final Bandung communique made
the five Colombo powers responsible
for calling any subsequent meetings. Of the Colombo
powers, only Ceylon had previously indicated an interest
in initiating steps leading to another conference. There
have been several indications that Egypt is anxious to be
host to an Afro-Asian conference in 1956.
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6. ISRAEL EXPECTED TO MAKE RETALIATORY ATTACK
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The American army attache in Tel
Aviv believes the two Egyptian at-
tacks on Israeli police posts in the
El Auja demilitarized area on 26 Octo-
ber will result in Israeli retaliation,
He expects an Israeli attack to be supported by forces
"sufficient for any eventuality."
Comment Retalia-
tion has
been a normal procedure
in Israel's tough frontier
policy. The Egyptian bor-
der activity may have re-
sulted from local unco-
ordinated decisions. I
After several
requests were made by the
UN truce chief, Egypt and
Israel withdrew reinforce-
ments in the ElAuja area
on 2 October. Cairo continues, however, to oppose the Israeli
settlement in the demilitarized area, and Tel Aviv is protest-
ing against the Egyptian troops stationed in a prohibited area
near El Auja.
27 Oct 55 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
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7. EL GLAOUI IN MOROCCO ANNOUNCES SUPPORT FOR
FORMER SULTAN BEN YOUSSEF
he announcement by El Glaoui, Ber-
er leader and pasha of Marrakech,
hat he favors the restoration of Ben
Youssef to the Moroccan throne is a startling reversal
of his stand against the former sultan. El Glaoui has
been the chief Moroccan supporter of France and is con-
sidered to have been a main instigator of Ben Youssef's
removal in August 1953.
El Glaoui's reversal of position ap-
parently completes Moroccan unity on the dynastic issue,
which should make the nationalists more unyielding toward
the French and increase their unwillingness to co-operate
in Premier Faure's program for a Moroccan government
and to demand instead the reinstatement of Ben Youssef
as sultan.
under pressure from Paris.
The Faure government, however, may
be more anxious than ever for Ben Slimane's government
to come into being as soon as possible, El Glaoui's turn-
about gives Paris less leverage to accomplish this aim
and probably strengthens the possibility of the early re-
moval as resident general of Boyer de Latour, who has
carried out Faure's Moroccan program reluctantly and only
27 Oct 55 Current Intelligence Bulletin
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