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December 9, 2016
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July 31, 2000
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January 19, 1956
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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS CONTINUED CONTROL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 19 January 1956 SC No. 00148/56 Copy No. 103 NO C14AW-AE IN CLASS. LI DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S 0 NExT REVIEW DATE: _ AUTH: HR 70??q~ DATE:.~..1._.i"~"''REVIEWER; ai.T- 9384 t OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espio- nage laws, U. S. Code title 18, Sections 793, 794,and 798, the transmission or the revelation of the contents of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES It is to be seen only by U. S. personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE information. The security of this document must be main- tained in accordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS. No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantage to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence. Approved For Releas 000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975)4 902300550001-5 Comments and interpretations in this publication are based on all sources, including COMINT, and repre- sent the immediate views of the Office of Current In- telligence. The classification of a comment is noted separately only when it is higher than that of the re- port commented on. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002300550001-5 Approved For Relea-ow2000/0 009754002300550001-5 25X1A CONTENTS 1. USSR SUGGESTS GREAT--POWER GUARANTEE OF IRAN'S NEUTRALITY (page 3). 25X1A 2. MOSCOW OFFERS AID IN CAMPAIGN TO INFLUENCE TURKS _ (page 4). 25X1A 3. POPULAR FRONT FORMED FOR GREEK ELECTIONS (page 5). 25X1A 4. THE DEEPENING FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS (page 6) 25X1A 5. BRITISH PLANNING TO REDUCE MILITARY FORCES IN HONG KONG (page 7) 25X1A THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION (page 8) 25X1A .19 Jan 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2 Approved For Release 2000/082SC1.GIA-RDP79T00975A002300550001-5 Approved For Relea,2000/08/ 9T009702300550001-5 25X1A 1. USSR SUGGESTS GREAT-POWER GUARANTEE OF IRAN'S NEUTRALITY 25X1A 25X1A Foreign Minister Molotov told the Iranian ambassador on 13 January that if :Iran is not satisfied with the assurances of nonaggression in the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1927, the treaty could be re- placed by a four-power guarantee of Iranian neutrality. According to the Iranian minister of foreign affairs, who reported the conversation to the American embassy in Tehran, Molotov stated that the. USSR would be happy to participate in such a guarantee if Iran would withdraw from the Baghdad pact. The Shah is concerned over the possi- bility that the USSR may propagandize the offer which, he believed, would hearten the neutralists, spread unrest among the population, and undermine the Iranian govern- ment. Iran's decision to join the pact was made largely on the basis of Iran's security, and the man in the street would say in the light of the Soviet offer, "What more do you want?" The Shah suggested immediate strong counter- action from the West, and the foreign minister stated that US adherence to the Baghdad pact and announcement of economic assistance to Iran would be "most helpful.' Comment The USSR on several occasions since August has held out the possibility of great-power guarantees of neutrality to several Middle East states, both singly and collectively. Moscow prob- ably believes that the offer of guaranteed neutrality as an alternative to membership in the Baghdad pact will ulti- mately cause Iran to question the wisdom of maintaining its close ties with the West. 19 Jan 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3 25X1A 2 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 T00975A002300550001-5 Approved For Releasq,~002?/R9 T009754,p2300550001-5 2. MOSCOW OFFERS AID IN CAMPAIGN TO INFLUENCE TURKS 25X1A On the occasion of the presentation of credentials by the Turkish ambassador in Moscow, President Voroshilov went out of his way to emphasize that since Turkey and the USSR were neighboring states, they must above all lay the foun- dations for improved relations, accord- ing to the American embassy in Moscow. Voroshilov repeated Khrushchev's remarks to the Supreme Soviet that blame for the deterioration of relations was not all -on one side. Turkish president Bayar, in a long pre- sentation of Turkish affairs to Admiral Fechteler on 16 Jan- uary, said that the USSR has approached the Turks both in Moscow and Ankara with offers of as much as they need in goods and loans to help them out of their present financial and economic straits "without any strings attached:" Bayar also told Fechteler that the USSR is at the same time distributing leaflets attacking the poli- cies of the Turkish government and calling on the people to bring about a change. Boyar said the leaflets had been smug- gled into Turkey and were being distributed in principal Turkish cities where there are large numbers of "marginal workers.' Comment These Soviet moves are part of Moscow's intensified campaign to influence the Turks. Despite Turkey's past rejection of Soviet approaches, the USSR probably will make it a prime target in the forthcoming months with the aim of weakening the keystone of Western defense planning in the area. The Turks have long regarded the USSR with deep distrust and suspicion. They probably will exploit friendly Soviet overtures in their effort to speed an American loan, but the present Turkish government will move reluctantly and cau- tiously toward any acceptance of Soviet aid. 25X1A 19 Jan 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4 Approved For Release 2000/08/2 9T00975A002300550001-5 Approved For Releasq,;000/08/29 R 9T009754 02300550001-5 25X1A 25X1A 3. POPULAR FRONT FORMED FOR GREEK ELECTIONS Comment on: The formation on 18 January of a Popular Front for the Greek elec- tions gives a Communist-front party its first strong voice in Greek politics for several years. The Front may offer a serious chal- lenge to Prime Minister Karamanlis' National Radical Union in next month's elections. The Popular Front is made up of the Communist-front EDA and several center parties includ- ing Papandreou's Liberal Party and Venizelos' Liberal Democratic Union. Under the agreement forming the coalition, EDA, which now has no representation in par- liament, would almost certainly gain 20 seats out of 300 in the new parliament if the Popular Front should win. The primary objective of the Front, however, is said to be the dissolution of the new parliament and a call for new elections under a changed electoral system. Karamanlis recently expressed serious concern over the growing polarization of Greek politics, which he recognizes as dangerous to the Greek national interest. Formation of a Popular Front government might immediately result in a move by the ultraconservative se- cret military society IDEA to overthrow the Front and es- tablish a rightist military dictatorship. 25X1A 19 Jan 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5 25X1A Approved For Release 2000/08/2 9TOO975AO02300550001-5 y 4 Approved For Releasa2000/ 0975AA02300550001-5 25X1A 25X1A 4. THE DEEPENING FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS The leaders of the Faure- Pinay forces agree a coalition government wi a Re- publican Front would result in "do-nothing policies" and would be doomed to failure, according to the American embassy in Paris. The Faure-Pinay parties, which include the Popular Re- publicans, would probably vote against Mendes-France, but they would be expected to abstain on the investiture of a Socialist-led government, 25X6 The embassy believes the influence of the Poujade movement has not reached maximum strength, and warns that its fascist tendencies may in- crease as the group's power grows. Comment The secretary general of the assem- bly foresees a two-week crisis while attempts are being made to form a new government. The Popular Republicans are on record as opposing a govern- ment which fails to repudiate Communist support, and leaders of the other elements of the outgoing coalition are maintaining their public position that a minority govern- ment is out of the question. The Socialists., however, are now publicly committed to accept Communist parliamentary support. 19 Jan 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6 25X1A Approved For Release 200 0975A002300550001-5 Approved For Release ,2000/08 097.p02300550001.-5 25X1A 5. BRITISH PLANNING TO REDUCE MILITARY FORCES IN HONG KONG 25X1A The British plan to reduce their 15,000-man military force in Hong Kong to approximately one third of a division, the number needed to maintain internal security only, 25X1X The plan 25X1 X calls for one artillery regiment to depart in February 25X1 X and one battalion probably in August, One major unit will probably leave every six months thereafter. Comment The reported plan is probably intended to alleviate troop deficiencies else- where, especially in the Strategic Reserve stationed in the United Kingdom. The British perennially contend with military manpower shortages arising from their manifold commitments, The British withdrawals are not expected to affect the attitude of the Chinese Communists toward Hong Kong. Their present aim is to divide the United Kingdom and the United States on Far Eastern policies and to maintain their "peaceful" posture,. 25X1A 19 Jan 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7 25X1A Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002300550001-5 Approved For Release,2000/08/2 . 9T009754JO2300550001-5 25X1A THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION (Information as of 1700, 18 January) An Israeli spokesman announced on 17 January that an Israeli patrol was fired on near the Gaza strip but suffered no casualties. The American army attache in Tel Aviv states that daily. skirmishes along the Egyptian border are now routine, but are carefully recorded by Israel. 25X1A India's chief UN delegate, V. K. Krishna Menon, visited Cairo on 17 and 18 January, probably hoping to play a moderating role in discussions regarding the Baghdad pact and the Arab-Israeli dispute. Both Prime Minister Nehru and Menon may feel that Menon's role in handling international problems may enable him to help lessen tension i East at this time. 25X1A 19 Jan 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8 25X1A Approved For Release 2000/08/ 79T00975A002300550001-5