CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A002300330001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 22, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

004/0-j"jC*A~Mf?cff g0975 Jo
22 Dpeember 1955
Copy No. 10:,
3
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. '
l', DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2 -;
DATE: REVIEWER:
OFFICE OF CUIRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Dept. review completed
0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO02300330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO02300330001-9
 25X1A
Approved For Relate 2104/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975 0A00330001-9
CONTENTS
1, RANGOON CONSIDERING SOVIET OFFERS TO UNDERWRITE
BURMA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
(page 3).
25X1A
25X1
3. POSSIBILITY OF A REVOLT IN CHILE
25X1A
4. INDONESIAN PRIME MINISTER' POSITION WEAKENING
25X1A
25X1
6. POSTPONEMENT OF ME SOVIET SESSION
25X1A
25X1A
22 Dec 55
THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATIO
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
25X1A
Approved For Release 002300330001-9
 Approved For Release D004.107.108 - 00330001-9
25X1A
25X1A
1. RANGOON CONSIDERING SOVIET OFFERS TO UNDERWRITE
BURMA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
A high Burmese planning official told the
American embassy in Rangoon on 18 De-
cember that his government is seriously
considering a Soviet offer to provide all
the assistance necessary to carry out Burma's economic de-
velopment program. He stated that even U Kyaw Nyein, the
most outspokenly anti-Communist member of the Burmese
cabinet, had reached the conclusion that Burma had no alter
native but to accept this Soviet aid. The Burmese official
stated that he was preparing comprehensive project requests
to be submitted to the Russians.
Comment Any Sweeping Soviet offer which appears
to promise quick results would appeal to
the Burmese, whose economic planning has always been
grandiose. Burma is attempting by 1960 to raise its gross
national product by one third over the prewar level.
in Western offers.
The Burmese are confident that their
ability to maintain control of Burma's destiny will not be se-
riously impaired by exclusive Soviet participation in their
development. plans. So far they have exhibited little suspicion
that strings might be attached to Soviet aid offers. They have
frequently complained of the red tape and restrictions involved
25X1A
22 Dec 55 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
25X1A
25X1A
Approved For Release 300330001-9
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO02300330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO02300330001-9
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0023 0330001-9
25X1A
25X1A
3. POSSIBILITY OF A REVOLT IN CHILE
25X1A
Many rumors and newspaper stories
have appeared of an abortive plot
against the government of President
Ibanez which was to have taken place
on 19 December, according to the
American embassy in Santiago.
25X1
According to the embassy, the guard
around the presidential palace has been increased, but the
government has made no comment, and Santiago remains
calm.
Comment The fact that Ibanez has failed.to alle-
viate Chile's economic problems has
reduced public confidence in his administration to an all-
time low. The cost of living, for instance, has been in-
creasing at the rate of about 6 percent per month for the
past two years. Unrest is further increased by the refusal
of 15,000 copper workers to return to work despite orders
from the government that they do so.
22 Dec 55 Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 5
Approved For Release 2004/07/68'?I~-RDP79T00975A002300330001-9
 25X1A
25X1A
4. INDONESIAN PRIME MINISTER'S POSITION WEAKENING
25X1A
The position of Prime Minister Harahap,
who has been unable, in the face of Pres-
ident Sukarno's opposition, to get the
necessary political support for a solution
to the air force dispute, has been further weakened as a re-
sult of returns coming in from the 15 December elections
for a constituent assembly in Indonesia. With over a third
of the vote counted, the returns show the National Party,
Communist Party, and Nahdiatul Ulama polling better than
they did at a comparable point in the count of the September
parliamentary vote, and the Masjumi doing worse.
Harahap, meanwhile, is apparently search-
ing for a foreign policy victory on the emotionally charged
Netherlands New Guinea issue to counter his domestic diffi-
culties. On behalf of the prime minister and Vice President
Hatta, a Foreign Ministry official asked the American am-
bassador to see what could be done to bring to a successful
conclusion current negotiations between Indonesia and the
Netherlands on the whole range of their relations.
The Harahap government entered the nego-
tiations on 10 December without the support of at least three
parties in the government coalition. The Netherlands is un-
likely to make any concession on the New Guinea issue which
could aid Harahap in his.domestic political difficulties.
22 Dec 55 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
25X1A
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO02300330001-9
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO02300330001-9
 Approved For Relea
25X1A
25X1A
6. POSTPONEMENT OF THE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION
Postponement of the USSR Supreme
Soviet session from 23 December
to 26 ][5ecember may indicate that a
plenum of the party central committee will be convened
during the intervening period. A central committee plenum
at this time would suggest unreconciled disagreements within
the party presidium over foreign and domestic policies. Con-
troversies to be resolved at this time possibly are connected
with the Soviet budget or with the Khrushchev-Bulganin trip
to South Asia. Resolution of such controversies might be fol-
lowed by important changes in the party hierarchy.
Since Bulganin and Khrushchev returned
to Moscow late on 21 December, it is also possible that more
time is required to prepare a full report on the foreign aid
program for South Asia to which they committed the USSR.
Postponement of a meeting of the Supreme
Soviet has occurred at least twice since Stalin's death. In
March 1953, a session was delayed to enable the central com-
mittee to accept Malenkov's resignation as secretary. A meet-
ing scheduled for 28 July 1953 was postponed to 5 August, pre-
sumably to allow Malenkov time to secure acceptance for the
"new course" economic polio which he presented at that ses-
sion. F_ I
25X1A
22 Dec 55 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
25X1A
Approved For Rel
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002 00330001-9
Riv-
25X1A
THE ARAB--ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 21 December)
25X1
a Jordanian patrol in the Hebron district and alleging other
No significant military action has been
reported. Jordan, however, has lodged a complaint with the
Mixed Armistice Commission charging that Israelis fired on
Israeli "provocations."
22 Dec 55 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9
25X1A
25X1A